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ABSTRACT
A PRISON OF REASON:
THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF AN AGE OF DOOM
May 19 88
Wade Doyle Sikorski
B.A., Montana State University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. William Connolly
This dissertation is an interpretation of the ways in
which modern science and technology conceals, imprisons,
and destroys the earth. It relies primarily on the latter
work of Martin Heidegger, and secondarily on the work of
Michel Foucault, William Connolly, Harry Braverman, Ruth
Schwartz-Cowan, and Amory and Hunter Lovins.
As the instruments of human mastery, modern science
and technology do not free, but imprison, do not make man
into a subject, but subjugate him, and in a way much more
completely than modernity is capable of acknowledging.
Science and technology are not mere means, neutral tools
for man to use as he wills, but ways of revealing things.
Before we use the power that science and technology make
available we are caught up in its architecture, imprisoned
in its logic, governed by a truth that is there before we
are. And so, modern truth (and truth is temporal, not
eternal) does not free us to meet our future, but dooms us
i V
to a destiny that was sent by Being.
Nihilism is the fundamental characteristic of modern
technology. Science and technology give us unlimited power
to secure our will, but the only thing that we can then
will is the will itself. As objects for the will,
conventions, traditions, morals, and God himself, become
values, a means for man to will, when this happens there
is nothing to will. Everything of value has been swallowed
up and destroyed by the truth modern technology has brought
forth.
The world that technical reason builds is inherently
fragile, open to catastrophic failure. Because of this
there is an expanding need to get things under control.
But the more things are controlled, subjected to the
command, the more the command can be deconstructed, turned
against itself, endangering the entire world that technical
reason has built. Many dreadful implications flow from
this logic.
V
Table of Contents
Page
ABSTRACT
IV
Chapter
I. Thinking About My Place i
II. Thinking About Technology 30
III. Technology As A Way Of Revealing Truth 40
IV. Science and Technology 50
V. Enar chy
^ 73
VI. The Flight Of The Gods 92
VII. A Prison Of Reason 113
. .VIII. The Architecture Of Americanism 151
IX. The Collapse Of The Household As Handmade Care 172
X. Harnessing The Earth To The Slavery Of Man 194
XI. The Vulnerable Machine 226
XII. The Architecture Of Insecurity 246
XIII. The Architecture Of Doom 267
XIV. The Monster 287
XV. The Turning 313
XVI. Building Dwelling Thinking 330
NOTES 3 50
BIBLIOGRAPHY 371
V
CHAPTER I
THINKING ABOUT MY PLACE
In the pasture behind my home there are still traces
of the ways people used to live here. An old farmhouse,
faded grey and falling down, stands near a small pond and a
dying tree. Beside it, barely visible through the growing
grass, are the foundations of other buildings, a granary, a
blacksmith's shed, a woodshed, and perhaps a barn. Further
away, a line of rhubarb plants still struggles against the
prairie grass, probably near what used to be a garden.
Further away there is a shelter belt of cottonwood trees,
maybe 60 feet tall.
People used to live here, now the cattle have pushed
into their old home, seeking shelter from the winter
storms. They have stomped the floor boards into the
ground, rubbed against the supporting braces, knocking down
walls and leaving strands of their hair on the nails that
stick out. The brick chimney has collapsed, leaving a hole
in the roof for the rain, the snow, and the wind to come
in. Soon, the entire building will fall to the ground.
2leaving the cattle without a shelter.
The soil around this old farm is sandy. m the 30's,
when the drought and the grasshoppers came, it blew.
Badly. Where there was once level farmland, capable of
growing good crops in good years, sand dunes grew, rolling
like a rough sea over the prairie. Now, the grass grows in
clumps, so fragile that you can reach down and pull them up
by the roots with one easy jerk. Only in my lifetime has
some of the worst blowouts grassed over enough to stop
blowing. Now this old farm is a winter pasture for our
cattle; the people who lived here have left, probably for
the city.
There are many old farms like this on my family's
farm. We remember them by the names we call places. There
is the Chapman place, the Morton place, the Pepper place,
the home place. the Blazer place, the Sawyer place, the
Harris place, the Jones place, the Hough place, the Frankie
place, and perhaps there are a few places whose names we
have forgotten. All of them were farms and homes that my
family took over, no doubt because we were more efficient
than they were. When I was a little kid, we had one of the
largest farms in Fallon County. Now, most of our neighbors
are bigger than we are.
And now, our farm is in danger of being lost too.
Perhaps all of it will some day simply become the Sikorski
place, and the names of all the places we remember will be
3forgotten, like the names of all the places the Indians
remembered
.
our
The Reagan administration, following the truth of
time, calls this progress. The inefficient and
nonproductive are swallowed up by the more efficient and
more productive, and the whole economy is made more
rational as a result. Resources, and this includes human
resources, are distributed and used in a way that maximizes
their utility. Large scale is more efficient and more
productive, and so it is more rational. Who, but women and
poets, can be so sentimental to doubt this truth?
Disciplined by the harsh realities of the free market,
American farmers are very productive, and becoming more so
every year. According to the 1984 Fact Book of US
Agriculture, put out by the USDA[1] , one farm worker now
supplies enough food and fiber for 76 people, where 10
years ago he was only producing enough for 50. One hour,
we are told breathlessly, of farm labor today produces 16
times as much food as it did in 1920. Where once, and not
so long ago, the vast majority of Americans were engaged in
farming, now only 2.5% are. The rapid expansion of farm
productivity freed people for more useful things--work ing
in the factories that made tractors for the farmer, the
transportation system that hauled his product to market and
distributed it, the financial system that loaned him the
money to buy the new technology, and the chemical industry
4the supplied him with the means of controlling pests.
Fertilizer use grew 15 times from its 1930 level to
now, tractor horsepower 11 times, tractor numbers 5 times,
and chemical use from nothing to its present levels of
saturation. As a result of all of this progress, according
to the USDA's fact book, farming now uses more petroleum
products than any other single industry in America--and
that does not include the energy necessary for the
distribution, preservation, and consumption of farm
products
.
In order to get from the farm to the consumer's table,
hundreds of billions of dollars are spent each year
assembling the food, inspecting it, grading it, storing it,
processing it, packaging it, wholesaling it, and retailing
it. It travels accross 177,400 miles of railroads, 3.2
million miles of intercity highways, and 26,000 miles of
improved waterways. Aside from the farmer, the American
food system directly employs 20 million people to
transport, process, and sell the farmer's products,
approximately one out of every five jobs in private
enterprise. This, however, is still only reflective of a
part of America's food system. It does not include the
people whose work indirectly supports it. It does not
include, to mention but a few, the people employed
supplying the entire food system with energy—oil,
electricity, coal, nuclear power--nor does it include the
5people employed building and servicing the transportation
system— the railroads, trucks, waterways, ships, tires,
highways—nor does it include the people employed building
and maintaining the refrigeration systems necessary for
stores, shipping, and home use, nor does it include
insurance and financial costs for all of these subsystems,
and it certainly does not include all of the external costs
of all these operations, the pollution of the land, air,
water, the extinction of various species, the destruction
of buildings and monuments, poor health steming from
pollution, chemical additives to food, and so on.
That modern farming is more productive, a great
triumph for humankind, is a truth that only analytic reason
can know. Positing farming as only the simple production
of food, measuring productivity as only the relationship
between input and output, and knowing progress as the
continual expansion of human control over this
relationship, analytic reason forgets that farming is
considerably more than simply growing food for as many
people as efficiently as possible. Traditionally, the farm
household not only grew food, but processed it, stored it,
and transported it to where it was used. Containing within
itself everything that the modern economy spreads over
entire continents, the traditional farm household was
almost entirely self-sufficient. Forgetting this fact
makes it posssible for analytic reason to entertain the
6delusion that the modern farm is so terribly productive.
some idea of the true extent and interdependence of
America's food system is contained in the fact that a
typical household, now in no way a farm household, spends
close to a third of its income directly on food. if we can
generalize from this cost, then, we could say that America
spends a third of its working effort supporting the food
system. This, however, is still an inadequate measure of
its interdependence. Not only is it dependent on a global
food system, the modern household must be linked up to a
variety of systems in order to participate in the general
food economy, among them the water system, the sewage
system, the transportation system, and the electrical power
system. It is necessary to own a car in order to get food
from the distant shopping mall, it is necessary to be
hooked up to the electic grid in order to preserve the food
brought home with refrigeration, and it is necessary to be
hooked up to the municipal water and sewage systems in
order to get rid of the resulting waste.
Since the modern household must be hooked up to these
systems, the costs of participating in the modern food
system go far beyond what the modern household directly
spends on food. If we include (and only analytic reason
could neglect to do so) the unpaid work of the housewife
along with all the direct and indirect costs of
participating in the modern food system as a measure of its
7extent, we can only conclude that the modern household
devotes a very considerable effort to feeding itself, way
over half of its time.
Perhaps it is time we asked the heretical, and wonder
if the modern food system, as a whole, is really that
efficient and productive, if the reason which has built the
modern food system is that thoughtful? Modern farmers do
indeed produce tremendous amounts of food for very little
labor, but they require many other inputs to do it and they
are only a small part of the modern food system. The gain
they make in labor is lost by the processing,
transportation, energy, marketing, and waste disposal
systems that support them. What would happen if instead of
using this vast food system, if instead of all of this
huffing, puffing, and pollution, we grew our food in a
garden near our house, carried (horrible loathsome word) it
by hand to a root cellar for storage, then carried (again
horrible, loathsome word) it to our kitchen when we needed
it, and recycled the wastes to our garden? We couldn't
possibly spend more of our time feeding ourselves than we
do now, and we wouldn't have to deal with all the results
of the modern food system, the pollution, the health risks,
the security risks, and the degrading work of the factory.
Gathering near at hand, what modern technology has made
distant, this way of living, this technology of life, would
overthrow the rationality of our economy, replacing it with
8the governing hand of our own thinking. instead of being
imprisoned by the distant logic of the market place, the
industrial economy, and government regulation, we could
respond to the earth, the changing seasons, and the needs
of those near to us.
The dissolution of the family farm, a largely
accomplished fact, is but the final dissolution of our
potential for thinking, for any possibility of responding
to things near at hand. Now, the necessity and truth of
technical efficiency draws us up into vast systems of
rationality and control, imprisoning us within the logic
and rationality of an economy that dispossesses us of our
land and our homes; cutting us off from being governed by
our care and concern as mortal human beings. Modern
technology makes us into rational, unthinking, monsters
indifferent to each other, the earth, and the sky above.
It destroys our homes, forgets our memories, and makes the
whole world desolate with its indifference.
Man's ultimate instrument of domination, reason has
built our age; it built our food system, as it did all the
other systems that we are caught up in. It is man's reason
that established the rules of progress that have
dispossessed so many of their homes, imprisoned them in
factories, and sacrificed their cares to efficiency. And
so, it is not human kind's flaws, failings, and weaknesses
that must be held responsible for the desecration of the
9earth and the destruction of the home, but this age's
highest aspirations, most secure truths, and most rational
values. It is the truth that reason alone knows that is
dooming us to a craven homelessness
, a desolate earth, and
a depraved death.
As a purely human instrument, structured by the logic
of human utility, reason is universal throughout its whole
extent, leveling out every local or temporal difference and
possible moment of incomensur ability and asserting unbroken
control over it, fixing it within a timeless and placeless
formal organization of truth. Posited by man for his
utility, it projects a crystalline pure conceptual grid
over all things, locking them tightly in their place, and
representing them as man's utility. Because it is a human
instrument of control, mathematics, and especially
geometry, are the purest expresion of our reason. In
geometry formal and exactingly precise definitions or
representations are first posited--a point, a line, the
meaning of parallel lines--and then these simple and
entirely unambiguous definitions and representations are
used to fabricate proofs, building up a complex grid of
truth through which the world can be known. Through these
representations, reason seizes hold of the world and makes
it into man's utility.
Unlike reason, which derives its logic from a
universal human utility, thinking is a handcraft, the
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Thinker argues[2], a handcraft because the truth it knows
is a temporal and a local response to the things that are
near at hand. Thinking is not a human instrument, governed
by the utility of man's dominion over things; it does not
first posit a man made grid of control over things, nor
does it recognize the utility of universality in its truth.
Thinking does not make discoveries which leads to an
extension of our control over things, but rather thinking
gently discloses essences, opening itself to the sheer
appearance of the thing from out of the mystery. Thinking
is a gentle response, an openness that reveals, not an
aggressive universal and eternal positing. it is a
handcraft because it responds to the particular thing at
hand as a temporal and local event, letting it guide it on
its way toward an unconcealmen t of Being. As thinking goes
its way, step by step drawing nearer to the temporality of
the thing rising up out of nothingness, it reveals its
mystery. Thinking does not build large systems, freezing
words in a formal and eternal structure which tolerates no
imprecision, ambiguity, or play. Governed by the cares of
its time, responding to that which is close to it, thinking
forever starts anew as the thing at hand changes, using
words anew as the path to their dwelling place changes. As
in all handcrafts, there are no eternal rules that guide
the craft of thinking to its own revealing of truth, but
rather there are the ways that the great masters of the
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craft—each according to their own time and place—have
cleared, ways which apprentices must be patient to follow
until they learn enough of the craft to clear their own
ways, to listen and respond to the occurance of the thing
before them, and come to its own truth. Then, drawing near
to their own life, their own place and time, the craft
knowledge they have gained will call on them to depart from
the ways of the master craftsman of the past because the
thing at hand, rising up before them in all its mystery,
calls them to its own time. Because thinking comes from
dwelling, and dwelling places, being local, temporal, and
near at hand, are never the same, the craft of thinking is
never practiced the same way when it is done as it should
be done, not even in our time when the same presses upon us
with such monotonous regularity.
The great danger of our age is the flight of man from
thinking, from responding to the temporal and local
occurance of the thing, and his great doom, his failure to
recognize it. Indeed, everywhere it is asserted just the
opposite. Never before has man been as ambitious or had so
many plans, launched so many scientific inquiries into the
design of nature, or attained such great triumphs over it.
And it is true that the calculation and the rationality
that made our nuclear power plants, our computers, our
space shuttles and our communications satellites is great,
unprecedented, and of awesome power. And it is true that
12
our sciences, especially our life sciences, now that they
are unraveling the possibilities of recombinant techniques,
promise even greater triumphs. But all of this is but a
calculative reasoning, a rational planning or investigating
that does not meditate deeply on the meaning of everything
that is or draw it near to the dwelling place. Calculative
reason computes, and it computes even if it doesn't use
numbers, a calculator, or a main frame computer. Never
stopping, never collecting itself, calculative reason jumps
from one solution to the next, forever seeking more
efficient or economical equations. It is the exclusive
mark of our age, the source of its progress and its mastery
over everything.
But if calculative reason is justified and needed in
its own way, if it is useful and indeed, inescapable, it
has not found its place or its time. Not permitting
meditative thinking to guide it on its way, it recklessly
and carelessly spreads its force over all the earth,
callously reducing anything that had escaped it to the
black on white monotony of its equations. For it,
meditative thinking is but colorful speculation,
unrealistic day-dreaming, floating off in a realm only
useful for poets and perhaps the entertainment industry.
For it, meditative thinking may be pretty, it may describe
a wonderful world, but it is useless in this vale of tears.
It is worthless for the current business of production and
13
out of touch with practical affairs. And furthermore, it
elevates itself so far beyond common understanding to be
available to none but a tiny elite that does nothing but
meditate all day long.
But this dismissal by calculative reason of meditative
thinking is not fair to it. It does not realize that
meditative thinking is a handcraft, that it responds only
to what is near to its time and place, and that it is as
available, or unavailable, to common understanding as it is
to trained understanding. While it is true that it
requires great effort, much practice, delicate care, and
occassionally great courage to open itself up to the thing
at hand, meditative thinking is as necessary for common
people as it is for the elite. Unlike calculative reason
which requires technical education, meditative thinking is
done--and must be done--by anyone in their own manner and
in their own limits. This is because, as a dweller on the
earth, responding to that which brings forth his life and
time, man is a thinking, a meditating, being, even if in
our time he so often neglects to do it. Thinking is the
way we dwell, the way we let the world world. To think, it
is always enough to dwell on what lies near and to meditate
on what lies nearest, enough to think about whatever
concerns us in our neighborhood, in our time.
But thinking is discouraged in this age, repressed,
14
denied, and even persecuted. Reason has built our world
and it has done it in a totally thoughtless way, a way
totally heedless of the things near at hand. it has built
our economies, our weapons, our houses, it governs the way
we grow our food, raise our children, create our
art--everything. And now everything is trapped in the
prison that reason has built. Projecting itself over
everything, drawing everything into the domain of its
universal and eternal truth, reason has fabricated its own
necessity. It must extend itself continually, mastering
everything that escapes its eternity— irrationality
,
unplanned behavior, local dissent of any kind. As a result
of its rationality, the modern bureaucracy, the modern
state, and the modern economy cannot function if people
meditate on what they are doing, responding to the
occurance of things near at hand. As parts of an
industrial machine with a global reach, people must do
their narrow function within the system, orders must be
followed unquestioned, and the rationality of the farflung
system must prevail over any local difference. The modern
age has, thus, given rise to a new experience of evil, an
evil that is so terrifying because it is so common, so
ordinary, and so possible. Adolf Eichmann, like all of us
conscientious workers, was just doing his job, fulfilling
his function within the system--only his was herding Jews
into ovens. An efficient technocrat, he might have been
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disposing of day old newspapers, babys' diapers, or toxic
wastes, but he was disposing of Jews. it made no
difference to him; there was no personal hatred in his
intentions. Why, he even had Jewish friends!
If Eichmann were truly an exception, if the
monstrousness of his genocidal actions could not now be
repeated, his life could not be a warning to us. But
Eichmann was not an exception, and the possibility, and
even the necessity of global death, has if anything
increased. All over this country, and all over this world,
there are missile silos armed with weapons so deadly that
they can do in a moment what it took Eichmann years to do.
They are manned by men carefully selected, as the logic of
deterrence theory dictates, to obey their orders and push a
button that will kill millions of people the moment they
recieve a code word. No doubt these men are better than
most of us. They are more intelligent, better disciplined,
have no vices, love their children, and never cheat on
their taxes. But they may soon be the instrument of global
destruction.
Perhaps it is too easy for us to condemn Eichmann and
the men manning our missile silos, perhaps we should look
closer at ourselves before we condemn men who are just
doing their jobs--we who are just doing are civic duty when
we pay our taxes, directly contributing to a state that
uses the money to build a nuclear arsenal, a small fraction
16
of which, exploded anywhere on the planet, is enough to
cause a planet wide nuclear winter that would kill billions
of people. Billions of people, many of whom might never
even have heard of communism or capitalism, much less
understand their necessities.
In this age that reason has built it is not easy or
safe to think about what we are doing, to respond to the
cares near to our lives. it is much easier to be
reasonable and go with the distant flow, to work inside of
the system, to do your duty. The penalties for the courage
to think our thoughts to their end are so great— ignominy
,
loss of career, hom.e, and family, perhaps even jail and
death. Even the Thinker himself was a Nazi for awhile--a
brief while, though. We should do as well, and probably
won ' t
.
For too many of us there is the flight into the
thoughtlessness of Fundamentalist religion, the American
counterpart to the Nazi movement. Reducing everything to
basic fundamentals, a simple distribution of the world into
black and white, right and wrong, it eliminates the
greatest of all demons, uncertainty, and leaves people
secure in their hatred, their arrogance, and their
evangelical totalitarianism. In a time when people have
been cut off from their roots, their homeland, the earth
that sustains them, and they wander about the world in
trailerhouses, they become prey to the most horrible of
17
fears. Isolated by their utility, dependent on the world
that reason has built, afraid of the horrors that would be
released by any fundamental questioning, they seek security
in absolute and eternal certainty.
Our fear, as we live amid the institutions that reason
has built, is a fear of reason's other, uncontrollable
chaos, ambiguious uncertainty, monstrous unreason, and it
is a doom that calls us to ever expanding conquests in the
cause of reason. For the security of all that we have
built and then become dependent on, we must make everything
rational, available for human control. And no one is more
in need of reason, or more fearsome, than our guardians of
nuclear death. Despite the terrible power reason has made
availabe by breaking the bounds of the earth and plundering
the power of the sun, our nuclear guardians, and we through
them, are governed by an overwhelming fear. Today we live
amid a world that can doom in a moment all the earth with
but a small portion of its power. Such a terrible monster
it is that must be contained with such power! Such a fear
it must be that it calls forth such power!
When they think the unthinkable, the actual strategy
and execution of of a nuclear war, our guardians of nuclear
death should not be reprimanded for the insane courage of
thinking thoughts too horrible to bear, but for the
cowardice of not thinking at all. Deterrence theory is a
18
masterpeice of rationality, calculation, and logic, but it
is a total failure of thought and courage. it posits an
artificial world of "exchange rates,"
"intense
interactions," "of counter forces," "counter values," and
requires the fear that its fabrications conceal govern the
real world. It builds weapons systems that are designed to
control a fearsome enemy that is but a mirror image of its
reason and nothing else, an enemy mad enough to risk
annihilation despite its assured destruction, and it
ignores the human reality of its real enemies. The
monstrous enemy that deterrence theory creates within its
concepts, its other it seeks to subject to rational
control, is but the mirror image of its own truth, an
irrationality and a mons trousness that comes from the core
of its own being. The enemy our guardians of nuclear death
seek to protect us from lives only in the Pentagon. But
this dwelling place of the enemy does not make it unreal.
On the contrary, the enemy that must be subdued is all too
real. The truth of his presence is attested to by the tens
of thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery systems we
have built and, more ominously, by the war bureaucracy
whose decision procedures would use them on a moment's
notice.
Our generals assure us, in our moments when our
resolve to face the nuclear age weaken and crumbles, that
they have made war impossible because they have made it too
19
horrible. The enemy is contained, subdued, and made
rational by the terror they inspire. But this promise of
safety ignores the fact that large numbers of nuclear
weapons exist, and moreover, that the decision procedures
and control centers for using them exist. And not only do
these things exist, called forth by the necessities of
nuclear reason, but two duplicate copies of them exist,
ours and our enemy's, each of them facing the other while
seeing only a mirror image of their own rationality and
fear. Together, these two war systems make nuclear war a
rational outcome because of the need to deter the feared
irrationality of the other. Each side interprets its
reaction to the other as a defensive move designed to deter
its fear, and the other side inevitably, and quite
rationally, given the limits of the knowledge available to
it, interprets this defensive move as an aggressive move,
needing its own deterrence. The two war systems that fear
of irrationality has built feed on each other, giving each
other back the stimulus that confirms its fears and
provokes it into another action. Although both sides have
thus far been able to control their irrationality, such
continued good luck is not guaranteed.
According to Paul Bracken[3], nuclear war technology
over the last years has developed into increasingly
unstable patterns, and the trend seems likely to continue.
The reason of our nuclear guardians is losing control of
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their fear. Through the development of surveillance
satellites and sophisticated communications and
intelligence systems, modern technology has made it
increasingly possible for the nuclear powers to moniter the
slightest change in the other's status. Satellites can
instantaneously expose any change in the enemy's deployment
of missile forces, air forces, naval forces, ground forces,
the output of factories, and the evacuation of city
populations. Electronic monitering of the enemy's
communications and intelligence systems, even
observation of increased traffic, can show what kind of
alert he is going to.
Because the speed of nuclear missiles has made rapid
reaction necessary, and because surveillance technology
makes it possible, warning systems and strategic forces
have been ever more tightly linked together, so tight,
according to Bracken, that they have become a single
automated machine of self-destruction. Human control over
the machine by either side is increasingly unlikely. And
because they are both so vast, so exceedingly complicated,
so intricately interlinked, and the time for reaction so
short, the war machines of both sides have been
increasingly automated. Even where people are involved in
the decision loop, they react in preplanned ways, much like
automated machines. And so, for the sake of controlling
their fear, the enemies have locked themselves in a ghastly
21
embrace, a prison of nuclear reason, that surrounds the
globe.
During peace time, according to Bracken, the two
nuclear powers seek to isolate threatening actions, to keep
accidents from provoking them into escalation and war.
Elaborate safety mechanisms, both institutional and
physical, are put in place. Designed to be fail safe in
peace time, they keep such things as a high flying flock of
Canadian geese or the rising moon, or a failed computer
chip, which appears to the warning system as a missile
attack, from being acted upon as an actual attack.
But once a certain level of alert is attained,
according to Bracken, the war system switches from a fail
safe mode to a fail deadly mode. The safety mechanisms are
one by one removed, the linkages are tightened, and the
context for interpreting information is changed. At
peacetime alert levels, warning systems are mostly used to
moniter the enemy's industrial and technical
activites—what factories are doing, what their war
machines are capable of, and so on. But when alert levels
start escalating, the warning system starts directly
monitering the enemy's war machine. Control over the
intelligence systems and its destinations shift from
civilian bureaucracies, such as the CIA and the NSA,
directly to the military. Nuclear command and control
centers are suddenly flooded with the most minute details
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of the enemy's movements. But also, because of changes in
the intensity of traffic, the nature of the codes, and the
destinations they go to, the enemy can instantly moniter
any escalation in alert status, and respond appropriately.
Alert levels provide a context for interpreting
information. At a high alert level, what was interpreted
as a malfunction, miscalculation, or accident at a low
alert leval, is now interpreted as enemy aggression and is
immediately linked to reactions in the deployment of
strategic forces. Although each response by itself is
merely a precaution, a planned response triggered by a
specified stimulus, it may be interpreted by the other side
as a threat needing its own planned response. As each side
responds in a rational way to the stimulus of the other
side, they ratchet each other up to a ligher level of
alert
.
At high levels of alert the strategic forces of both
sides start jocking for position. Since both sides rely on
satellites to locate enemy forces, some commanders, in the
hope of at least keeping their command intact long enough
to strike back, will be tempted to interfere with the
enemy's satellites that are monitering him. But as soon as
he does this, perhaps even with something as innocuous as
electronic jamming, he will likely force the opposing
commader to conclude that he is doing it to cover an
attack. As in all wars, but even more so in the nuclear
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age, it is better to do than to be done unto, and the
temptation to preempt when war seems inevitable will
probably prove to be irresistable for at least a few highly
exposed commanders. Once someone breaks the ice, a context
of hostility is clearly established, and everyone else will
have no choice but to minimize their risks and attack.
According to Bracken, the difference between high alerts
and actual war is close to nonexistent.
The Star Wars program that Ronald Reagan is pushing
will greatly increase the instablity of the world war
machine, linking it together so tight that in many cases
people will have to be withdrawn from the decision loop and
replaced entirely by ultra fast computers. On the surface
a purely defensive system, destroying only incoming nuclear
missiles, the Star Wars program in fact can only be used in
the context of offensive action. Against a first strike,
as all the technicians working on it agree, it is likely to
leak enough warheads to still destroy us completely.
Against a second strike, however, which would be
significantly reduced in size, would be uncoordinated, and
occur over a much longer length of time, it would likely be
much more effective. Because it can only be effectively
used as a tool of aggression, the other side, knowing this
because they are as reasonable as we are, will have to link
its warning and strategic forces together much tighter than
they are now, putting everything on a higher level of
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alert, entirely removing some institutional and physical
safety mechanisms.
According to the Reagan Administration, however, the
Star wars defense would reduce the likelihood of war
because it would reduce the calculabili ty of it. it would
mean that a fist strike attack could not be assured that it
would be able to successfully strike at the targets-the
delivery systems and the command and control centers— that
it must in order to assure that an effective second strike
would be impossible. m order to assure that any one
target was destroyed, an uneconomic ratio, exceeding
anything the enemy could rationally deploy, of warheads
would have to be delivered against it.
This, however, could only be true on average. The two
missile defense systems, like any other system, and
probably more so, will have times when they are more
capable than others of stopping incoming missiles, and no
doubt there will be times, due to malfunction, redesign,
sabotage, development of new technologies of deception, and
security leaks, that they will be comparatively
ineffective. This may well occur, and eventually will
certainly occur, when the other missile defense system is
operating at relatively high levels of effectiveness.
Under these circumstances, the effects of a nuclear
exchange are much more calculable--missiles can be expected
to reach their targets reliably, and the side that has the
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temporary advantage would be strongly tempted to strike
first, knowing that the advantage could soon be reversed.
When the Star Wars defense system is deployed, nuclear
war will occur not as a result of ideology, national
hatred, or glory hungry leaders, but because of a entirely
rational response to the situation, solely because of the
logic of the weapons our fear has deployed. Everything but
the facts of the strategic or technical situation will be
irrelevant. The management of nuclear war, thus, has
become a purely technical activity, governed by a purely
technical orientation to reality. its logic or rationality
pulls us into a cold wasteland, far removed from any human
habitation.
Because of the prison of rationality that this age has
built and then locked itself into, nuclear war, despite
universal acknowledgement that it is insane, irrational,
and pure madness, can still occur, and eventually must
occur. And it will occur not necessarily because some
insanely evil monster somewhere wanted it and provoked it,
but because we simply followed the monster in our reason to
its conclusion. Everyone operating our nuclear war system
can love their children, fear war, despising nuclear war
above all else, and yet, because they are imprisoned within
the limits of its rationality, they will be drawn into it
by their fear. When the bombs start going off, it may be
no one's choice; it will not be some monster that ends the
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world, some horrible and evil antichrist, but the
monstrousness of our own reasoning, a banal, everyday
monstrousness, so common and ordinary that no one
recognizes the horrible fear dooming us to its future.
Now, when man holds dominion over all the earth
through the power of his reason, when but a small exertion
of his effort can destroy all life on the planet, leaving
it to die a cold and dark death, now the terrible fear
lurking in our most powerful, most profound,
accomplishments pursues us the most relentlessly. This is
our tragedy and our doom. We shall not escape or overcome
our technology of death by becoming more self-conscious of
it, by exerting our mastery over our fear once again. For
the fear we aspire to control through human mastery is
itself the concealed truth, the indestructible double, of
our reason.
People bemoan the fate of farmers losing their land,
but, imprisoned by the world reason has built, they can do
nothing to stop it. The homeless crowd our cities, living
the most horrible lives, but they are not seen, even when
they are stepped over. The family has been shattred, and
its children thrown into terrible poverty, but no one is
willing to provide them with the means to escape a life of
despair and rage. The water we drink is contaminated with
dangerous chemicals; the air we breathe is befouled with
smog and rains an acid that is destroying our trees and
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ponds; the land around us is littered with ugly and
dangerous wastes; the products we consume are a threat to
our health, and yet we must not hamper the productivity and
rationality of business with regulation. That would be
irrational, counterproductive, and above all else,
dangerous. is not our life, every moment of it, in
everything we do, and everything we will, an affirmation of
the rationality that is destroying it?
The truth of our fear, though we strive to silence it,
taps against our skulls, haunts us in our dreams, and
follows us, despite ourselves, to our death. it speaks to
us, our fear; it worms its way through our brains, warping
our lives, rotting our hopes, smashing our dreams in the
world it has built. Soon the logic of our fear may be the
death of us all, soon it may leave the earth a barren and
devastated place, a windy desert littered with our sand
blasted bones. And then, perhaps it will die with the last
man, forgotten.
Despite his cunning, the magic potions he conjures up
in his laboratories (which he is so famous for), modern man
will be unable to escape the prison of his reason, for it
is the very nature of our scientific and technological
truth that attempts to escape its appocalypse through
scientific cunning, calculation, and technical mastery
serve only to advance its cause and assure its triumph.
No, though it may rattle the heavens with its power and
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make us the killers of God with its revelations, our reason
shall not set us free. For it is the truth of our age of
reason, the truth which we value so much, the reason we
cannot deny, that threatens our life with ultimate death.
Our most profound, most real, end will not come to us
through the irrationality of man, some mismanagement of the
earth's resources, failure to modify social contradictions,
or moment of panic and dread over the button, but from
human kinds' greatest triumphs over irrationality,
ignorance and fear. These things may kill us, the Thinker
tells us, but only because we are already dead. They will
kill us and destroy the earth because the subject, the
metaphysic, the truth, that makes our technology and reason
possible is already its death.
We are dead men now, though we live, though we go
through the motions which keeps our bodies alive, because a
hidden death lingers in everything we do, is in everything
we make, and concealed in everything we know. The subject,
the ego cogito, self-consciousness, the will to power
(everything essential to the reign of reason) , is death
itself because its being, following its own rationality,
does not think its own Being, but rather throws it into
oblivion. It does not dwell, does not draw near to
whatever is at hand, think it, and live its mystery, but
loses itself in the farness of its global reach and the
fear that has built the world we inhabit. Our life as
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workers, citizens, consumers, lovers, parents, scientists,
technicians, is de-ranged, uncentered, jerked out of place,
or, most profoundly, homeless, because it is not
thoughtfully, prayerfully, directed to the thinging of the
th ing ,
CHAPTER II
THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY
In his thinking about technology, the Thinker seeks to
prepare the way to it and make it possible for humanity to
have a free relationship to it and to itself. [4] The first
step along this way is to distinguish, to think of the
nonidentity, between technical activity and the essence or
nature of technology. Just as the identity of a tree, as
tree, is something that pervades, precedes, and makes
possible all trees but is not itself a tree, the identity
or essence of technology has nothing at all to do with
technical activity. That which makes technology possible,
which brings it forth and gives it its distinctive
identity, will not be encountered by pushing forward the
domain of mechanics and calculation or by attempting to
conclude, as the popular debate over it does endlessly,
that it is either good or bad, to be extended or
contracted, or, much worse, that it is something neutral,
rely a tool depending on humanity's virtues or failingsme
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for its good or bad effects. Such a way of proceeding
would not enable us to think its truth or reveal what
brings it forth but only deliver us over to its rationality
more completely.
TO seek the essence of a thing, that by which the
thing things, is to ask what it is, to think about the way
in which it is present. in our time, two answers are
commonly made by rational discourse on what technology is.
The first says that technology is but a means to an end, a
way of asserting power over things, and the second says
that technology is a human activity, a way of asserting
human control over things. According to the Thinker, these
two common definitions supplied by reason belong together,
for to name ends and seek the means adequate to them is a
human activity, exclusively so in our time. Not only are
the machines, the tools, the factories, part of what modern
technology is according to modern reason, but so too is the
end, the human will they serve. Modern humanity gains its
power, its mastery over things, and accomplishes its will
through its technology. Thus, The Thinker calls this
rationalist conception of technology the instrumental and
anthropological definition of technology.
But there is nothing incorrect about this
identification of technology as a bringing about and as
human power, as far as mere correctness goes, in fact it is
correct in an uncanny sort of way, a way entirely
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appropriate to this age of reason. This concept of
technology as a bringing about and as human power holds for
reason not only for ancient and premodern technology, but
also for modern technology, including within it not only
the tilling sticks, the water and wind mills, and the horse
drawn implements that the ancients used, but also the
nuclear power plants, the four wheel drive tractors, the
jet aircraft, and the big factories that we use. All of
these techniques are means to ends, ways of bringing things
about and asserting human control over them, even if they
differ greatly in power and complexity. But, reason knows,
if modernity has only expanded the power of technology and
extended man's mastery over the earth, it has also thereby
greatly increased the need to get technology itself under
control, to master it just as man masters the earth through
it. The great fear of reason is that the means by which it
imposes its will upon the earth and all that is in it will
escape human control, as Frankenstein's monster did, and
subject the new Prometheans to a cruel fate, perhaps
nuclear war, perhaps ecological disaster. The will to
technical mastery becomes more urgent and insecure just as
it becomes more powerful and sure of its domain.
The modern will to mastery must find in itself only
itself, pure will willing itself. Anything that is not
reason itself, escaping its control, must be isolated,
contained by knowledge, and made into a yet greater means
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cause
of control. Technical man must find in his will, the
to all the effects his technology brings about. Wherever
reason and the instrumentality of technology reigns, there
reigns causality and human subjectivity.
But, the Thinker inquires, what if in its essence
technology were no mere means, simply a human way of
bringing things about, neutral as long as man had control
of them? What if man never did have control over the
technology he deploys, and could not bring things about by
willing them about, but rather was in his willing always
preceded, appropriated, and possessed by something other
than his will? What if man's will could not be a cause,
and technology a mere means to human ends? The Thinker
responds by probing the nature of causality and human
willing, seeking within it the identity and essence of
modern technology.
Before the age of reason, philosophy had long
maintained that there are four different kinds of causes to
anything that occurs and becomes present: (l)a material
cause, the physical substance out of which a thing is made;
(2)a formal cause, the form or shape into which the
terial enters; (3)the final cause, the end for which the
tter is pressed into its form; (4)and the efficient
cause, the actual force that brings about the effect. For
example, the material cause of a silver chalice would be
the silver that went into it; the formal cause would be the
ma
ma
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cup-like form it became, smooth, gilded, or whatever; the
final cause would be the sacrificial rite to the Gods tht
it was made to participate in; and (4)the efficient cause,
in this case, would be the craftsman that made it.
In the age of reason we have become accustomed to
representing cause as that which brings something about.
Efficient causality, only but one of the four causes
philosophy has known since Aristotle, has set the standard
for all causality. So far modernity has carried this that
the final cause is no longer even considered a cause, but
often dismissed by reason as myth or delusion. Telic
finality, or the holy has disappeared from our thought.
Moreover, despite the fact that the theory of
causality traces itself back to Aristotle, Greek thought,
according to the Thinker, had nothing to do with bringing
about and effecting. Instead of the linear movement of
billiard balls clicking against each other, a causality
modeled on the pure mechanics of motion, the Greeks thought
causality as responsibility, indebtedness, mutual
interdependence, a responsibility that, responding to the
presence of a calling, draws the thing out of nothingness
into being. Causality is not bringing something about, but
bringing something forth. The difference is decisive.
For example, the silver that comes from the earth and
goes into the chalice as its matter is co-responsible for
the chalice. Responding to the worlding of sacred
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Chalices, the meaning of a cup in a holy context, it is the
silverness of siver that helps bring forth the sacred
nature of the chalice. At the same time, and equally
responsible, the chalice is indebted to, and brought forth
by, the aspect of a chalice, the cup-like for. that marks
its difference from a brooch or a ring and makes it useful
as a sacred container. The third and most important part
of the chalice is its sacred character, the part that in
advance confines and circumscribes the chalice as a
sacrifical vessel, the telos of the chalice. But we must
not misunderstand telos simply as aim or purpose, as
modernity is apt to do, but rather as that which bounds and
completes the thing, the world that surrounds it, provides
an interpretation and place for it, and makes it whole,
holy. The telos of the chalice, its character as a sacred
tool, brings forth the silver from the earth and makes it
into the shape of the chalice, calling on the craftsman to
bring it into the world that worlds it.
The fourth and final participant in the play of
co-responsibility that grants the chalice its nature, is
the silversmith, the one who brings about the sacred
chalice. The silversmith is granted his place in the
four-fold play of responsibility not just because he brings
about, giving mechanical cause to the effect that ends in
the chalice, but because he considers carefully, with the
reverence appropriate to his task, interpreting his
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responsibility, and draws together the siver and the shape
Of the chalice into its completd whole as sacrifical
vessel. It is his handcraft, responding to the worlding of
the sacred chalice, interpreting the nature of the earthen
silver, and functional form that it must enter into, that
makes him co-responsible for the chalice. As the dwelling
artisan, a mortal drawing near to his time and place and
interpreting his responsibilities, he brings the chalice
forth from nothingness, making it present in the world.
Though the four modes of responsibility are each
different from the others, they are all united in the play
that brings a thing forth out of nothingness. They set the
thing free, gathering it into its place in the world,
starting it on to its way of arrival. Every tool that fits
the hand of man, every tree, rock, flower, everything that
appears amidst the dwelling place of man, they, in their
four fold unity, are responsible for calling everything
forth from the world they world. The four modes of
responsibility bring things forth.
What, then, is a thing? [5] The Thinker poses the
question with child-like simpleness, asking in innocence
what reason overlooks because it is too near and obvious.
But nothing is murkier than the thinging of things,
especially in modern times.
The Old High German word, "ding" and the Old English
"thing" both mean a gathering, and specifically a gathering
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to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a publicly
contested matter. "Thing" refers to anything that bears
upon humanity, that concerns it as a social gathering, that
is a matter for discourse and discussion. The Romans,
deriving their usage from the Greek "eiro" (rhetos, rhetra,
rhema), called a matter for discourse "res." Contrary to
common knowledge, "res publica" refers not to the state,
but to that which, concerning everyone, is known by
everyone, and is debated in public. Often, the Romans
being great legalists, the word "res" designated a case at
law. The Romans called this thing a "causa," or,
translated into English, a cause. How uncanny! We started
pursuing the origins of "thing" and we are back at cause!
We must not however understand "causa" in a mechanical
sense, but rather as pursuing a cause for justice, a
charitable cause, a political cause, and so on. A cause is
a thing that gathers us into its care and calls on us to be
responsible toward it. It rises up of itself out of
nothingness, the unknown void, making its presence felt,
demanding a response. But, it is only because "causa,"
almost synonymously with "res," means the case, can the
word "causa" later come to mean cause as the causality of
an effect. The point of pursuing a cause, of responding to
the thing at hand, was to produce, shall we say, an effect,
a result, in things. Gradually the Roman "causa" became
the Romances "la cosa" and the French "la chose," or, as we
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say in English, "the thing." a thina fho^ cn g is t e result of a
cause, a summons that gathers it up and calls it forth out
of non-being. The summons that gathers a thing into its
presence, that causes it to be i^ ^o , IS, as we saw, composed of
four different moments, each one responding to the others.
AS a thing, the silver chalice is a gathering together
of all that makes it a chalice. The earth because its dark
obscurity is the fertile source of its silver, the sky
because the chalice's aspect and function is revealed by
the sky's openess; the gods because they are the whole, the
beckoning messengers calling for the gift of the sacrifical
offering; the mortal who makes it because through his life
of living his death, his caring concern for the earth, the
sky, and the gods, the gathering of the chalice is drawn
forth from unconcealment
. Thinging, the thing stays earth
and sky, divinities and mortals, bringing the four in their
remoteness near to one another, uniting them in the simple
onefold of their self-unified four fold.
The Thinker uses strange phrases, the world worlding,
the thing thinging, in order to draw attention to the
originary origin of things, the Being of beings. The
thinging of the thing, the identification of its presence
before the eyes of dwellers, cannot be reduced to reason's
causality, a mechanics of stimulus and effect. Instead, it
is revealed, drawn forth according to its own mystery from
unconcealment, made present and given its identity by the
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world's worlding. a wo.ld has to be dwelled in, and the
identities of things
.ust be at hand, available for
interpretation, before the things revealed in it beco.e
present. The world's worlding cannot be explained by
anything outside of it, underlying it, or determining it,
by a theory of me taperception, for example. This
impossibility is due not to failings of human science or
the inadequacies of our reason, but to the simple being of
the world, the incalculable and unfathomable character of
the world's worlding. Modernity's will to explain, to
reduce to separate parts, an underlying truth, and then to
capture the structure of cause and effect in the whole,
strangles the essential nature of the united four. Earth
and sky, gods and mortals, cannot be understood by
separating them and explaining one by another. They are
together. Mortals dwell on the earth, under the sky, in
the presence or absence of the gods. Dwelling necessarily
brings the four modes of occassioning together and presents
it as the thing.
CHAPTER III
TECHNOLOGY AS A WAY OF REVEALING TRUTH
The etymology of the word technology is quite
revealing. [6] Technology derives from the Greek word
"techne." Techne does not mean simply an art or handcraft,
as the dictionaries commonly have it, but rather, to let
something appear, to bring a thing forth from
unconcealment. Techne is a mode of aletheuein, of
unconcealing, of revealing whatever does not bring itself
forth and does not lie before us. Techne refers to the
things that man alone makes, the truths that he alone
brings forth. As a mode of aletheuein, techne is contrasted
to those things that come forth of themselves, physis.
Physis is commonly, but inadequately, translated as nature.
Prior to the modern distinction between things man-made and
natural, prior to Aristotle's imposition of a difference
between techne and physis, physis revealed that which
bloomed forth of itself, as a rose does. In the time of
the Presocr at ics
,
strangely enough, physis was identical
with logos, the language of Being, because then language
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was not man's instrument, but something that came forth of
itself from the chaos, the void that was the origin of all
things. Physis was the origin of all things natural and
man made because it was the name of that which, always
concealing itself, mysteriously brings things forth. This
time did not know a difference between physis and techne.
And it did not yet think archy, either
.[ 7] Archy,
which seems to have come into its own only with Aristotle
and Plato, refers to two things, command and origin. Archy
is a commanding origin, a cause which calls things into
being. From its inception becoming emerges, but only
according to its rule or logic. It is that which governs
appearances. As an underlying and general truth of things,
it makes knowlege of things possible.
Once the distinction between techne and physis is
made, it becomes possible to think of man as an archi-tect,
the one in whose command is the origin that builds things,
brings them forth. Since the time of Aristotle, whoever
builds--constructs a house, a ship, or a sacrifical
chalice, or cultivates a vine, or whatever— reveals things
as they are brought forth by an archy of some sort, a
command that gathers together in advance the underlying
principle of the ship or the house with a view of the
finished thing, and from this gathering rules and governs
the manner of its building or construction.
The decisive thing about techne is that it is not at
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all a bringing about, a making, manipulating, or a neutral
or rational means. it is much more than that; it is a
revealing of truth. Through techne, a way of Being, a
thing becomes present according to its archy, and in its
presencing presents the world which awaited it. Technology
is a means, but not a mere means of rational manufacturing,
easily accounted for by its efficiency or lack of it, it is
a way of revealing truth, of drawing a thing forth from
unconcealment. The way a thing is revealed is all
important because that way is responding to the world that
worlds it. To change from one way of Being to another is
to exchange one world or dwelling place for another, one
truth for a different truth.
The usual conception of truth, the conception of truth
that abides in our age of reason that the Thinker calls on
us to deconstruct, starts with things and ends by
establishing their correspondence with a proposition, a
universal and eternal archy. [8] Truth, as it is commonly
thought, is that which correctly corresponds to its
referent. For example, the proposition: "it is dark out"
is true if, upon looking outside, it is in fact dark out.
For the common conception of truth, truth is when the
proposition or archy accords with the facts.
Me ta-physis-cal in essence, this conception of truth moves
beyond the physis the Presocratics knew to the archys that
we know. Just as the original thought revealed in physis
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was concealed by the distinction Aristotle made between
Physis and techne, things that come forth by themselves and
things that come forth by the hand of man, metaphysics
rests on a sharp distinction between subject and object,
knower and known, appearance and reality.
This Metaphysical distinction finds its origin not in
Kant or in the modern age with the rise of positivism, but
in age old Christianity (Aristotle only opened the way
toward it), with the positing of the creator over against
the created. The created is true when it measures up to,
accords with, the eternal and universal idea that God has
of it. Man can know the truth of any creation because,
created in the image of God, he fits into the unity of the
divine plan of creation. His words and thoughts can be
brought into perfect accord with the universal and eternal
because they are wholly adequate to the task.
In our time, despite the absence of the divine in our
discourse, and a popular revolt against traditional
metaphysics, the notion of truth as the correspondence
between universal and eternal words and contingent things
is still retained. Just as contemporary positivists
maintain that scientific theories can be tested and
brought into accordance with the facts, Voltaire's worldly
reason, supplying the law for itself, is able to
immediately know the world, to accord the representation
with the represented. Empiricists, rationalists, and any
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theory that mediates between the two poles,
.e.ain
Christian and united in their notion of truth as
correspondence, and, despite themselves, metaphysical.
When truth is understood as correctness, as a
correspondence with an eternal and universal principle or
archy, untruth or error becomes merely incorrect and can be
dismissed without hesitation. Falling outside the essence
of truth, untruth is not a part of being and therefore, has
no importance once it is understood as untruth. Once
physis is excluded by metaphysics, errors are something to
be overcome; they have no ontological significance.
But the way to truth is the way to untruth, the
concealed, the mysterious, and the Thinker reminds us that
one thing necessarily conceals another, stands in front of
it, and perhaps limitless others, obscuring them in
unknowable mystery. [9] Because much more is concealed than
is revealed, because the darkness which obscures is
limitless, while the light which reveals is limited to the
clearing, the concealment of things as a whole is older
than any temporal revealing of them. At the edges of the
clearing that is the world, surrounding it in an endless
night extending without limit, time, or direction, lies the
mystery, a pure expanse of nothingness. Not a particular
mystery, regarding this or that thing, but a mystery that
is one because it cannot be divided. In dwelling, in
drawing things forth from unconcealmen t into time and
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place, as their way of being calls them to, mortals at the
same time conserve the mystery, preserving the abyss that
is the origin of their truth. To dwell is necessarily to
fall into this nothingness, to preserve the mystery while
revealing time. Interestingly enough, according to the
Oxford English dictionary, the word dwelling, besides
meaning to stay in one place and preserve it, also means to
lead into error, to retard and delay.
By dwelling in error, untruth, and mystery, mortals
gain their possiblity for truth. Outside the truth, always
eluding it, the mystery beckons to kowledge, imploring it
onward. Mystery is the essence of truth, the ineluctable
support of it because it could not be truth without the
concealing darkness of untruth surrounding it.
For the Thinker, freedom, the preserving and sparing
of the thing as it rises up of itself out of the void, is
the origin of truth, the source of any possibility of
correctness or of understanding. Placing the origin of
truth in freedom, in letting the mystery be, does not
plunge it into the arbitrariness of human caprice, the
subjectivity of an autonomous human will. it does not
transform the object into something human, produced by,
say, alienated labor or the will to power. This does not
happen because freedom is not at all the property of man, a
human subject that is the rational master of itself,
because the mystery which is at the origin of truth is not.
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TO be free is not to be at the o.gin of one's actions, the
rational self-willing cause of all that one is, or the
architect of the world.
The rationalist conception of truth celebrates the
true and dismisses untruth. [10] The Thinker reverses this.
It is the mystery, untruth proper, that is the most
essential, since it is the support, the earth upon which
the truth dwells in its time, the abyss on which the world
is.
The earth, as it is known by the Thinker in his latter
thought, is identical with what the Presocratics knew as
physis. It is the concealing mystery, the abyss which is
the origin of the world. From its dark obscurity things
are constantly breaking forward according to their own way,
suddenly and mysteriously appearing as truth in the light
of the world. Man is not at all in possession of the
earth. His reason does not posit or form the things that
appear from the earth, but rather it itself is formed
within the earth's dark mystery. Contrary to reason,
untruth, error, is not founded in the finitude of man, but
in the earth itself. It is the earth breaking forward,
revealing the world that it bore within itself, that grants
man the truth he knows and the errors he does not. And so
it is not man that interprets, that thinks, that speaks,
that acts, but the earth itself.
Far from being located in a human will, freedom is
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letting things be the things they are, letting the
identities that determine them present themselves according
to their time and place. However, this is not a
justification of thoughtless conservatism, such as one
finds in the Republican party. On the contrary. Letting
Being be is a call to engage oneself with things as they
rise up out of the abyss, to actively and thoughtfully
participate in the revealing which draws things forth from
unconcealment. Far from being a passive response to the
world, a justification of the negligence and indifference
toward things that finds its conclusion in the destruction
of the earth and the depravity of work, freedom is the call
to let the world world.
The revealing of truth is possible because man, by
being there, dwelling in the world, is already possessed by
the world. Being possessed by the world does not coincide
with the sum total of all immediately familiar experiences,
feelings and perceptions. It also opens man up to the
unfamiliar, the strange and mysterious. Science, and
knowing in general, does not just reveal the expected and
certain; it also, and here it approaches its most original
intention, reveals the unexpected and the unfamiliar.
Strange new things rise up before the vision of science and
knowledge, contradicting accepted truths. But, because our
age of reason anticpates even the unfamiliar and
unexpected, modern reason omnisciently levels and plans out
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an the world. Bearing itself without li™it, drawing
everything into its metaphysical domain, rational knowledge
flattens out the unexpected and unfamiliar, accepting it
into its understanding, thus, concealing Being as the abyss
and making untruth into mere error. Because the essence of
truth is freedom, historical man can, while letting Being
be, also not let Being be, covering up, concealing, and
distorting truth, as he has throughout the history of
metaphysics.
in order to dwell free, man must come to know what the
archys that he has built history around conceals and seals
off. He must recognize that his metaphysics cuts him off
form the physis, the earth on which he dwells. To live
free man must build not according univeral and eternal
truths, but according to the truth that the earth brings
forth in his time and place. Truth must cease to be
universal and eternal and become temporal and local, it
must open itself up to what presents itself. Anarchy must
replace archy.
It is through thinking that humanity gains freedom,
overcomes its errors, breaks free of its archy, and attains
the truth of its mystery. Unafraid to encounter mystery,
never forgetting its errancy, thinking freely lets the
earth break forward. Being be, the world world. In this,
thinking stands opposed to reason. Taking man himself as
the source of all positing, reason, through metaphysics.
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shuts Off the earth, denying itself the fruit of the earth.
Tracing inconspicuous furrows in language, thinking is
a stern and resolute openess that does not disrupt the
concealing mystery, the earth that makes all things
possible, but draws it unbroken into the openess of
understanding and truth. At the same time that thinking is
regarding the world with gentleness, it is not necessarily
kind to the sophistry of reason. Standing opposed to
reason, which accepts the accepted as true and errors as
irrelevant, thinking must, as the breaking forward of the
earth, be discordant and disruptive, letting strange and
unfamiliar thoughts rise up against reason and common
sense. Attacks against reason are inevitable because
thinking is open to the mystery, the abyss, or the earth,
while reason is imprisoned in the logic of a "correct"
understanding of philosophy.
CHAPTER IV
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Technology is a way of revealing truth, of drawing the
thing forth from unconcealmen t . it can, of course, be
objected that this conception of technology does indeed
hold for Greek thought and is appropriate to the techniques
of the handicraftsman, but it does not hold for modern
machine powered and computer controlled technology. And
this difference is what must be questioned. It would seem
that modern technology, unlike ancient technology, is based
upon and is the consequent of, the exact mathematics of
modern science, that it is the practical application of
what science is in theory. [11] Ancient technology did not
rely on science and mathematics to do what it did, and so
could be a handicraft, the concrete application of everyday
knowledge. But the Thinker maintains that this
relationship is reversed. It is not science which makes
technology possible, it is the technical ordering of the
world, the archical way of being, that makes modern exact
science possible. New things rise up and new discoveries
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are made, not because they have been anticipated by
science, but because someone has perfected or developed the
experimental apparatus that presents the data, or because
someone has developed a new technique or procedure for
dealing with the data. As Bob Ackerman and others have
argued[12], instruments, or technical apparatus are an
essential moment in a dialectic that moves between data,
instruments, and theory. For instance, new data domains
are uncovered as the techniques for producing them are
perfected and developed. A slight improvement in technique
will sometimes produce anomolous facts, previously ignored
because the technique that made them was not judged
sophisticated enough to explain the abnormality, cannot be
explained by prevailing theory, but can only be understood
by a different theory. it is the craf tmanship, the
technical character, of science that guides its
development, amd determines its truth.
What is the essence of modern science that makes it
the result of modern technology? According to the Thinker,
"science" as we understand it today is fundamentally
different from the doctrina and scientia of t^g Middle
Ages, and especially from the Greek epistemi. Unlike
modern science, Greek science was not exact in calculation
or measurement, nor did it need to be in order to respond
to the things present to it. We cannot claim, then, that
science is more true because it is more exact thanour
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theirs. Nor can we say Galileo's doctrine of free falling
bodies is true and Aristotle's teaching that light bodies
strive upward is false. That is like saying that
Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced than that of
Aeschylus's. Because of the different technologies, the
different ways of Being, governing the presencing of the
thing, we cannot say that our science is more correct than
theirs or that it has progressed beyond it. Between the
world of the Greeks and our world there lies a break, a gap
of incommensurable understanding, that cannot be bridged by
continuities of measurement and development. Thus, to
understand the nature of modern science and its technology
we must free ourselves from the tired habit of comparing
the new science with the old solely in terms of degree and
progress.
Scientific knowing establishes itself as a technique,
a procedure within the realm of what is, opening the world
up to observation. Every technique or procedure of
knowledge, by its own being, determines beforehand that
which is, a fixed ground plan, or archy, governing the
presencing of natural events. And through the ruling
governance of this archy it uncovers the things--natur al
events, reactions, pr ocesses--appropr iate to it and locates
them in their unique ordering.
For example, modern physics, the paradigm science of
modernity, uses mathematics obsessively. But it can use
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mathematical technique only because it already is
mathematical. To it things are present and understood
exclusively in terms of its mathematics. This is quite in
contrast to the Greeks, who, while being excellent
mathematicians and included the great master Euclid among
them, did not understand physics as numerical or
calculative mathematics. Aristotle, for example, did not
use numbers or equations to explain the physics of things.
For the Greeks, ta mathemata meant that which man
knows in advance in his observation of whatever is and in
his relation with things, whether it was the corporeality
of bodies, the vegetable character of plants, the animality
of animals, the humanness of man, as well as the exactness
of numbers. Just because numbers are the most familiar and
striking of the already known, does not mean that
originally the mathematical is totally encompassed by
numbers and calculating. On the contrary. As the already
known, the mathematical had a much more expansive domain,
covering many more qualities and properties than are
contained in numerical exact formal systems.
When Galileo was developing his concept of
inertia[13], he did not passively observe the movement of
things as they naturally occured, as Aristotle would have,
but rather he set up an artifical concept, a hypotetical
universe that existed only in the mind. By means of this
artifical concept, which removed such variables as air
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resistance and f.lctlon fro. the experiment, he was able to
reduce the pure inertial movement of things to a
mathematical formula. Despite the fact that nothing in
nature behaved exactly as the formulas predicted, Galileo's
mathematics have overwhelmingly been accepted as true, at
least in non-relativistic normal circumstances,
'
by
generations of scientists ever since. The mathematical
projection, out of its own ruling, provides its own
standards of exactness. it is indeed ironic that Aristotle
has for centuries been vilified for being a poor
empiricist. [14]
in general, physics is the knowledge of material
bodies in motion. And if the archy that governs physics
is calculable, if everything that it encounter s-every
motion, every reaction, every weight, whatever-is
quantified, measured, and subject to calculation, then that
is what nature becomes— some thing mathematical, numerical,
and formalizable. Motion becomes a measurable change of
place, and no motion or direction of motion is superior to
any other. Nor is any place or time superior to any other.
All forces are defined according to their consequences,
their quantifiable, measurable, effects of transformation.
Causality becomes understood as a bringing about rather
than a bringing forth. All events are only inasmuch as
they fit within this archical projection; outside of it
they are not. This projected ordering of nature into the
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mathematical finds its
..a.antee in eve., technique applied
to the body Of nature. what will be learned is already
known by its mathematics, and its value is determined by
Its measure and formal exactness.
It is, thus, the mathematical projection that makes
possible our mechanized and rationalized world by reducing
the fourfold modes of occassioning to mechanical causality,
a Simple linkage of material cause and effect. m order
for it to attain the rigor that it demands of itself,
mathematical reasoning must remain within the framework of
its initial premises, drawing upon no assumptions, tacit or
otherwise, that were not explicitly postulated at the
outset. Modern mathematics is to the core of its nature
axiomatic, a formalizable procedure played out within
explicit and unambiguous rules of organization.
Abstracting itself from all external meaning, seeking to
eliminate any appeal to evidence that rests on intuition,
modern mathematics becomes nothing but an internally
organized and tightly specified configuration of symbols
and procedures. [15] These symbols and procedures are so
highly organized and tightly specified that a machine, if
it were sophisticated enough and properly programmed, could
perform all of the operations of mathematics automatically.
From the beginning it was as if the whole necessity of
modern mathematics was to advance itself to the point where
it became a gigantic, infinitely exacting, machine that
56
of
could automatically grind out all of the truths
mathematics, completely eliminating the creative role of
the mathematician himself. it is no accident that our age
has created the computer. It was a machine made necessary,
if at first only in metaphor, by the destiny of mathematics
itself.
AS it is with a mechanic who is creating a well
running machine, the task of the modern mathematician is to
create a complete system without any contradictions in its
axioms. Because the truth of mathematics rests on its own
internal structure, and not on any form of external
evidence or intuition, the truth of any one conclusion,
however small or insignificant, is totally dependent on the
integrity of the whole structure. The truth of
mathematics, thus, depends solely on its consistency, its
mastery of contradiction and ambiguity. A machine is
useless, worn out, or broke if the interactions of its
assembly do not by themselves produce the desired result.
When you wash your clothes in an automatic washing machine,
you expect the machine to go through a decision procedure,
filling up, agitating, spinning, rinsing, agitating,
spinning, all by itself. As with the washing machine,
mathematical procedure, following the axioms and
definitions imprinted within it, must produce unvarying
results, universal truths that any mathematician would come
to if he used the correct procedure. Modern mathematics is
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pure technique, a total reduction to mechanical form and
causality.
But the rigorous demands of exactness in physics as
mathematical research, the Thinker tells us, are not simply
reducible to quantified precision. it seeks quantified
precision only because the things present to its reasoning
demand mathematical rigor. if the object of research
cannot be measured with quantified precision, as they
cannot be in the life sciences, the human sciences, or the
historical sciences, then the rigor of mathematical
research is satisfied with an analytical and formal
discourse. The lack of quantification in these sciences is
not a deficiency, but only the appropriate response to the
formal nature of this kind of research.
In all these sciences, physics, as well as the life,
human, and historical sciences, science becomes
mathematical research through the projected plan and
through the securing of the plan in the rigor of rational
procedure, the technology of accumulating knowledge. If,
however, the world mathematical exactness projects is to
become secure, objective in its truth, then it must be able
to encompass all the facts that exactness uncovers under
the rule of laws. For it is only within the ordering of
rule and law, the techniques of mathematical procedure,
that facts become clear as the facts that they are. Facts
in all their plentitude and diversity are mediated and made
58
possible only by the rules, laws anrf i .=, , d instruments of
measurement that anticipate them.
Clarifying itself on the basis of what is already
rational to itself, explanation is the encompassing of
facts under rules and laws. As such, it is always two fold
in its nature. It accounts for an unknown by means of an
known, and at the same time it verifies the known by means
of the unknown. A new technique of knowing unique to
modern science, the experiment i <; th^ v u •'^I'CL , s the technique that
modern science uses to explain the known and uncover the
unknown. The experiment is possible only after the
knowledge of nature has been transformed into a calculable
presence and science is understood as mathematical
explanation. Although they' were often very careful in
their observation of things, and demanded compelling
evidence for the assertion of any claim, neither medieval
doctrina nor Greek episteme performed experiments as modern
science does. Contrary to common belief, the Thinker
argues, Aristotle was a very careful observer, observing
things as they presented themselves, their qualities, their
modifications under changing circumstances, and
consequently how things as a rule behaved. He was a very
good "empiricist," describing the limits and possibilities
of observation, the circumstances under which it was
distorted or clear. But Aristotle's "empiricism" remains
fundamentally different from the modern experiment, and it
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remains so even when ancient and medieval observation works
with number and measure, or uses apparatus and instruments,
inspite Of seeming similarities that have been interpreted
as the origin of the modern experiment in ancient
knowledge, a decisive difference remains, separating their
techniques of knwoledge from ours. "Twisting the lion's
tail," as Francis Bacon would say, the modern experiment
distrubs things, separates them from their context and
subjects them to rigorously planned control in order to
reveal the mechanical causes determing them. it begins by
laying down a law as a basis for the experiment,
abstracting the thing from the forces, variables,
complications, that makes impossible a formal observation
of the facts and any possibility of the determining causes
that will either prove or disprove the law. where
Aristotle sought to observe things in their natural
condition, surrounded by all the four modes of occasioning
in all their complexity and interplay so that he could know
the thing as it is, the modern experiment establishes
artifical, controlled, and planned circumstances,
eliminating the complexity and interplay of "irrelevant"
variables on the basis of an already known law so that it
can know the simple mechanical causes of the thing. It is
this controlling on the basis of an already known, this
reduction to mechanical procedure, that makes the essence
of the modern experiment mathematical, and distinguishes it
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from ancient and medieval observation.
contrary to the experiment's mythology, its self
proclaimed progress is not a progress that all ages could
acknowledge and revere. By abstracting itself f.om the
natural situation of the thing, by reducing its essence to
a mechanical cause or a mathematically formalizable entity,
the experiment conceals many things. For instance, the use
modern Agribusiness makes of chemicals to directly kin
pests that damage crops could only have arisen and been
acknowledged as an improvement of technique over the older
methods because the experiment concealed the true
complexity of nature from itself. Aristotle, for instance,
would not have been convinced that the development of a
chemical that kills a pest simply and directly would be a
useful tool, an advance beyond old techniques, because, by
abstracting the insect from its environment, the experiment
ignores the place of the insect in the nature of things,
making it vulnerable to external consequences that it could
not anticipate. what other insects would the chemical
kill? What effects would that have on other life forms?
What would it do to the soil after many years of use? what
would it do to the farmer, his state, his gods? in order
for a chemical pesticide to be judged an improvement for
Aristotelian science it would have to open itself up to
many more questions then it does in modern experimental
science. An Aristotelian science might well reveal that
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-game farming is a much better technique than chemical
farming because it loo.sata technique from the vantage
point of its place in the whole of things.
It must, however, be cautioned that the already
.nown,
the projected law that controls the experiment, is not an
arbitrary imagining, it comes from the presencing of things
drawn out of nature and present to the plan of the
experiment. The experimenf i q 4- u •A t t s a technique which, in its
projected plan and execution, is founded on previous
experiments and the things made present in them. And the
more exact the projection of nature and the things revealed
in it, the more exact becomes the possibility of the
experiment. The experiment is a technique of knowledge
that spirals inward, ever more exactly establishing the
conditions and truth of its own knowledge.
Source criticism in the social sciences is the
equivalent of the experiment in the physical sciences, the
Thinker claims. Although the social sciences do not always
attempt to trace facts back to laws and rules, they never
limit themselves to merely reporting the facts. Just as in
the physical sciences, the social sciences aim to fix,
objectify, and render stable the object of its
discourse--human beings. And if this process does not
always yield universal laws, it never fails to compare
everything with everything, explaining everything against
the ground plan of history, subjecting human life to the
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calculation of cause and effecto , to the measure of norms
and equivalences, the ordinary and thP .'- d a e average. The
unique, the rare, the qreat i c: . -, •g , is eclipsed and rendered
invisible by being incomprehensible in the presence of the
norm.
AS science as experimental research progresses,
building on itself through ever more exact experimentation,
it relies increasingly on itself, turning inward and
relying on proven techniques, methods, and procedures. A
fact gains currency and value only because it arose out of
an accepted technique, a method that a society or
institution Of scientists believe win produce truth.
Because truth arises out of correct method, that is to say
an institutionally approved method, science as experimental
research is of necessity institutional research. [16]
Results from experiments must be precisely detailed,
communicated to other scientists, and reproducible by other
scientists. All of this takes a closed community of
specialists who write ariticles for one another, talk with
one another, and meet one another at conventions. On the
basis of approved techniques, these institutions develop
bureaucracies for the funding of experimental apparatus and
for selecting those who will recieve funding and those who
will not, as well as bureaucracies to decide who's results
will be published and who's will not. Science as
experimental research produces a regime of truth enforced
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th.ough disciplina., buceauc.acies of co„ect
.ethoa
the institutional cha.actec of scientific
.esea.ch extends
and consolidates its
.ei,n of t.uth, it
.o.e and „o.e
establishes the p.io.ity of .ethod and technique ove.
whatever is. Pacts a.e true not because they are, not
because they rise up f.o. the earth and present themselves,
but because the are established by an institutionally
accepted technique or method. Truth co.es not from things
thinging, from the breaking forward of the earth, from
attending to the whisper of the world worlding, but from a
regime of truth that conquers and subjects everything to
the reign of its method, its reason, and its technology.
Before this regime of truth that is science as experimental
research everything is penetrated by rational method and
made objective, and the gods whose presence which formerly
granted things their boundary, their interpretation and
place in the order of things, and their sacred character
are put to flight.
Through the institutions it calls into being, the
techniques it uses to validate its truth, and the rigor of
its method, science as experimental research disciplines
and creates a new kind of man--the research man. The
erudite scholar as well as the thinker and prophet
disappear, silenced by the institutions of experimental
science. The research man who takes their place no longer
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needs a library at ho.e, a meditative place for thinking
and reading, and certainly not a desert to retreat to
instead of seeking a silence to nurture the
.ystery, he is
constantly on the
.ove, negotiating at meetings of his
peers, collecting information at conventions,
administrating and participating In the bureaucracies of
the experiment. At the same time, science as experimental
research produces and constitutes the thing as object,
distinct and separate from the the human subject as knower!
The subject as knower, the scientific researcher, gains his
knowledge of the object through representation,
re-presenting the thing in the calculating projections of
science as experimental research. [17] Nature, by being
calculated in advance as scientific object, and humanity,
by being elevated to the status of scientific subject, are
"set in place," produced as the doubles of a way of being
that makes possible a rational explanation of everything.
Only insofar as the things of these sciences become objects
of representation for subjects can they exist at all. m
the world of science as experimental research, things
simply are not unless they are as formal representations
posited by subjects. It is only as representation, secured
by the technology of the experiment, that science as
research attains certainty of its truth.
Thus, for the Thinker, Descartes prepared the
metaphysics—Nietzsche Included— for the whole of the
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modern world, a metaphysics that in its relentless quest
for Objectivity, its production of the subject, and its use
Of the experiment as a value neutral means for knowing the
truth of things, is unique among all the ages of the world.
The unique thing about the modern age is not just that
man has freed himself from the obligations and limits of
the Middle Ages, but that the very essence of man himself
has changed—man has become subject. The Thinker
understands the subject as the Greeks thought it, as
hypokeimenon, as that-which-1 ies-before
, gathering as
ground or foundation everything into itself. Originally
the Greek subject had no special relationship to man and
none at all to the I.
However, when, as in the metaphysics of Descartes, man
becomes the architect of the world, the underlying reality
of all that is, man either individually, or later in
Marxism collectively, becomes subject. When man becomes
subject, the comprehension of what is as a whole changes,
breaking radically with the worlds of all previous ages.
The world becomes understood as picture, as
re-presentations of things gathered into objectivity and
set in place before a human subject. To understand the
world as picture is not just to see it as picture, an
imitation of the thing, but, much more, to be involved with
it as picture, to dwell in a world of pictures. In the
world as picture everything in it becomes present only as
66
representation, an architecture built by man.
AS an example, consider a home vidio carera and
screen, a technical device of our time that has gained
widespread use. Even though some of us might have
momentary difficulties making the thing work, almost
everyone can eventually, though after some effort and
usually after reading the instructions. And everyone
understands what they are seeing when they watch it and
what the image it presents is. They see themselves if the
movie is of them, their friends if the movie is of them.
Anthropologists, however, recently came across
hunter-gather tribe that after being shown a home vidio of
themselves reported seeing nothing but shadow and flashes
of light on the screen, even though the anthropologists
clearly saw pictures of the tribe going about its everyday
activities. The tribe members actually could not see the
representations of themselves, no matter how hard the
anthropologists pressed them.
Having never experienced the world as picture, as
re-presentable object, the tribal members could not
experience any similarity or difference, any identity,
between themselves and the representations of themselves.
To them the world was an immediate temporal experience, in
no way present as re-presentation. A re-presentation of
their world was an impossible thing for them, an identity
as equivalent of unequivalent things. They did not dwell
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amid the tools of representation, nor the identities
between things that determine their use. And the thinging
of the thing, the home vidio, simply could not occur for
them, become present in their world. They were not
gathered into the fourfold occurance of our world as
picture.
Perhaps not all to their loss. This same tribe could,
the anthropologists observed with more than a little awe,
travel through hundreds of miles of rain forest unerringly
without a compass. Any Westerner would only have seen
identical trees and would have been hopelessly lost. But
the hunter gatherers saw di fferences—perhaps differences
that no Western eye could ever see— that enabled them to
see where to go.
The thing that is present to us, the home vidio,
cannot be reduced to a pure mechanics of causality.
Although the physics of perception, the photons that
resulted in sense perception, were no doubt the same for
both the anthropologists and the members of the tribe, they
did not cause the thing, the re-presentation of tribal
life, to present itself to the members of the tribe.
Since the world has become picture it has become
possible to contrast a new age with the preceding one, to
concieve of different "world views." In the Middle Ages a
different "world view" was unthinkable. For that which is,
is created by God, the highest cause. To be is to be put
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into God.s created order, to correspond to the will of God
And nothing is unless God wills it. The world of the
Middle Ages could not concieve of things being placed
before man's knowing and always at his disposal. That
would be usurping God's place, a sin of pride.
Even less could the Greeks have concieved of man as
subject or thought the world as picture. Parmenides said
one Of the oldest sayings of Greek thought, which the
Thinker translates as: "The apprehending of whatever is
belongs to Being because it is demanded and determined by
Being." Whatever is, thus, is because it arises and breaks
forth from unconcealment
, coming to presence before man as
the one who opens himself and comes upon the thing. what
is comes to be not because man looks upon it, representing
it to himself as a subjective perception, but rather what
is comes to be because man is looked upon by that which is.
Man is gathered toward the thing as it rises up out of the
earth. To be human is to be beheld by the earth, to be
drawn to the thing and borne along by it, even if it is to
be driven about by its oppositions and marked by its
discord. The early Greeks were called upon to gather, to
save, and to preserve whatever came upon them, even
sundering confusion. Because of their calling to preserve
the world, even as sundering confusion, the early Greeks
could not live the world as picture. It would have
required that everything be subjected to a rational
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o.ae.in, positea by .an. Nevertheless, the Thin.e. points
-t that When Plato,
.adicall, separating appea.nace ana
-al.ty, defined the appearance of whatever is as eidos
aspect or view, his thought, often ruling indirectly and in
concealment, destined far in advance the world's becoming
picture.
in contrast to the pre-Socratic mode of Knowing
things, modern representing brings what is present at hand
before man, forcing it into an exclusive relation with
humanity. it is only through man, his will to power, his
mode Of production, his sense data, his intersub jective
consciousness, that things are. For the first time in the
ages Of humanity upon the earth, man decisively and
expressly sets himself up as architect of the world,
narcissistically making himself the origin and ruling arche
for everything. And so, it is only through man's mastering
himself as a species being for itself, or setting aside the
religious delusions of his super ego, or becoming the
overman, or whatever, that he fulfills his essence. For
the first time man, as man, comes into being. And his
calling from out of himself is to become master and
archical lord over all the earth, to subject to control all
that has eluded him in his alienated consciousness, his
unconscious delusions, his lies that he has told himself in
his weakness. Separated from himself by age old delusions,
man must come to himself by seeing all that is as only
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ic
an " I
"
own
himself, master and underlying truth of the world.
It is only because man has become subject that it
becomes necessary for him to ask of himself the specif
nature of his mastery over the earth. is it as
contained by its own preferences and freed by its
arbitrary choosing that man becomes subject, or does it
happen as a "we," a collective self through which each sees
itself as a whole and attains its freedom? is it as
individual or community, as unique personality or mere
group member in the corporate body, as nation state, or
race, or world united humanity, that man is subject? it
does not matter. The discourses of man divide themselves
amid these debates in a smothering confusion, all of them
united in a quest for archical human mastery of all the
world. Life is lived as either a struggle to become a
self-sufficient individual free of social entanglements,
perhaps as a capitalist property owner or citizen of the
liberal state, or else it is lived in the struggle against
individualism and for the community, a socalized
consciousness, as a goal governing all achievement,
usefulness, and possibility of meaning. Individualism and
collectivism are doubles of each other, complementing and
constituting each other in their differences, united in the
knowledge of man as archical subject, the underlying
reality of all that is. The debate between the two is but
a debate of the time, containing no possibility of a
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decisive encounter with the realities ^nri h«- dxiTii a d dangers of the
modern world.
Within the dialog of .an a strange and revealing irony
occurs. The more ™an conquers the world and becomes its
subject, making the thing ever .ore objective in its stand
against man, the more subjective and impetuously arbitrary
his Observation of it becomes, for in the thing man
encounters only himself, the one who as its architect,
imposed upon it its order and rank. His care to draw 1
line Of difference between himself and the thing, so that
he can be its master, comes to nothing, and comes to it
more certainly the more efficient and complete his conquest
of it. The observation of the world becomes an observation
of man, science becomes anthropology, and humanism becomes
the doctrine of the age.
Only possible in the world as picture, humanism is a
moral-aesthetic anthropology, according to the Thinker, an
anthropology not in the sense of an investigation of man by
a natural science, but in the sense of a archeology of man
which explains and values all that is from the standpoint
of man and in relation to man.
Since the 18th century, anthropology has increasingly
set its mark on discourse, and the proof of this is that
whatever is, is interpreted as a world view, an exclusively
human Weltanschauung. As soon as the world becomes a
picture for man, the position of man as viewer, constituted
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and limited by his historical situationt^ituat , becomes a world
view, one view among many possible.
This understanding of history and different ways of
life is, no doubt, the impetus behind the liberal state's
tolerance for different religions and its protection of
speech and assembly. Such tolerance was impossible for the
Greeks who dismissed "other world views" as barbaric, the
noisy babble of outsiders, or for the Christian Middle Ages
which labled them sin and conquered them with the salvation
Of true teachings. But the liberal state's tolerance is a
limited tolerance; it is unable to know the truth of any
opinion that does not consider itself subjective. m the
age of the world as picture, competing world views come to
the fore, but only those that articulate themselves as
subjective world views are allowed to complete their
dominion. Only that which secures, organizes, and
totalizes man as the guide and underlying reality of all
that is, is allowed to expand to its full extent. The
world as view contains all safely within the iron cage of
its tolerance, making the world secure for the subject.
In this struggle of world views, seeking to expand his
dominion, man brings into play his limitless power for the
calculating, planning, and molding of all things.
Containing within it anthropology as world view, science as
experimental research is necessary for the establishing of
archical human subjectivity.
CHAPTER V
ENARCHY
Modern technology is a revealing of truth, a way in
which the world worlds, the thing is brought forth and
assumes its identity. Unlike the truth of the early
Greeks, modern truth does not let the thing be itself, a
mystery brought from the earth, but instead imprisons it,
demanding that it become man's utility. [18] The old
windmill supplies energy for humans, but it need not take
from the wind anything that the wind, as physis, does not
freely give. Its sails may spin gently in the summer's
breeze, becoming a blurred whirl in the winter blizzard,
until its tail sail turns it to meet the spring winds that
come heavy with the rain for the growth of the towering
tree, the blooming flower, and the grass that feeds the
deer. It need not disturb the north winter wind that
brings a numbing frost, and it can let the summer afternoon
shower go its way after wetting the wildflowers of the
field that grow around it. At peace with the seasons, it
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need not steal energy f.o. the air currents and make the.
into something other than they are in order to be.
in contrast, the strip mine must imprison the earth,
make it totally subject to the human command, before it
puts out coal for man. Locked up in the prison of a purely
human archy, the earth becomes a coal mine for man, the
soil a mineral deposit for man, the sky a place for man to
dispose Of the wastes made by burning coal. All the earth
becomes a coal mine now because it is necessary for it to
supply the energy to spin the turbines that supply the
electricity to power the factories that supply the products
that the consumer consumes that must be consumed in order
for the worker to have work and for the owner to make money
to pay off his debts in order to keep the economy healthy
so that the state will have a sufficient tax base to build
the war machines that are necessary to protect the coal
mine. Nothing is left as it is or unchallenged by the
mastery of man, the modern archy who, having represented
everything to himself as his object, has the truth of all
that is at his disposal. Originating in man's
representations, subjected to man's command, everything
becomes available for man's utility.
The prairies of the American West that the Indians
formerly hunted upon and dug for roots, the fertile fields
that the Indians of California cultivated and set in order,
appear differently, are different, now than they were
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before the white .an ca.e with the interpretation of things
that industrial technology imposed on the.. The Indians
did not imprison the soil of the field with their
representations,
.ake it into their utility, or take fro.
it more than it had to give. But rather, they accepted it
as a divine
.ystery; they went along with it, responded to
it, and cared for it as a gift of the gods. Along with a
fish for fertility, they sowed seed in the earth, putting
it into the keeping of the forces of growth, trusting in
its powers of increase. Now, agribusiness sets upon the
soil, and, as if it were nothing more than the use made of
it, demands that it produce fiber, protein, vitamins, and
calories. Natural cycles are interrupted with herbicides,
pesticides, and fertilizers, leaving the soil a poisonous
chemical vat. The air is set upon to yield nitrogen and
carbon dioxoide; dammed and diverted, water is set upon to
yield its power of growth; and the soil is set upon to
yield its produce, then transformed into saline seep or
eroded away.
The truth of things as representations projected by
man and made available as calculative utility is limited,
constrained, and twisted into unanticipated forms by the
regime of efficiency which man subjects himself to. The
coal that has to be hauled out of a strip mine is not sent
for the fun of it, at the whim of its owners; it is
supplied because it useful, needed by some industrial
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process. :t is stoc.pixea, that is to say, at the call of
the system Of producing things as a totality, what it is
as a thing is contained and ordered within a system of
efficiency and rationality that g.eatly exceeds it, one
that is driven by economic and technical demands and social
and political imperativs the cover the whole earth
Because of the dangers of inefficiency to the global system
Of control, every thing-every plant, mineral, animal,
energy source, and human being-must be drawn into the
systems that reason has built and rendered productive.
Nothing can be left by itself; the security, rationality,
and well being of the whole system of control demands that
it be brought into its ordering.
The archy that rules over the destiny of things
throughout modern technology has a demanding, arrogant, and
conquering, character, challenging things to come forth and
be as they must be for man as technical master of the earth
to continue on to his destiny. The energies concealed in
nature are challenged forth as man's object,
representation, and utility. They are transformed into the
forms most useful for him, stored when and where it is
necessary for him, then distributed to serve his end uses,
which because they are many, interdependent, and complex,
are switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming,
storing, distributing, and switching about according to the
imperatives of man's reason are ways of revealing the truth
77
one
s
s a
an
of man as origin and command. As the modern archy, the
Whose representation reveals everything that is, whose
command everyting submits to, man is that for which
everything is organized, done, and accomplished. And yet
what is there to be organized, done, or accomplished?
Nothing except the human possiblity of command. since
there is no other origin or command to bring things forth,
save man, there is nothing to govern the bringing forth of
things, save the possibility of man's command. Nothing i
for anything except command. Everything, then, become
means for something else. The revealing never comes to
end, a goal, or a purpose. Man may, at last, be subject,
but his subjectivity is empty of content, of anything to
do. IS the end of the Rhine locked into supplying power for
production in factories for the consumption of heat and
light in the home, or is it there for the profits of the
electrical industry, or the steel and chemical industry,
then again might it not end in the security of the German
state? All of these ends through which human mastery
comes to itself fade into each other and are revealed as
intermediate, dependent, and lost in an aimless confusion
that must be mastered. In order for man to keep his
position as master over things, he must regulate and secure
things as they move about their interlocking paths, making
sure they follow the most efficient course. So much is
this so, that reformulating, regulating, and securing
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become the chief characteristics of reason's way of
revealing.
in the unconcealing of modern technology all things
are revealed in the world as the reserved, ordered to stand
by and submit to further ordering by man and his reason.
Things are and can be for modern technology only insofar as
they surrender their identity and stand ready to be
something else, whatever it is that man wills. As the
Objects of man's will, they no longer present themselves to
us as things, gathered together by a care that is near at
hand and responsive to the earth, but rather they come
forward as constituent parts of a technical system which
orders them over vast distances and compels them to
continually revise themselves according to man's will and
fit within the niches of the command.
Hegel defined the machine as autonomous tool,
immediately ready for the use that can be made of it, and
the Thinker agrees that when this definition is applied to
the tools of the craftsman it is correct because the
craftsman, responding to the calling of the earth, uses his
tools to respond to the thing before him, quite independent
of any other consideration. But this definition does not
think of the machine as belonging to the technology that
orders it and brings it forth in our age. Revealed as the
Reserved, the machine is not autonomous; it does not
respond to the earth, only to the command. It belongs to a
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technical syste., a co.ple. econc, o£ inte.aependent and
mutually constituting pa.ts, and the syste. dete.^ines what
the machine is-how it is ™ade. how it win be used, when
it is worn out, how it will be disposed of.
A tool is something that is used for something else, a
means for bringing a thing forth. Because they are a melns
for bringing something forth, they cannot be visualized
known apart from the world that they help bring forth.
interpretation of their uc?p i-h^-;^ ^uu se, their purpose, and their
meaning must be available for a tool to be a tool. By
themselves they are nothing. a hoe is for tilling the
earth and making it possible to bear fruit. Depending on
the world that it is used in, it can reveal the earth's
power to be fruitful or it can reveal the power of man to
impose his will upon it. A tool always refers to a
totality, a god as the Thinker would describe it in his
more poetic works, which provides an interpretation of its
use and gives meaning to its purpose. A tool is for
something, yet it is the fundamental charater of our age,
when everthing has become a tool for man, that our tools
are for nothing. The thing that the modern tool brings
forth, the purpose that gives the tool its meaning as tool,
is only another tool, another instrument for man's willing.
The revealing never comes to an end, a god that would make
the tool a tool by making it into a means for something.
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This is Why nihilism, the purposeless and ai.less win
Of everything as a means for man, is the ultimate truth of
our age. Por us in our use of things there rs no god
providing an interpretation of their use, nothing to tell
US what a thing is for.
It is man, the tool user, through whom the challenging
of the thing takes place, it is he through whom the thing
is revealed as the Reserved, and it is he who accomplishes
the thoughtless, purposeless, and nihilistic destruction of
the earth. But, despite his arrogrant illusions to the
contrary, man does not control unconcealing itself, decide,
will, or cause the thing to come forth as the Reserved. On
the contrary, the identity or interpretation of the thing
precedes and poseses man, granting him its truth as will
amidst the modern world's worlding. if the world has come
to us and been interpreted as the lighting of ideas since
the time of Plato, it is not Plato, the writer who is the
cause of this--he only responded to what presented itself
to him. If the world now is, in its entirety, a tool for
our use, it is not that way because we have willed it that
way, but because that way is the way that has possessed us.
It is only because man is already possessed by the
ordering challenging that conquers the world as the
Reserved that he dwells amidst it as such. And if man is
possessed by a world that is present as the Reserved, he
himself becomes more profoundly and more terribly the
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Reserved, the object of his wiUing. A„a as proof of this
we see human labor replaced by machines, because it is ™ore
gainful, and the unemployed treated little better than worn
out machines, a useless clutter only grudgingly left any
space at all.
The modern farmer may grow some of the same crops,
work the same fields, and live in the same house as his
grandfather, but unlike his grandfather, who grew a
diversity of crops primarily for himself and his family and
only secondarily for profit, the modern farmer is commanded
by the aimless imperatives of profit making in
Agribusiness. As a business man or a worker he is
subjected both to the market that organizes and fabricates
the demand for food and to the market that supplies him
with the technology of production that he uses. The food
that he grows is grown not for the health of his family or
those whom he trades with, but for the cash necessary to
pay off his debts and his interest on them, and to buy the
equipment, fertilizer, chemicals, and fuel necessary for a
cash crop. The cash crop bought from the farmers is,
again, sold not for the health of the person that eats it,
but for the profits of the food processing, transportation,
advertizing, and retail industries. Because health is not
the concern that gathers the crop up and sets it onto the
table, many dangerous chemicals and additives are present
in it in order to secure its prof i tabli ty
.
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so .uch has the health and nut.itlve concern of food
-.ing disappeared £.0™ its production, that the cost of
the wrapper for a loaf of bread is greater than the cost of
the Wheat in it. But this is not surprising, because the
function of the wr;=innor- -= ^ Japper as advertisement and preserver is
to insure that its consumption is available on demand. The
truth Of the consumer as Reserved for the food industry is
again demonstrated by the monstrous actions of the Nestle'
corporation in the "under" developed world.
A dramatic reduction of demand for baby formula, one
Of Nestle.
s products, followed the end of the baby boom in
the united States. m order to keep its factories going
and its profits high. Nestle' began an advertizing campaign
throughout the underdeveloped world. Bottle feeding was
sold as a "modern" technique, much more sophisticated than
breast feeding. However, because of conditions in the
underdeveloped world-low per capita income, poor sanitary
conditions, ignorance about modern technology-bottle
feeding turned out to be entirely inappropriate, resulting
in the death of tens of thousands of babies wherever it was
used. Mothers could not afford the amount of formula
necessary, so they diluted it with water, often unsanitary
water, thinking that would be OK because the formula's
powers, as they were presented in the adver t izements
, were
so great. The result was malnutrition, disease, and death.
Both the farmer and the consumer are revealed as the
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Reserved by the food indust.y-the consume, because his
consumption is a thing to be manipulated and controlled by
advertizing technology, the farmer because his craft is
measured by by its usefulness to the food industry,
"inefficient" farmers go broke and become surplus farmers.
The ugly truth of the farmer as Reserved by the food
Industry is best revealed by President Reagan's joke that
we should keep the wheat and export the farmers. From time
to time, though, the farmer's work is dignified and
surrounded with respect when his cash crops for export
become a weapon, a tool to punish and control communist and
3rd world countries that resist the will of our foreign
policy managers.
As the developers and propagandists for the
technologies of human control, we social scientists are
especially useful for the maintenance, perfection, and
security of the challenging which treats people as the
Reserved. No doubt we will become yet more useful as the
world system becomes more strained and falls to its doom.
Yet man is not gathered into the Reserved as the
energies of nature are becasue he is not passive before its
onslaught. In subjecting the world to his will and making
it into the Reserved, man subjects himself to his reason
and his destiny, driving technology forward. But the world
itself, within which the ordering challenge unfolds, is not
and never can be a human handiwork. The world worlds
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Whenever
.an opens his eyes, unlocks his ea.s, ana attends
to What presents itself to hi™. i„
^.^
living, his meditations and his entreating,
.an reveals the
world, bringing its things forth from unconcealment in the
earth. When man reveals the thing, he is merely responding
to the calling of the world, the breaking forward of the
earth, even when he contradicts it. when man,
investigating, observing, ensnares nature within a web of
his own pictures, he is already claimed by a way of
revealing that requires him to approach nature as an object
Of research. And nothing will stop this way of revealing,
even if, contradicting itself, the thing disappears into
the nihilistic thinglessness of the Reserved, becoming
no-thing in the endless web of reason's revealing.
Ordering and revealing the thing as the Reserved,
modern technology is not anything man does, then. He is
gathered into it, captured by the world's worlding. The
gathering of the thing, the truth of the world, specific to
the modern age of technology the Thinker calls Ge-stell, or
Enframing as it is commonly translated. Enarchy, as I
shall think it, is the originary claim, the command and
interpretation of things, that governs the world, revealing
it as the Reserved, a mere tool for man's endless and
aimless willing. The commanding origin enframes in that
its interpreting assembles and orders, traping everything
that it brings forth in a framework or system, ordering it
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for a use that is always
.est.uctu.ea and
.evealea anew as
-n.swln. Nihilistic through out its whole extent
anarchy is the way of revealing that is the essence oi
modern technology, but it itself is nothing technological
Since it in its originary truth is in no way anything
mechanical, calculative, or procedural. Ma.ing the machine
calculating and rational procedure possible, it is what
precedes .an's will and reveals the world as the Reserved,
the truth producing the thing and presenting it as .an's
utility. A truth preceding man, it is not, therefore, a
human activity, nor a .ere means within such activity, but
a way of being governing how things are brought forth, a
truth that knows everything as a coherence of forces
available for exacting calculation and measurement. The
essence of technology is not represented by gadgets, exotic
tools, and technical accomplishments such as the computer,
the space shuttle, or the nuclear reactor, but rather it is
present as a ruling command that sets man up as its origin.
Contrary to popular opinion, far more radical revolutions
in technology separate Parmenides from Aristotle, and the
16th century from the 18th century, than anything that has
occured in the last century. Between Parmenides and
Aristiotle and the 16th and 17th century, entirely
different ways of being broke forth from the earth and came
into their truth, separating the past from the present with
a radical gap of incommensurability. Amid all of the
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supposed technical revolutions of the modern age, there is
in fact complete continuity. au of the technical
accomplishments of our time have occured within a way of
being that has in its essence remained the same. [19]
our way of being was first revealed in the rise of
modern Physics as an exact science.
.s we saw, modern
science's view of the world as picture, its seperation ot
the world into subject and object, pursues and entraps the
earth as a calculable coherence of forces. And it is
experimental not because it is first and foremost
empirical, but because it projects nature as something
mathematically calculable and measurable in advance. The
possibilities, that is, the variables formalized within its
structure, of the experiment are ordered and structured in
advance so that knowledge can be gained of how nature
reveals itself when set up in this way.
But modern mathematical physics existed almost 2
centuries before the revolutions of modern technology
started occur ing. "How, then," the Thinker asks, "could it
have it have already been set upon by modern technolgy and
placed in its ser vice?
" [ 20 ] Although modern tehcnolgy
advances with the aid of the sciences, it does so only
because the way has been prepared for it by the modern
physical theory of nature. And this is precisely what the
essence of modern technolgy does; it reveals things,
pictures them, objectifies them, in a way that makes it
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possible fo. the sciences to .now the.. Mtho.^h ™o.e.n
physical science begins in the seventeenth century, and
machine-power technology develops only in the second half
Of the eighteenth century, the essence of technology is
revealing and holding sway from the very start of the
modern age.
The calling that gathers man into Enarchy is his
destiny and his doom-his destiny because from the
beginning of our world, he is sent on his way to it; his
doon because the way to it obliterates all that he is in
his essence. But destiny is never a fate that merely
compels, for it is only in meeting his destiny, following
the ways of the world worlding, that man finds his essence
and his freedom.
As we said before, the essence of freedom is not
connected with the will, collective or individual, or even
in the causality of human willing. Man does not come to
his freedom by means of his arbitrary choice, neither does
he come to it in the constraint of law, nor he does he come
to it by means of a demystified fully rational and
reflective consciousness; he comes to it by sparing the
world, preserving the mystery of the earth and all the
things that break forward from it, and meeting his destiny.
Anarchy governs the opening which lights up and reveals
things as they bloom from the earth, and it happens as the
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occurance of a temporal truth. Gathering a world into
itself in the midst of mortal dwelling, the truth of things
is drawn forth from the concealing mystery and humanity
comes to its freedom by letting the anarchy of the world's
worlding or the thing's thinging be. Seeking neither to
command nor to trace its origin back to a universal and
eternal principle, anarchy is a freeing presencing which
conceals in a way that opens the thing up, letting the
mysteries of the earth be what they are and the visible
openess of the sky be what it is.
As Enarchy, modern technology, too, is a way of
revealing things, of coming to truth. it is our destiny.
But, according to the Thinker, being free to meet our
destiny does not mean that we must blindly and
thoughtlessly push on with technology, nor does it mean
that we must reject it, rebelling helplessly against it and
cursing it as an endless evil. Either action is only a
continuation of the will's willing, a judgement that
Enarchy is in full accordance with. However, when we open
ourselves up to the essence of technology, knowing it as a
way of revealing things, we can free ourselves of its
relentless logic and meet the things it reveals as they
are--not as the objects of our will, but as the earth
breaking forth.
Placed between these possibilities, open to Enarchy,
closed to anarchy, the essence of man is endangered by his
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very destiny. The destiny of Enarchy is, thus, a dan.e.
and a doc. And the Thin.e. tells us that while
.an .ay
well destroy hi.self and his planet with the aweso.e power
Of his machinery of war and production, it is only because
he is already dead-dead because his essence is concealed
from him and because he pictures himself as only his will.
Seeking to be master of the earth, the sovereign archy of
all the world, the will that wills everything,
.an is dead
to his calling to be the guardian of the world, the sparing
preserver of all the earth's things.
When earth's things come to presence in the light of a
cause-effect coherence, even God loses all that is exaulted
and holy, and the mystery of his distance disappears, for
in the light of causality God becomes merely the first
cause, the mechanic of creation. Even in theology, God
becomes the God of experimental science, his mystery
concealed by the causality of making. m America nowhere
is this more evident than in the recurring battle
Creationists have with Evolutionists. Evolution, it is
asserted by our devout critics of modern science, didn't
cause all the plants and animals and especially man to come
into being, God did. Indebted to the science of causality,
yet rejecting its scientific truth, such a God as the
Creationists have can only be maintained with the most
profound hypocrisy, and such a God is in fact dead. Why
else does Jerry Falwell demand frequent loyalty oaths from
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his teachers at his Bible College?
When wo.ia.s aestin, is Ena..,, u is i„ sup.e.e
aan.e..
.He aan.e. co.es upon
.an i„
„,,3.
things are present no longer as the earth',Liie s mystery but
exclusively as the Keservea, an. it beco.es
.an's aestiny
to be the
.aster oE the Reserved through his reason, he
co.es to the brin. o. an catastrophe, a precipitous
£all--he hi.self beco.es Reserved, the object of his own
willing. Meanwhile *-u, as the one threatened,
.an exalts
hi.self as the lord of the earth, the one who's constructs
and representations constitute things as a coherence of
forces. This humanist illusion deludes man into believing
that in everything he encounters he meets only himself.
But in truth, man no where encounters only hi.self, his
essence. So totally is .an locked into Enarchy that he
does not understand it as a calling, that he is possessed
by it, and that he is the one spoken to. He fails in every
way to dwell as a mortal letting the world world, the earth
be. He, thus, can never encounter only himslf, because
what he is, is concealed from him by his way of being.
Enarchy not only denys man his truth, throwing into
oblivion his relationship to himself and to everything that
is, it subjects man himself to its ordering, driving out
every other possibility of revealing by its discipline.
Through its compelling demand for order and reason, Enarchy
conceals and represses any sense of a revealing which lets
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Or^erin,,
.eg.latln,, ana sec.in,
as the
.ese.vea
Ena.chy.en.s thin.s t.ei. own fundamental oha.acte.!
thei. identity that inte.p.ets the. in the awellin, of
humanity. Ena.chy not only aenys things ana all humanity
their truth, it conceals revealing itself, ana with it the
way in which truth comes to presence.
ordering the world, Enarchy locRs truth into its
order, denying it any possibility of becoming present as a
gift Of Being and holding sway over humanity as such. The
destiny that sends us to Enarchy is consequently the
extreme danger. But it is not technology itself that is
dangerous, the evil that denys man and the thing their
essential truth. It is not the machinery of aestruction
and production that technology has made, nor is it their
awesome power that may result in a cold and dark death in a
wasted land, that is the extreme danger of Enarchy, it is
the truth of things, the truth that permits the dissolution
of man's being, his calling to be guardian of the earth,
that makes our destiny into a doom. Machines of limitless
destruction and production are nothing and hold no sway,
unless they are ordered into use. Ordered as the Reserved,
compelled by the necessities of reason, these machines are
useful in a world that uses them.
CHAPTER VI
THE FLIGHT OF THE GODS
Like a river flowing to the sea, a comet falling into
the sun, our age is rushing to its apocalypse, its doom and
terrible truth. Perhaps it is possible that a few mortals,
huddling like caveman around fires beneath the towering
monoliths of our age will survive the collapse of the world
our reason has built. Perhaps many more than that will
survive. But this much is certain: Enarchy, a world born
such a short time ago and already pregnant with its doom,
cannot, for it is not possible for it to attain its truth
as master of all the earth, to assert its rigorous
organization of reason over everything, without begetting
its monstrous nemesis, destroying itself with the
irrationalities that escape its control. The more Enarchy
spreads its control over everything, the more it makes
irrationality possible, exacerbating the dangers it sought
to eliminate. We cannot overcome the doom of our age with
yet another triumph of our technology, yet another
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assertion of our mastery, because any attempt to escape our
fate through experimental research, calculating reason, and
technological triumph will only serve to advance its cause
and assure our doom. Herein lies the tragedy of our age.
For it truly is not from our weaknesses, our failure to
master the things we have not controlled and hope to
overcome, but from our very method of solving all our
problems, our truth and way of technical mastery itself,
that we Shall come to our doom. When all the world becomes
cold and dark, when death becomes a tidal wave that swirls
over all the earth, it will not be our greatest tragedy,
only our last. Before that, preceding it, making it
possible, was a doom that called us to our fate, a doom
that possessed us before we were born, and now locks us
ever more tightly in its grip with every attempt we make at
escape
.
It is the scientific sovereign of our discourse that
is the danger of our age. It is this self which, knowing
that it is not always the sovereign master and interior
cause of its actions, feels that it must know the ways it
is dispossessed of sovereignty, and then, by becoming
master of the causes formerly external to itself, repossess
its sovereignty and asset its power. Suspicious that
there is always a cause or power external to itself, while
obsessed with being the master of itself, the modern
sovereign is possessed by a grim and all-consuming will to
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-cUnations, an. sec.ets
..st confess thel. aiffloult
inte„ogated with a cola
.uthless
.eal to see if their
-ality ana t.uth is not something aiffe.ent than what .an
has
.asterea.
.li things a.e heia in
.ese.ve fo.
.eason as
something else than itself o^,„n , some concealed truth or being
that must not escape the scientific sovereign.
TO our age of power through technology, of mastery
through reason, were born three great masters of
suspicion-Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. Though they are
each different from each other in their own way (and
Nietzsche much more ambiguously than the other two)
, they
are united in a metaphysic, a technology of truth and
power, that makes man the archy of all beings, the
potential master of all the world. The three great masters
of suspicion share this in common: a deep and abiding
suspicion of appearances and accepted interpretations of
them, and a certainty that their truth lies either in
translating them into the language of human desire, or
understanding them as a human production, or conceiving
them as the all-too-human deposits of the will to power.
Before each of these masters of suspicion man finds himself
dispossessed by a reality he let slip away from his self,
and, finding his delusions intolerable, is called on to
overcome himself, to grab the opaque night of all of his
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lies to M.seU necK and
...e t.e. into nis own
.he
.ysti.yin, Of cuss exploitation t.e.e shall 5e
the«or.e..s paradise of co«s., where there was the
rancorous slave there shall be the overman.
The .o.ent of affirmation for all these
.asters of
suspicion is the moment where man returns to himself as the
abiding power, and wills only himself as master-the moment
When the future classless society and its transparent
values become actual, the moment when the ego masters the
id and disolves its pathology, the moment when the
revaluation of all values is understood as the positing of
value
.
But what is the fruit of all this suspicion, this
attempt to assert control over all that has escaped its
logic? It is nihilism, the radical repudiation of value
and meaning, the dissolution of the world man's reason has
built. For Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, moral truth is
approached not as something which is a response to the need
of dwelling, nor the truth of the stay of mortals upon the
earth, but as an object of knowledge to be researched and
analyzed, whose genealogy must be chronicled and synchronic
structure mapped, whose causes must be calculated and
transformations submitted to scientific interrogation and
understanding. Knowing everything as nothing but a
re-presentation of man, the necessity of control reduces
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eve.nhin,,
t.a.itions, ana instU.Uons, to
Withct direction o. ai., aU that it
.an „iu is ™ote of
itself,
.o.e technology,
.ore power, ™ore
.astery-„ore of
n-an. Having accomplished the possibility of control
mastery underlines the value of the things it has
conquered. It engages itself in a ceaseless struggle to
become only itself, mastery transparent and pure. And yet
what institution or value c^^n cm^,,^a survive this accomplishment?
Once everything becomes man's value if .s . It can be revalued,
reassessed at whim fnrn , o whatever reason man wills. And
because the value of evprvfh i r,^ ^ ur e yt ing can be reassessed at will,
according to whatever man at the moment wills, it losel
whatever value it could have, becoming totally valueless.
It is these three masters of suspicion who, speaking
the only truth available to our time, setting themselves up
as the sovereigns before whom all values must pass in
review and render up an account of themselves, it is these
three who have spoken the word that killed God for us,
vanquishing all the hope, value, and meaning that he gave.
Before the age of Enarchy, before the time when man became
master of all the earth and beyond, God was the absolute
positer of value and meaning, the creator of a metaphysical
whole, a beyond, infinitely superior to man which
possessed man's being with its purposes and its ends. So
far beyond man, it was nothing that he could even dream of
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controlling. xt was not a whole put t.e.e ourselves
out o. all-too-hu.an needs,
.ut a whole that was Its owl
necessity, a beyond by which we ™easu.ed ou.sel.es,
.alued
things, and lived ou. lives by.
,he ceal™ of the
-taphysical was li.e the light of Piato.s sun shining down
on us, lighting up our practices and actions with meaning
and purpose. it was our guide and our hope. But then,
technical man, swallowing ud th^ qo. • •p e sea, wipmg away the
horizon, unhinging the earth frr^my n o the sun, put himself in
the Place of authority. Now, as the technician of value,
the judge of all conventions and practices, the sovereign
Of the new archy, he rose up, as subject, and transformed
everything, including the metaphysical realm, into a
scientific object to be prodded and turned over, analyzed
and dissected. Morals became conventions, beliefs became
values, faith became a delusion, and all were held in
reserve for the social technologist, the propagandist, the
advertizer, the r evolutionary-to work upon, to transform,
and to make more rational, more useful. Casting God down
from his throne of authority, we became the technicians of
all value positing, and the value we, as masters, have of
things becomes the truth we impose on them. m our age the
sun no longer emits light of itself, free of our meddling,
but is instead a dull and dimmed moon, getting what light
it gets from us, the masters of the earth. Once
autonomous, the metaphysical realm is now nothing but a
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made necessary by repressed desire.
The scientific sovereign of our age seeksys K to surpass,
to overcome, man's finitude i,r^up to now, making itself the
primary characteristic of aU that is, drawing itself and
everything else up into its own willing, a pure win
wUlingonly itself. that is, is as that which is
mastered, linked together as the win of man.
.u the
archys or gods which formerly conditioned and limited the
essence Of man, providing an interpretation to his life
his actions, and the things In his life, have fled the
earth. They, and especially the Christian patriarchal god,
are dead. As the scientific sovereign In control of
everything, man has killed them, plundered the temple, and
desecrated all that Is holy. The world has become
lifeless, dead, a circle without a center.
Too true, there is Christian faith here and there.
And sometimes it rises up with fanatical strength, but the
love, and the hatred which more often sustains it, is not
the effective, determining truth of our time. No modern
state listens to the will of God, and in America, the
prototype of the modern state, anything associated with
God, Is rigorously excluded from the actions of the state.
No multinational corporation responds to anything except
profit and power. As subject, as the builder and maker of
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things,
.an can neither pray nor sacrifice to the
.odern
God; he is far removed from the use we .ake of things, the
way we live, and our place of .astery on the earth. Once
thought and lived as the truth and interpretation of
everything real, the realm of the holy has become unreal in
the world man's reason, science, and technology has built,
in our work, our making, our living, and everything we do,
the holy, the interpretation of what our being was for, is
gone. With its disappearance all the things of the world
lose their divine truth or interpretation, the trees, the
flowers, the birds, the animals, the sins of man and woman,
the nature of their works, and everything else. All
morals, traditions, and institutions have lost their
meaning because the archy around which they were built has
lost its place in the order of things. No longer is the
image of the holy, the divine design, the underlying truth
of things. This is what Nietzsche means when he says that
God is dead. it is not a claim about God's existence or
nonexistence, but an assertion that God is irrelevant to
this age of man, no longer near to us in our life.
The history of the West is the history of the
progressive concealment of Being, the silencing of the
earth. Where once the name for Being was "physis," the
blooming forth, a sudden and inexplicable revelation, after
Socrates, after the Romans had mistransalated Being
"natura," after Christianity made knowledge of Being into a
100
dogma and metaphysics, Being appeared instead as a physical
process of action and reaction, more and more a chain of
causes and effects available for reason. Along with
Platonism, Christianity is initially responsible for
withdrawing Being from the earth, were it was revealed to
the early Greeks, and removing it to a metaphysical
beyond. [21] The essence of things moves beyond (meta) the
earth (physis)
,
becoming metaphysical. The earth is closed
off and man is no longer confronted with its mystery. Cut
off from the earth as the revelation of Being, Christianity
turns to scripture, which silences all questioning before
its dogmatism, and to metaphysics, which elevates
categorical understanding as the way of knowing Being.
Although it has become the history of world,
Christianity need not have turned to metaphysics and
dogmatism. According to the Thinker, the apostles John and
Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther, still were able to
experience Being as the abyss of God, to feel the holy
rising up through them, but as soon as they attempted to
explain their experience, they became entangled in
metaphysics and dogmatism. Some Christian mystics, like
Meister Eckhart, managed to avoid the traps of dogmatism
and metaphysics by using contradiction and tautology, but
they were unable to find any listeners. They became
saints, vehicles for the church to expand a new dogmatism.
Perhaps in our day Wendell Berry is a Christian that has
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not succumbed to the tcaps of aog^atis., sc.iptu.e, and
metaphysics. Although Christianity has occassional flashes
Where it has access to Being as revelatory enig.a, such
flashes are quickly overwhelmed by the dogma of
metaphysically interpreted scripture. As a result, God is
no longer a way of Being, a world whose worlding calls on
man to encounter the mystery of the earth, but a being who
has created both man and nature and who has revealed
himself in and as Christ. As the creator of all beings,
God is understood by dogmatic Christianity as merely the
highest and most real being, the first cause. Being itself
is, as a result, more completely interpreted in terms of
instrumentality, retreating even further from the human
dwelling place.
As a result of the entrapment of the earth in
metaphysics and dogmatism, the retreat of the holy form the
earth and the dwelling place of humanity to the
metaphysical beyond, the fundamental way of man upon the
earth is as a faithful believer. Cut off from the earth,
the source of the holy, by metaphysics and dogma, the only
thing left to humanity is faith, the abandonment of all
questioning, all thinking. Possessing no access to God
save scripture and the certainty of faith, the beliver's
God must be incomprehensible, beyond all human
understanding. It is a distant god, the Christian god, far
from the dwelling place of humanity. It is within this
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nihilism approaches.
Moae.nit, appeals fi.st as the aoubting of all
traaitional authocity, and especially the authority o£
sc.iptu.al
.evelation. ooubtln, eve.ythln,,
.an tu.ns not
to the ea.th but to hl.self as the certainty o£ eve.ythin.
And yet, despite the dissolution of Cod and the
.ise of
man, Ena.chy regains fundamentally Chcistain in its way of
Being: the certainty of faith becomes the certainty of
doubt, divine creation becomes modern technology, and
throwing Cod down from his place of authority, man himself
becomes the highest being, the prime mover, and final end
Of the world. Even when God is dead we remain good
Christians.
we will not escape the truth of this terrible and
haunted thought by being blind to it, dismissing it as the
final delusion of a history that for too long thought that
God mattered. Despite ourselves, lurking always at the
corners of our thought, our dead God will remain an uncanny
guest, all the more pervasive and influential the less he
is thought.
According to the Thinker, we do poor service to a
thinker when we but repeat their thought, interpret it, or
extrapolate it correctly. We do a thinker honor only when
we think his thought, listen to the earth breaking forward
in it. And this means that we think what is essential in
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theU t.ou..., tha. we a.aw it nea. to ou. Uves ana ai.ect
ou.selves to the
.nthou,.t in their thought, thin.in, a„a
perhaps, living thei. thoughts
.oce aeepl, than they
.1
he aces this foe Nietzsche, (22, the Thin.e. does not li.it
hi.seu to a correct interpretation of his thought, hut
goes beyona it to the woria that woriaea Nietzsche ana his
thought. This rneans that there is yet .ore horrors in the
aepthsof Nietzsche-s nihilis. ana aoo.ea aespair than
Nietzsche himself thought, that aespite himself, Nietzsche
has not overcome nihilism but only servea to extena it.
Accoraing to Nietzsche, the aeath of Goa makes
possible the overman, the one who will revalue all values,
and make himself into master of the earth. This shouia not
simply mean that man, in the form of the overman, directly
takes the place of God, usurping his position as he
dissolves his authority, because this would not be thinking
in a holy way about the holy. Mortal and all too human, man
cannot put himself in the place of God because the essence
of man aoes not reach up to the realm of the holy. No,
according to the Thinker, something more uncanny happens.
Thought metaphysically, as it has been throughout the
entire history of Christianity, the place of authority
belonging to God is as the cause and preservation of
everything that Is. Everything belongs to God because he
created it. But this place can remain empty, and insteaa
of being occupied, another place, another way of Being,
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corresponding to the age of the overm^^ny cn ma , can appear in the
sky~a place that is identic;?! w-i *-kla ntical with neither the realm
belonging to God no. to the
.eal. of
.an unde. his
authority. The place that .an co.es to occupy i„ his ti.e
as the overman is unique to itself, bearing no relation to
What was. Despite dissolving his authority, the overman
does not usurp the place of God, rather he lives in another
world, another time, and another archy governing the way of
things. This other way of worlding, which is the way of
Enarchy, is subjectness.
Everything which is, now is for a subject, an object
re-presented before an ego cogito. viewing the world as
picture, the ego comes to be that which underlies its own
activity, like a mathematician positing the form and
structure of things. Returning to itself from its object,
the essence of consciousness is self-consciousness.
Everywhere, for every modern thinker, Nietzsche as well as
Descartes, the worlding of whatever is, is as
re-presentation, a subject setting itself before itself.
Worlding, the world is viewed as picture, as r epresentable
object. Everything is delivered over to human
representing, putting it in the midst of human positing,
calculating, and mastery. The earth itself is revealed as
the object of an assault, an aggressive challenge that
draws its circle around everything. Nature becomes the
dominated object of man and his technology, and the will to
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power becomes the truth of all things.
As the world comes to be as object and t-K
^ ^
u the struggle
Of
.u.an su.3ectness is
..i„in, UseU to
IS the dissolution of itself th^I . T e completion of this truth
about all things-which is as the winn ll to power, whether itknows itself as that or not-ist IS becoming certain and
conscious of itsplf ;5 c n,-,^i.e as master. According to the Thinker,
self-conscousness is the necessary instrument of the
Willing that Wilis as the will to power, whether it is the
therapy mediated consciousness of Preud, the class
consciousness of Marx, or the feminist consciousness of sex
as the artifical and man made fabrication dominating
feminine lives. Objectifying the world and everything that
denys it its completion, self-consciousness as a way of
Being becomes necessary for economic planning, for rational
childrearing, for psychiatric therapy, for a scientific
theology, for the liberation of the oppressed. Obstacles
must be overcome, traditions modified, irrational values
and superstitions disposed of, contradictions resolved
before control Is complete and fully rational. The quest
for self-consciousness finds it necessary to ceaselessly
dissect history, to objectify and interpret it as one thing
or another man has possession of. Once this correct
Interpretation of history is made, reduced to the entirely
human thing that secretly determines it, underlies it, and
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-pes us aesun.,
.,en U ca„
^^^^
subject to human will.
respite his c.i,i,.e oe the su.^ece,
.eason, ana
sc.ence, the thought of
.ietzsche
.ep.esents the "..eat
noon" Of h^an subjectivity, the ti.e of
..i.htest
brightness when consciousness 5eco.es conscious of itself
as the „iu to po„e..
.t iast unasha.ea of itself, „inin.
Objectifies everything in its wo.ia,
.a.ing it all totally
ana uniformly secure as something
.esecvea for itself. But
as the will to power wiiic ^4.^lls itself, it must also will the
history that makes it oossihlAp b e, every moment of it as the
Eternal Return of the Sa.e. To will everything as it is,
even the most horrible of
.events, the most terrible of
conaitions, is to accept ana profounaiy affir™ the
consciousness that reveals the will to power as the archy
Of everything. At the moment that everything is wiUea as
it is, as it was, as it always will be, the will to power
becomes i tself-conscious of itself as the will to power,
attaining its highest freeaom, the freeaom to be the master
of the earth.
At high noon when the will to power affirms itself ana
is conscious of itself as the will to power, the woria
worias as value, as something positea ana affirmea by the
will to power. All things become valuable, placeain a
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nonotonously exclusive celation with the pute, H
^. ^
^'^^ r ly human willthat evaluates and places the. in a
.elation .
„ 1 .
'^elati to itself
—3 the essence o. the enti.e
„o.ia, thl
^^nn. .uth o. eve..th.n. as the
.ese.vea.
.3 thethinker of the will to r.^power, Nietzsche is fullest
expression of technology.
estee.ea than
.ein, as value-ana positin, the wo.ia as
value is how Niet.sche ove.co.es the valuelessness o£ all
values-yet, according to the Thin.e., this is not t.ue
Wo.iain. itself as value, the wo.ia is onl, ae,.aaea
.o.e.'
Nihilis. is not overcome, it is extenaea to its te^i.ie
-canny, conclusion, when the wotia wo.ias as value itl
essence is sealea off f.o. itself, obliterating eve.y way
Of experiencing the
.ystery of Being, the erupting power of
the earth.
But this has long been the destiny and doom of Western
thinking. since Plato, since Christianity, Western thought
is marked by its metaphysical closure, its inward necessity
for making the Being of all things a being, for
interpreting the inward truth of a thing as an archy of
some sort-the one God, the logos, transcendental reason,
sexual drives, class dynamics, or whatever, and cutting
itself Off from the earth. When finally, with the triumph
of technology, the woria appears as value ana power,
rendering valueless all previous metaphysical systems.
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metaphysics is only fulfilling its destiny th»u , e complete
concealment of the earth.
in ou. age when technology has
.ade us the master of
everything because it is held as the Rese„ed and is as
value for us, the oblivion of Beina fh^ ^r g, t e concealment of the
earth, the dar. night of the world, haunts us
unforgivingly. Closing inward on Itself around
.an, the
world worlds nothing,
„o-thing. Held as the Reserved,
everything loses itself in Enarchy, an ai.less, groundless
willing of the will. Nothing permeates our lives, our
work, our things, our gods and beckons at us fro™ our
graves. Subjected to control, everything has lost its
center, its purpose, the archy that it is for, disappearing
in a uniformly and infinitely distant mist of oblivion.
Nothing, no-thing, is near at hand, close to the dwelling
place. And thinking in terms of values only draws it
nearer to hand, becoming pure nihilism. Nihilism, as the
revaluing of all values hitherto, is overcome as an
affirmation of valuing, only within its own metaphysics.
Taking the will to power as the truth of everything,
valuing does not let the world world, allow Being to be as
Being, or the earth to bring forth its mystery, but instead
brings about the consumation of nihilism.
Not only does this metaphysics of the will to power
not think Being as itself and does not spare it its
identity, it overturns all metaphysics, setting itself up
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-
t.e
.e..ta.io„ o. aU previous
^e.apH.sics. Bue
aevaluauon o.
.eeap.,sica: ana
..e
.eva:.a..on o.
.HePhysical, is stiU determined, and in essence
.
, . remains
-ent.cai
^^^^^^^
-taphysics,
..t metaphysics with a aie.e.ence. it has
concealed
..o. itsei, its own metaphysical essence, ac.iy
th.owin, Bein, into o.Uvion. Once the wo.ia is esteemed
as value, and the trut-h of ^-u^ u .ut O the technical world as the will
to power comes into its own r.., all questions concerning the
wo.ldin. Of value become supetfl.o.s and
.emain that way
If, as the Thinner ar,.es we should, we thinK Niet.sche's
overthrow of metaphysics as metaphysical despite itself,
then it and everything it overcomes remains nihilistic'
interpreting God and all the metaphysical as the highest of
all values, devaluing them, and interpreting them as the
will to power, Nietzshe's metaphysic is not thought from
out Of Being itself. Taking the will to power as the Being
Of everything, it unknowingly gives God, the first of all
beings, the ultimate blow by degrading God to the highest
of all values. God died not because he could not be
believed, nor because his existence could not be proved,
but because he becomes the highest being, the first cause,
and then the highest value, a cultural and social artifact.
This attack against God comes not first and foremost from
Nietzsche, nor secular humanists, athiests and their ilk.
no
but from Christian theology itself. secular h
^ -, ,
umanism does
w at Christianity
.ir3t started
„hen i.
.^n o.
: - - ^ --^.3i.l ..on.
--^ to ^hin. o. eem.Itself, to stand astonished before fh« . . .^"•"^ actual presence ofthe holy in the life and dwellinq of hs g humanity.
Christianity cuts man off f,om the earth th^n , e myterious
abyss from which piMall th.ngs come, by knowing God only
through scripture. Thrnnr^v,rough scripture and dogma, it
continually thinks God as onlv . k3 y a being, the underlying
metaphysical reality of the wori^y ld, never as a truth made
present by the world worlding.
According to NietzschP nr^t- ^ iiNieczs e, not only is God dead, but
-ch worse and terrifying, he was Killed by all-too-hu.al
-n. God was killed; the highest of all beings, was
vulnerable to .an's insurrection, man's rebellious uprising
into the self positing I-ne.s of the ego cogito. Through
this rebellion which so suddenly and mysteriously was
thrust on us, everything is transformed into object, and
the objectivity of the object is swallowed up by
self-positing subjectivity. God no longer lights up the
world from the authoritative heights of the metaphysical,
but now is nothing more than a value posited by the will to
power, a truth to be established by experimental science.
And now, even our most devout fundamentalists talk of
Ill
Christian values.
The killing of God brinas ^"lying a new metaphvsip ir,*- u •
abolishing the old n, . u ^ ^^'"5'g n metaphysical world, makin. •
for
.an to be the subject and
'^'^'''^
^ D master of everything
The death of God is an
^•^Vthing natural.
^ a IS event that doeqn'i- o
c^nHH ^- ^° "^^^h mark thea.sappe..„.e o.
.
^„ ^^^^^ ^
under which the multihnHoo ^tudes were called +-k •
M-o^, ^^^^^ God in theMiddle Ages is not the skv nnn. u-
, ,
""'"^ "^^^h called to our
^
unbridgeable difference, difficult
to aiscern and largely unnoticed as yet, separates us fromtnem.
to
.eet.
.cco.a.n. to t.e Thin.e., a su..ey o„
.isto.,
-veals that „e neve, have thought the t.uth of Bein,
Itself, a presencing thought as its own tcuth, not ev.n
pre-Platonic thinking, which ca^e the closest. The history
Of Being begins, and co.es to us, with the forgetting of
Being, the oblivion of that which worlds the world. The
Oblivion Of the world worlding, then, is not the unique
consequence of the age which calls the will to power to its
truth, but is due to the reality of metaphysics, which is
the enduring reality of our history. This uncanny oblivion
Of Being, which has haunted us throughout all our history,
is due to metaphysics as metaphysics. Escaping our
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n-etaphysical destiny has thus fa. been fruitless if
metaphysics attempts to g.ab hold of its essence, it does
so metaphysically, thus constantly falling short of its own
essence and
.emainin, incomplete. Eve.y time metaphysics
tries to climb beyond itself, to create a metaphysics of
xtself, it always falls back into itself, without knowing
that it has done so. Such was the fate of Marx, Preud, and
especially Nietzsche, who struggled the hardest against it.
The nothing that is the ultimate truth of our
technology as human power, is constantly lurking on the
edges of our thought, forever threatening to break in and
shatter our thoughts, our lives, our work, because our
thought remains despite itself metaphysical. Everywhere,
from the beginning of our history until now, nothing is
befalling Being and its truth, and so strangely that the
truth of Being is forever gone from us. But now, in our
time when modern technology has pushed Being so much
further from us, nihilism is attaining its completion,
pushing itself to its furthest limit.
CHAPTER VII
A PRISON OF REASON
of
The truth Of everything under the governance
Enarchy is its possibility £or control. m this, Enarchy
seeks out evervthina that- ;ycn g at is not under control, that
thwarts it, escapes it, or .ocks it, and subjects it to its
.eason. Even in its difference, its irrationality, and
Obscure resistance, the others of the age of reason-the
insane, the criminal, the sexually deviant-^ust be made
into an strategic affirmation of reason. Around the others
of reason, Enarohy builds institutions of control. More
real than anything else, Enarchy builds a world appropriate
to its truth. And among the most important of these things
that Enarchy brings forth are institutions that produce
human subjects.
The essence of freedom under Enarchy is control, human
control. But so much are the institutions and discourses
of control articulated, extended, and built, that the
subject that controls disappears into what is controlled.
Eventually, the whole extent of human being becomes the
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P-e Objectivity of powe. relations. See.in, control ove.
everything, Enarchy interprets everything as power, even
at last in Poucaulfs discourse, hu.an subjectivity. The
subject becomes the object of a c^nh^M^.*-'L t subjugation more profound
than himself.
written by Michel Poucault, Discipline and Punish[23]
is an institutional and technical history of the modern
individual as object of reason and as its mastering
subject. It interprets the history of the modern subject
as power and it reveals the strategy of control behind the
reason and judgement of the modern prison. Modern
punishment and modern prisons are not merely repressive
mechanisms, simple juridical matters, but complex
technologies for the control, subjugation, and production
of man as subject, according to Foucault. And its
technology of control is not confined to the limits of the
prison walls because its truth and architecture is not; it
is spread throughout the whole of our civilization,
penetrating our factories, schools, medical clinics, armed
forces, and all. within its walls, the prison reveals and
practices the technologies of control that govern our world
and build our institutions and buildings. As a specific
architecture of subjugation, it can be interpreted as a
general technology of power in which Enarchy holds man as
the Reserved and reveals him as subject.
But there is something ironic about Foucault's
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interpretation of the subject as the subjected, only a
means for nonpersonal power strategies. it itself is but
an articulation of Enarchy's truth. Foucault hi.self
describes his works as a tool box that those who seek to
resist specific power relations, such as the prison, can
use. His works have no specific political agenda, no
conception of the good, no specific justice that they seek.
They are but a means for something else, almost anything
else. Like Nietzsche before him, who interpreted
everything as power and as a means to something else,
Foucault is a nihilist. As nihilists, they both are
imprisoned within the truth of modern technology, however
much they interpret its subject as the effect of a power
that exceeds its grasp.
Thinking everything as power, completly dissolving the
subject into relations of power, Nietzsche and Foucault
remove themselves as the speakers and writers of such a
power to a placeless place, a dwelling removed from the
earth as metaphysics has always done. Unlike metaphysics,
though, they know that they are aliens to the earth.
Dissolving the subject itself into an architecture of power
relations, they have destroyed the only dwelling place of
humanity in the this age of technology. Amid our
institutions of technology, our discourses, and our
truths--every thing that is near at hand--the only way to
be, to actually live, in our time is as a subject. To live
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and act in
.oae.n society, to use the tools that it
provides for life, the means that it has for providing,
food. Shelter, transportation, health, communication
education, political space, and entertainment is to dail/
.oment by moment, invoke the architecture which has made i^
possible, human subjectivity. As we saw before, a tool is
for something. it has its use a<. ^ ^ is a tool only in the
context of other tools. Using any tool as . m^ L a means invokes
the entire world in which it is useful.
TO dissolve the subject that underlies and makes our
life in this time possible is to endanger it, and in the
most profound way possible. To think the subject as pure
subjugation is an ontologically impossible thought. it is
impossible because our entire life in this time of
unbounded technology is dependent on the freedom of the
subject. The complex, interdependent, and vast economies
and institutions that our lives depend on cannot survive
unless we act as subjects within them. We, as subjects,
are subject to them on pain of death. To think the
subjugation of the subject is to think the deadliest
thought possible.
And yet this most impossible of thoughts is present in
the work of Foucault. It is present because its ironic
truth is the reality of our time, a truth that has been our
doom since the inception of Enarchy. Knowing freedom as
control, Enarchy seeks control by making everything subject
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- cont.ox, i„cluai„,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
°^3ect o. cont.ol, as
_ ins.Uu.ions,
.He3ub:ece cont.ols
.3 aissolvea into an a.chUectu.e o.
Powe.
.elations.
.oucault is notHin,
... a ™u.o. of ou.
time, ana the thought that he thin.s is nothin, but the
truth of our time of doom.
in o.ae. to understand the architecture of the modern
prison and the way its technologies have set upon
.an and
structured hi„ as an object of reason it is helpful to
follow Poucault as he interprets the architecture of the
practices that took place in another time.
Before our ti.e when criminals are humanely
incarcerated in oriqnnc; +-h^wp sons, they were tortured, put on the
rack, drawn and quartered, covered with boiling oil, hacked
to pieces, and, at the moment before pained death, made to
confess their crimes. These practices, so horrible to our
eyes, so repugnant to the architecture of reason, was a
political ritual, a war against the enemies of the king.
The law was the archy and order of the king and the
criminal who violated it was at war with the king. As is
the way of war, the king met the violence of the attack
against him with overwhelming force, displaying the sheer
terror, strength, and power of the law to the public. m
the excess of retribution, in the physical attack against
the criminal's body, manifest as bloody marks,
dismemberment, and pain, the power and integrity of the law
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was reasserted, the affront to the king righted, and the
architecture governing the order of things rebuilt.
But as the architecture of the king's law and power
found its for. in rituals of atrocity, it also displayed
its own limits. a criminal's body may be destroyed piece
by piece, reduced to dust, and thrown to the wind, and the
king's triumph may be all but concluded. But still, each
time the law was broken and the right of the king
challenged, it had to be reactivated and reapplied.
For all of its excess and violence, the carnival of
atrocity was preceded and governed by a very precisely
detailed architecture of legal proceedings. An extremely
elaborate code of procedure determined what was evidence
and what was not, measuring it against a hierarchy of
proof, and revealing its truth in marks on the accused's
body. Truth was brought forth with pain, a precise and
measured art of pain. Torture is the art of maintaining
life in pain, subdividing it into a thousand little deaths
before it ceases in the most horrible agonies. Unlike our
more reasonable architecture of justice and truth, where
the accused is known innocent until proven guilty, and then
found either totally guilty or innocent, the truth of
torture knew a mere suspicion as a sign of a slight measure
of guilt, a stronger suspicion as a sign of a greater
measure of guilt. A sign from God, a fact amid the chain
of being, each gradient of suspicion called forth the
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appropriate measure of quilt ^nri if<=y i a d Its response, a measured
amount of torture.
Also, unlike our modern architecture of justice, the
establishment of an accusation and the technology o£ its
truth were the absolute prerogative of the magistrates.
The procedures of truth took their course in secrecy,
producing their truth sometimes even in the absence of the
accused. The truth of the crime was the absoulute right of
the king to establish to his own satisfaction, it was only
the punishment, ghastly and bloody, that was revealed to
the public.
But the regime of torture and its truth required one
thing more, the criminal's acknowledgement of the truth of
his crime to the public. His confession combined with the
rituals of public torture, legitimated and justified the
king's vengence. As the criminal was tortured before the
public he was made to confess, and as the marks of the
king's power were progressively inscribed on his body,
becoming the marks of God's approval, the criminal
progressively validated the justice of the torture and the
truth of the accusations. When the spectacle had
concluded, culminating in ritualized execution, the truth
of the inquisition would also be concluded.
During the 18th century, humanist reformers, suddenly
knowing another more rational and human truth, brought
forth an architecture that attacked the excess of violence
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in the spectacle of torture, criticizing it for its
irrational distribution, its ineffectiveness, and its
tendency to incite mobs-its utility in short. it became
an evil to be cured, an angry immoderation to be lessened
and replaced with humane reason.
According the the humanist reformers, the essence of
the theater of atrocity was violence, insane and excessive
violence, and in this irrational violence tyranny confronts
rebellion, each calling forth the other. Instead of
revengful retribution, the state should simply punish,
reconstitute the criminal as subject, making him once again
into a responsible actor deserving to belong to civil
society. Crime, in its truth for the humanist reformers,
was not an attack on the king's body, a war against the
king's might and authority, but a breaking of the social
contract in which society as a whole was victimized. Now
the new archy, civil society was made up of individuals who
willfully choose to quit the state of nature, with all its
insecurities, risks, and inadequacies, to enter into a
contract with each other protecting life and property.
Since crime violated the architecture of the contract,
society had a right and an rational obligation to redress
this wrong. The archy or ruling standard by which justice
was enacted no longer derived itself from the authority of
the king and the truth torture revealed, but came instead
from the "humanity" and rationality of the act, the will
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that was its inception. As a hu.an subject, the criminal
had consented to join civil society, an act which all
parties to the social contract share as a result of their
humanity. Punishment, therefore, must accord with the aim
of preserving civil society and the subjectivity which
founded it, willed it, and governed it. its limit-and its
target-would be the humanity, rationality, and will of
each subject. m redressing the wrong done to society,
punishment must not be inhumane or irrational, and it must
not fail to make the criminal both human and rational, into
a will that willed the instrument of civil society.
With the dissolution of the architecture of torture, a
radically different architecture of truth came into being.
It was supported by a whole variety of technologies and
institutions. According to Lewis Mumford, the development
of the technology of glass production was a crucial
development for the development of the architecture of the
modern self. [24] By the end of the 17th century, glass
became a common substitute for the wooden shutter, or for
oiled paper and muslin. It had furthermore become much
more clear and colorless, moving beyond its former uses for
medieval church decoration, and becoming a transparent
medium through which the world could be represented.
Glass helped put the world in a frame, transforming it into
an object. It made possible the eye glass, the framed
window, the telescope, and the microscope. By making it
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possible to control the visible presentation of things, to
move the. near or far away, to separate one thing fro.
another for experimental purposes in chemistry and yet see
both, it made it possible for man to see entirely new
objects-the moons around Jupiter, the microbes in a drop
of water, and the written word when his eyes grew old and
tired
.
Since it opened up the interior of the household to a
new visibility, it revelaed dirt where it had never been
seen before, in the corners, on the covers of things,
underneath the furniture, and it created a new standard of
cleanliness. in order to be used to its fullest extent,
glass must be clean in order to be seen through. it also
is easy to see the slightest trace of dirt on its hard and
smooth surface. Glass reveals matter out of place and it
helps create the necessity of putting it were it
belongs—outside the frame that reveals it.
But more important than its effect on hygiene, is the
effect glass, as a presence revealing a new visibility, had
on the architecture of the self. Even in the times of the
wealthy Roman empire, mirrors were uncommon and not very
good. The images were distorted and the background was
dark. By the 16th century, however, the technology of
glass making could make excellent large mirrors that
accurately represented the world, and the hand mirror
became a common possession. The mirror became a
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metaphorical presence that dominated epistemology and
philosophy. For the first time it became possible to think
about re-presenting the world. More than that, it provided
the metaphor for self-consciousness, seeing oneself as one
was. in the presence of the mirror, the ego could see
itself and think about asserting control over its
apearances— shaving, make-up, hair powdering, at a surface
level, but more profoundly, preparing the way for the
subject who would assert mastery over all the earth by
representing it as his own.
Humane punishment, according to Foucault, relied on a
whole technology of representations, pictures of
punishment, which subjected the subject to his humanity,
and through that made civil society correspond to its
nature, the willing that willed its rationality.
The first technique designed to do this was to make
punishment as unarbitrary and uniform in application as
possible. A perfect punishment would be transparent to the
crime it punishes, mirroring both the nature of the crime
itself and the remedy correcting it. Such a picture
presented to civil society would function as a deterrent, a
lesson immediately intelligible to criminal and society.
To do this the nature of the punishment must correspond
exactly to the nature of the crime: those who have
committed violent crimes must be subjected to physical
pain; those who have acted despicably will be subjected to
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infamy. The more the punishment is transparent to the
crime and exactly calibrated to its task, the more
effective and efficient this architecture of representation
will be in deterring crime.
Besides being constituted in such a way as to be a
deterent to all of society, the architecture of punitive
representation must also operate on the criminal himself,
preventing a repetition of the crime and requalifying him
as a juridical subject. The technique of representation
designed to achieve this end was the adjustment of the
punishment to the coherence of causes governing the crime
in the criminal, the will determining his criminality. It
would either be made painful enough so that in the calculus
of pleasure and pain crime would not be worth the pain it
was sure to bring, or it would mechanistically oppose the
force causing the crime, setting into motion a set of
representations that restructured the economy of interests
and passions in the criminal.
However, in order for these technologies of
representation to be possible, a precise knowledge of the
criminal and the crime had to be accumulated. Seeking this
knowledge, the humane reformers of the 18th century sought
to construct a comprehensive table of knowledge in which
each crime and its approprate punishment would find its
exact place reflected in a code of law.
Once the various species of criminals had been made
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into architecture of knowledge, classified, and their
crimes categorized, it was clear that the same punishment
could have substatially different effects on criminals from
different social groups or with different character
structures. The technology of reconstituting juridical
subjects demanded ever greater individualization, objective
knowledge of the criminal, and precise application of the
punishment in order to attain the desired effect. Through
the architecture of the criminal all of society became an
object for the emerging social sciences. The subject gains
his mastery over himself and attains his proper place in
civil society only when the social sciences have
objectified him, gaining precise knowledge of the ways in
which his actions are determined, his will willed, making
him available for the precise application of the technology
of control. Such is the ignoble origin of the social
sciences.
Where architecture of torture worked with violent
excess upon the bodies of the King's rebellious subjects,
the architecture of humane reform worked with calm reason
the wills of criminals. For the reformers the body was
ly an avenue to the will. The aim of the humanist was no
longer to crush the body, dismember it, and destroy it,
producing the most exquisite agonies while delaying a
hellish death, but to operate upon the will, transform the
mind, and reconstitute the reason of the subject.
on
on
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The ideal form of punishment was not, as it would be
in the next age, incarceration, but rather public works.
Strung together in chain gangs, the criminal worked on
roads, canals, and public squares. Traveling throughout
the land, he bore the representations of his crimes,
benefiting socety not only with his work, which repayed the
damage his crime had caused, but also, and more
importantly, with his lesson, which demonstrated the
irrationality of crime.
The signs that the convict bore did not have the
physical effect of terror, nor did they bear witness to the
power of the king, but rather they were a picture to be
viewed, and the convict's public presence was a theater of
punishment, designed and manipulated to produce the right
habits in the citizenry. it was not terror that kept the
land's peace, but the gentle and humane art of painting
pictures upon the soft fibers of the brain.
Although the humanist reformers stopped the practice
of torture, they never really got a chance to fully develop
their architecture of punishment. Although the period
surrounding the French Revolution saw many of their
proposals put into practice, the rise of Napoleon and the
aftermath of his reign cut their day short. Most of their
aims and some of their practices, however, were
incorporated into the third architecture of criminal
punishment, disciplinary technology.
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Although the p.i30„ appea.ea suadenl,,
,ulc.ly
displacing all othe. technologies of punishment, it was not
entirely unanticipated by the humanist
.eEo.^ecs during the
Classical age. Several Dutch correctional worKhouses used
the technology of the prison guite early, the ™ost famous
Of these was the Maison de Force at Glent. Prisons were
expensive, and, since the age was governed by a concern for
economic efficiency, it was only prudent that criminals
Should work to pay for their own correction. But ™ore than
prudent, the correctional workhouse would produce docile
workers, ready to contribute to the productivity of
SOC iety
.
The English reformers later added the principle of
isolation to the principle of work. Isolated in his cell,
the convict would be left alone th face the recriminations
of his own conscience. As he worked alone in his cell, the
convict would produce his own correction.
It was the Quakers of Philadelphia who brought the
prison to its fulfilment in 1790 with the opening of the
Walnut Street prison. As with the Dutch and English
prisons, the economic imperatives put convicts to work
paying for their own correction. Under careful
supervision, the convict's labor-time was organized as
efficiently as possible, his day divided into productive
segments. The moral imperative also followed the English
and Dutch example, with each convict receiving moral
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guidance and spiritual direction.
The Quakers added some dimensions of their own
however, making the prison even more a site for the
technology of control. Reversing torture's architecture of
secrecy for discovering the truth of the crime and its
practice of pubUc atrocity for punishing it, the Quakers
had public trials and punished in secret behind prison
walls, turning r esponsiblity for the criminal's correction
over to penal technicians who had total control over all
aspects Of the convict's life. m this site of total
control, these technicians of reason accumulated knowledge
of the criminal and the cime, making detailed observations
of the prisoner, conducting extensive interrogations,
completing dossiers, and scrupulously classifying all
relevant facts. They kept records of the criminal's
progress under detention, taking special notice of his
rebellion against the system or his acceptance of it. The
aim of the new architecture was to produce a docile body, a
body that could be trained, exercised, used, transformed,
improved, and subjected to supervision. Punishment became
a technical operation, best done free of emotion, meddling
influence, and juridical intervention. it was but a
politically neutral and rational means of producing the
subject
.
Now the object of a technical discourse, man was
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SIS
as
aPP.op.aee. into
. s.see. o.
organization t.at
esta.iis.e.
,is t.utH as a tooi oe p.oauction. His .oa. is
-veale. as a machine ana is su.^ectea to
.i.o.ous anai,
and to a training procedure that
.a.es hi. as efficient
a machine. Likp rr.-. u-e a machine with tightly linked and
interacting parts, the body is analvh.-. nIS lytically reduced to an
architecture of units— the thumbs fho ^•n , t e fingers, the wrist,
the el.ow, the shoulder, and so on. Bach unifs
.ove^ent
-
ta.en up separately, analyzed separately, and subjected
to a calculated architecture of training that reduces each
unit to its
.nost efficient operation and then combines
everything into a s.oothly functioning whole. Details are
crucial; complex, vast, interdependent systems are built by
attention to the smallest and most obscure details.
Nothing must escape specification, reduction, analysis, and
disciplinary training.
Seeking to keep all details under its control,
disciplinary technology relentlessly expands its
architecture accross both space and time, imposing its
framework on both as it uses them differently. if
disciplinary technology is to work efficiently and
effectively, it must work continuously, organizing time so
that moment by moment the body's motions are specified more
precisely and made more docile. The details of the body's
motions must be chr onogr aphed
, because control cannot be
applied occasionally or at regular intervals; it must be
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applied continuously, letting no moment escape its purpose.
The efficient operation of .any bodies working in
interdependent systems, such as factories and military
forces, requires that every motion is standardized, the
time necessary to perform it precisely measured, and
applied universally to all the bodies working within it.
The control of space is as essential to disciplinary
technology as the control of time is. Disciplinary
technology produces it effects by projecting individuals
into a carefully organized, specified, and enclosed space,
a mathematical grid of truth prepared in advance for the
individual. In the hospital, the factory, the school, the
prison, or the military field, an orderly grid, a ruling
framework, is imposed on everything. Once established,
this architecture produces a precisely organized
distribution of individuals available for surveillance.
This projected distribution, following the same regime of
truth present in the experiment, makes possible and
facilitates the accumulation of knowledge on individuals by
making their dispersion and location visible. It has the
strategic advantage of identifying its others, dangerous
groups or wandering individuals and reducing them to docile
and fixed categories, or at least of making possible their
isolation.
In disciplinary technology the architecture of space
obeys the principle of eliminating uncontrolled spaces and
131
absences. e.is a.c.ieeetu.e space eacH slot in t.e
.^ia is assi.nea a value ana each inai.iaual is evai.atea
ana aiscipunea acco.ain, to .is p.essence o. absence.
Within this o.,ani.ea space inaiviauals can piacea,
t.ansfo..ea, ana o.se.vea ve.y efficiently, po. the .ost
efficient production of inaiviauals, it is necessary to
systematically aefine befo.ehana the nature of the parts to
be usea, stockpile the Inaiviauals or parts that fit the
definition, place the. in places
.ost appropratea to the.,
and sot them to aoing their designated function.
AH waste, gaps, free margins, must be eliminated and
enframed by the system. This elimination of all slack
increases the efficiency of the system, and expands its
control over individual parts by making possible their
interchangability
.
By the end of the 18th centry, a century before
Fredric Taylor, factories were already organized by the
same disciplinary techniques as the prison was. Foucault
gives an example of the Oberkampf manufactory at Jouy. it
was divided into- a series of specialized workshops
separated by functions such as printing, handling,
coloring, engraving, and drying. In the largest building,
110 meters long and 3 stories high, on the ground floor 132
tables were arranged in 2 rows. At each table a printer
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worked with an assistant. Because of this architecture of
space, all of the workers could easily be put under
supervision by a supervisor walking up and down the aisle
between the two rows of tables. From this organization of
space, the specific production of each pair of workers
could easily be compared to the others. As in an
experiment, any variable could be def ined-strength,
promptness, skill, cons tancy-and then could be observed,
measured with exactness, organized into a hierarchy of
merit, and then rewarded or punished. Spread out as an
architecture of visibility, a whole multitude of workers
could be understood as individuals, and as individuals
subjected to precisely calibrated control by an efficient
economy of centralized supervision.
From the very beginning of large-scale industry,
making it possible and assuring it its efficiency and gain,
there existed a division of labor, fragmented into unique
individuals and distributed accross a tightly organized
space and precisely measured time. In such a system, the
ordering of the whole multiplicity was carried out and
depended on the the control, surveillance, and production
of the individual. The individual was the focus of
control, the part of the whole, that made the dominion of
disciplinary technology possible and assured its expansion.
Under the reign of disciplinary technology,
individuals are revealed and produced by the examination.
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The specific variable the examination will
.eveal and the
individual it will p.oduce in a heterogeneous population is
determined by the specific system and its imper atives-a
system of correction and it will measure values of
correction, a system of production and it will measure
values Of production, a system of medical care and it will
measure values of sickness, and a system of death, like the
concentration camp or the Vietnam war, and it will measure
the body count. All systems, needless to say, will measure
docility and internalization of the system.
Arrangement of the results of examination into a
hierarchy is the key to expanding control and production.
The examination individualizes according to a projected
grid layed out beforehand and its hierarchical organization
of the results links the individual to the system,
subjecting him to its dominion through the technology of
reward and punishment. The examination and the hierarchy
it makes possible combines to assure control through
surveillance, efficiency through organization, order
through an architecture of space and time.
The first model of these techniques was not the
prison--they only attained their perfection there--but the
military camp. Here total oranization, total control, and
total observation first assumed the forms it was to take.
Foucault hints that the application of these new techniques
was fostered by the introduction of the musket into
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warfare. The musket decisively changed the nature of
battle and required the introduction of new techniques of
control. instead of teaching men the art of using the bow,
the sword, or the lance, instead of inculcating courage in
the face of the enemy, men were now trained; drill
displaced art, habit displaced courage, and systems of
examination and organization displaced loyalty. And war
became truly cruel because it was no longer between men who
were either angry, loyal, or sinful, but men who had become
automatons in systems of slaughter. Evil disappeared as
genocide became possible.
The examination takes many forms rendering the
indivdual visible in all his uniqueness. The imperative of
the examination increasingly became part of the architect's
design. The necessity of total visibility had to be built
into buildings. For instance, at the Parisian Ecole
Militaire the buildings were constructed with long halls of
monastic cells, each cell a sealed compartment separating
the individual from his neighbors—but with a peephole so
that he could be observed. In the dining rooms, the tables
were neatly arranged for visibility, and the inspector's
table was built higher than the others to assure it. The
latrines had half-doors, but full side walls. This petty,
suspicious architecture of visibility was designed to
produce healthy and vigorous bodies, obedient and docile
soldiers, competent and qualified officers, and assure that
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debauchery and homosexuality did not occur.
When disciplinary technology was applied to productive
processes, the number of variables needing to be controlled
increased as it played a more important part in the
economy. Laziness, fraud, bad workmanship, sabotage, and
illness became more costly and important to control as the
efficiencey and size of the industrial apparatus increased.
Disciplinary technology took on a crucial economic function
when it entered into the productive process, an event that
assumed decisive importance for the development of
industrial technology. As workers were subjected to
disciplinary technology, their tasks were precisely
specified, simplified, and integrated into a architecture
of systematic production. They became automatons,
mindlessly repeating simple tasks. Once disciplinary
technology was applied to workers it became as easy as it
was obvious and necessary to replace them with machines.
And in turn, the reserve army of the unemployed that the
machine produced subjected workers ever more tightly to the
discipline of the labor market. Disciplinary technology
and machine technology are in their truth really only
extensions of each other, making men and women identical
with the machines they work at, nothing more than
replaceable parts in an architecture that exceeds them.
People still worked, but it was the archy, automatic and
anonymous, that organized and produced things.
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in order for disciplinary technology to deploy people
in all their specificty at the functions most appropriate
to them, a normalizing standard was necessary to unify
operations and extend control down to the level of micro
detail necessary. Assuming a global importance in the
economy, disciplinary technology extended its dominion over
matters too trival and isolated to have been included in
the legal web. Through a normalizing judgement it imposed
a whole micro penalty of time (lateness, absences,
interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention,
negligence, lack of zeal), of behavior ( impolitness,
disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the
body (incorrect attitudes, lack of cleanliness), of
sexuality (impurity, indecency). Because of the imperative
for controlling the most detailed aspects of everyday
behavior and for making it useful, almost anything could be
subjected to an architecture of micro-penalties.
Within the domain of disciplinary technology, all
behavior lies between two poles of use, the functional and
the dysfunctional. Between these two poles a graduated
series of steps can be imposed, quantifying and ranking
deviations from the norm with objectivity and precision.
By assessing individuals according to these norms, the
truth of the individual's deviation is revealed and the
penalty it imposes of itself is legitimated. Being an
objective automatic measurement, normalizing judgement
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produces truth and its own legitimacy.
The examination as a ritual of power is a subtle but
important reversal of previous architectures of power.
Previous forms of power, like torture, exercised their
dominion through the visibility of power, constantly
bringing it out
.nto the open, putting it on display.
Common people are kept in the shadows, an undifferentiated,
unknown mass. The examination, according to Foucault,
reverses these relations, bringing common individuals to
the fore, concealing the powerful behind an neutral,
objective, gaze. m schools, hospitals, the army, and the
prison, the examination is a ritual of power which brings
forth the individual, making him visible to an objective
gaze, and producing knowledge of him. The examination, we
may say, is a technique called forth by the truth of the
individual held as the Reserved in Enarchy.
Held as the Reserved, the common individual becomes
the source of dossiers which accumulate the minute details
of everyday life, a biography of banalities. Previously
the biography of common individuals had escaped the web of
the legal system and any genre of writing, but under
disciplinary technology they received meticulous and
endlessly suspicious attention. In the feudal regime,
indiviuality was most apparent for the nobility, and
especially for those in succession for the crown. The more
power one exercised the more one was an individual, marked
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whith honor, prestige, and in death with elaborate
funerals. But in modernity a kind of writing that had once
lauded heros, celebrated the nobility, and focused on the
unique and special, now was reversed, and the most mundane
activities accumulated in file after endless file.
Clerical paperwork becomes essential to the operation of
disciplinary technology, enabling the authorities to
fabricate a network of objective codification. And in it,
the child, the patient, the criminal, the recipient of
public charity are known in much greater detail than the
adult, the healthy individual, the law abiding citizen, or
the employed worker.
The more the individual is examined and documented,
and the more the documentation is systematically organized,
the more disciplinary technology is able to measure the
gaps between them and calculate their distribution in a
given population. The architecture of documentation makes
possible the measurment of general facts, the description
of groups, the characterization of collective phenomena.
It is no accident that the science of statistics, which
made possible the experimental control of variables
projected into the population, was progressing by leaps and
bounds in this age, nor that the American Constitution
required a census every 10 years. Objectified, analyzed,
fixed within a mathematically rigorous projection, the
modern individual is a historical fabrication, an
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architecture unique to onr au age. Supporting this triumph of
technology and extending it, the social sciences are made
possible and necessary by its imperatives. Originating
within particular institutions of power (schools, prisons,
hospitals, the military) the modern social sciences
(psychology, demography, statistics, criminology, social
hygiene, and so on) are not mere neutral means for a human
technology of humans, but rather are the tools of human
subjugation to Enarchy. Knowable man is the object and
product of disciplinary technology, the truth around which
the social sciences deploy themselves as a mere means in
the service of the human subject. [25]
Jeremy Bentham's plan for the Panopticon, according to
Foucault, is the archetype of disciplinary technology. in
its architecture it brings together and assures a political
technology of control. Where torture had contained with
heavy chains, cold iron, and thick stone walls, and
controlled with sheer terror, the Panopticon contains with
light and controls with visibility. As an architecture of
power, the Panopticon consists of a large courtyard with a
tower in the center; circling around it, at least part way,
are a series of cells, usually several levels of them. In
each cell, there are two windows or openings, one bringing
in light from the outside, the other facing the tower. The
focus of this optics of visibility, the tower in the
center, has large observatory windows which, protected by
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one way glass or shades of see set, can be seen out of
but not into. in this architecture of controlled
visibility, the cells beco.e s.all theaters in which each
actor is alone, totally individualized, and constantly
visible. The individual in the cell is perfectly visible
to the watcher in the tower, but only to the watcher in the
tower. separated by walls, he is cut off from contact with
anyone else. Isolated from any diversion, totally visible
to the authorities, he is the object of knowledge, never
the subject of communication.
The major benefit of the Panopticon is its economy of
organization, containing and controlling the individual not
with brute force, but with an architecture of visibility.
The inmate in the cell cannot see if the authorities are in
the tower or not, so he must always behave as if
surveillance is constant, unending, and total. It is not
the walls, or the bars, that imprison in the gentle age of
reason, it is the prisoner himself who builds the archy
that imprisons him. Through the architecture of
visibility, he internalizes the disciplinary power that is
operating on him. The prisoner becomes his own guard. So
perfect is the Panopticon's architecture that even if there
is no one there watching the prisoner, he could not escape
it.
The political technology of the Panopticon is
continuous, disciplinary, and anonymous. Anyone, and
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perhaps no one, could operate it as long as it was
organm.ed properly, and anyone could be subjected to its
organization. The technology is multipurpose. it could
operate as easily on a criminal as it could a madman, a
worker, or a schoolboy. if the architecture of the
Panopticon functioned perfectly, it would eliminate any
transgression against the archy, any unplanned behavior,
any thought, even, the disciplinary archy of subjectivity
could not accept.
The efficiency of the Panopticon does not end with its
control of the individual in the cell, but extends itself
to the control of the controllers. Those who stand in the
central tower are themselves trapped by an architecture of
visibility. Any failure on their part to control and
modify the behavior of the inmates, any lack of diligence
in surveillance, quickly becomes visible in the inmates'
behavior to the administrators of the controllers. The
accumulated knowledge of inmate behavior under the reign of
disciplinary technology becomes the norm by which the
controllers are judged, and any deviation from it is the
mark of their failure. Disciplinary technology draws
everything into its architecture, controlling inmates and
controllers alike, revealing everything as object to be
known and subjected to control. Seeking to make man the
master of his world, discipinary technology escapes anyone
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Who would
.aster it b,
.a.ing thei. position of
.aste.y
contingent on their subjugation to its reign over the..
There are no masters in the age o£ disciplinary technology,
only prisoners of Enarchy. The subject is a trap; the
master who would rulp ^ r^r^<:,^r.^^ ^e a prisoner of his own architecture,
technology, and reason.
The Panopticon is not only a technology of control for
individuals, but also a laboratory for their
transformation, a controlled architecture for the execution
of experiments. The individual cells, the optics of
visibility, the possibility for controlling all variables,
and the total availability of the individual for technical
control, combine to make the Panopticon a perfect place for
performing experiments on human beings. The inmates are
already appropriated by architecture of disciplinary
technology and it is their destiny to be objects of
knowledge in the experiment.
Bringing together knowledge, power, control of the
body, and control of space into an subtly effective
political technology, the Panopticon is a particular
instantiation of a general architecture for the subjugation
of man. It is an adaptable technology, useful whenever
there is an imperative for making individuals or
populations productive, visible for control, or useful for
the accumulation of knowledge. Its basic technology can be
generalized and used in different organizations of space.
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It is a technology of enframing, organizing, and defining
spatial structures, and can be deployed wherever a space
can be enclosed defined, articualted, and made available
for control.
in our own time, the advance of electronic technology
has made it possible to extend the architecture of
visibility embodied in the Panopticon without the building.
For instance, it is now possible, with sensitive electronic
apparatus, to moniter the brainwaves of individuals and, by
use of computer surveillance and a history of norms, to
determine whether they are performing their function or
not. Any deviation from a normal working pattern sets off
warnings of some sort, perhaps recording them for future
reference by the authorities, and draws the worker back to
his work. First applications will probably be on Air
Traffic Controllers.
The National Security Agency now randomly moniters
overseas telephone calls from the United States with
computers programed to record, analyze, and kickout for
human inspection, any conversation in which programed
phrases or words occur. As computers become more powerful
and faster, and as programers become increasingly able to
subject ordinary human speech to computer content analyses,
this practice will no doubt become more useful and more
prevalent. Perhaps it will be, and probably already is,
combined with a program to measure and analyze voice stress
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to see if the person is lying.
Still in an experimental phase as an instrument to
moniter people on parole is an electronic radio device that
is attached somewhere to a person's body in a way the
person cannot remove. it sends out a signal to nearby
devices, perhaps in the home, possibly throughout the
neighborhood, the city, or the entire country, that records
the presence or absence of the person wearing it and sends
the information over the telephone to the authorities. By
means of this device the authorities can know the location
of the individual at any time of the day or night. No
doubt this monitering device could be eventually used to
transmit information on what the individual is doing,
saying, thinking, and feeling for analysis on a computer.
But perhaps that would be necessary only for the most
anti-social, uncooperative, characters. It may well be
that the authorities would know enough of people's
activities by tracking their credit card purchases through
computer networks.
At any rate, it is clear that modern technology is
developing very sufficient means to subject people to
itself. Such a state of total control in not a future to
look forward to with fear, but a truth whose presence is
already near to us. The Panopticon and the truth that
brought it forth has existed for a long time.
Foucault gives 2 examples where the Panopticon's
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architecture is imposed on a space too large to be enclosed
by a building, the leper colony and the quarantined city,
in the 17th century, the quarantine developed as a method
for the control of the plague. Officals divided whatever
areas, both town and countryside, were suspected of being
infected into administrative units. Under the penalty of
death, no movement outside the household was allowed. Only
the wretched assigned the duty of removing the dead and the
officals in charge of the administrative space were allowed
to move in the streets. Each day a roll call was called
for each house, and those who did not appear had to be
accounted for. The information collected was passed up to
the officals in charge, who, if contagion was discovered,
had the unqualified right to dispose of property, initiate
procedures of purification, and issue orders for
evacuation. Everything was supervised by the authorities,
the activities of medical personel, the progress of the
disease, the movements of anyone outside their house.
The quarantine was a specific application of the
architecture of disciplinary technology to a large
dangerous space. As in the Panopticon, it required
analysis and division of a carefully defined space, the
surveillance and control of all its inhabitants, a
hierarchy of power, and the meticulous regulation of the
smallest details of everyday life. Behind the total
organization of the quarantine was the haunting memory of
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uncontrolled contagions, of rebellions, cri.es,
vagabondage, of people who live and die in disorder!
Against its other, its greatest fear, reason imposed its
truth, total control.
Where the quarantine was an spatial act of inclusion
by diciplinary technology, the leper colony was a spatial
act of exclusion, a binary division, separating out,
stigmatizing, and confining within a safe space, the leper.
Called to its duty by Enarchy and its revelation of man as
the Reserved, disciplinary authority took upon itself the
right to exclude lepers from one space and exile them to
another. If the space that lepers were exiled to was never
very rigorously organized, it was a space that bore witness
to disciplinary technology's total relation to man. It
subjected man to its "temporary" emergency laws on the
organization of space, the movements of people, and the
possession of property. It strictly defined boundaries
between populations, subjected them to its analysis and its
reign of technical knowledge. Under the total control of
reason what was permitted and denied was based not on
religion, nor on tradition, and certainly not on
superstition, but' on the continuing development of
technical knowledge. The leper was no longer a sign of
God's justice, a punishment for the sinner and a warning to
the saved, but a diseased victim needing to be isolated
from a population that was vulnerable to his contagion.
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ion was
The fear of God's judgement and the sinner's damnat
transformed and restructured into a fear of the abnormal,
the diseased, the deviant, and the degenerate, justifying
and requiring the ever expanding domain of disciplinary
technology, when reason's fear of the abnormal replaced
the fear of the Biblical judgement, disciplinary technology
had suceeded in subjecting man and nature to its essence.
Since disciplinary technology, reflected in the
Panopticon, the quarantine, and the leper colony, reveals
man as a knowlable object, it calls for the the social
sciences. The knowledge of normality, produced by the
social sciences, is the architecture by which disciplinary
technology defines its grid of specification and its
hierarchy of norms, permitting it ever finer distinctions
over which it has control. Although the social sciences do
not have a direct disciplinary effect, they interact with
the architecture of disciplinary technology, reinforcing
certain structures within it, weakening others. Through a
prolonged period of interaction between the social sciences
and the disciplinary apparatus, the architecture of each
evolves, producing new objects, extending the domain of
disciplinary technology into new areas, withdrawing it from
others. As the social sciences grew in knowledge and as
the disciplinary apparatus refined its techniques of
control, the object of control shifted it architecture.
Instead of attempting to reconstitute the juridical
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subject, disciplinary technology developed the necessity of
reforming the delinquent. The delinquent, as reason's more
refined other, is distinguishable from the criminal by
being known not so much by his crime, the act which put him
in prison, as he is by his entire life. As an architecture
of the self, the delinquent became a quasi-natural species,
a coherence of natural and social forces, able to be
identified, isolated, and known as a history, quite apart
from his crime. it was not enough to punish the delinquent
for his crime, he had to be rehabilitated, his
inclinations, habits, passions, and life history taken as a
totality and remade in detail. With the appearance of the
delinquent as reason's other, normalizing observation and
control extended itself into a new domain. Not only must
the delinquent be subjected to the norms of the prison, but
also to the norms of the population at large. And it
became the task of disciplinary technology to know and to
operate on not only the delinquent but the entire
population. Delinquency could be preempted by identifying
the tendancies toward it in the general population and
preventing them from taking their course. With the
delinquent as reason's other, discplinary technology became
a totalitarian structure. No longer was it confined to the
crime, limited by the laws and politics of the liberal
state, but was extended to all the dimensions of human
behavior revealed by the social sciences. In the face of
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the social scientist's knowledge and expertise, judical
punishment was struck dumb, silenced by its
acknowledgement of the social scientist's and behavioral
technician's authority over the delinquent. it is with the
fabrication of the new architecture of the delinquent that
the totalitarian state, as a reign of technical power
adequate to the socal scientist's truth of the individual,
became a possibility. Everything must be controlled
because the architecture of everything is built by the
delinquent.
But despite disciplinary technolgy's promise to
rehabilitate the delinquent, it never succeeded. More
often than it succeeded, the prison only served to teach
the criminal new techniques for crime and avoiding the
police. Most often they are only human warehouses, keeping
a dangerous population isolated until they were again
released to the streets. But this complaint was heard from
the very inception of the prison, virtually coterminous
with it. It does not rehabilitate, it does not reform,
and yet, Foucault observes, in the face of the failure,
reformers have persisted in offering the prison as the
remedy for its own ills. Just one more extension,
perfection, or adjustment of its technique will cure all
its ills. Somehow we just cannot think of anything else.
So in the face of this curious persistence, the
question is not, why have the prisons failed? But rather.
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what other ends are served by this failure, this failure
which perhaps is not a failure at all? Poucaulfs
conclusion is that the architecture of the prison is not
intended to eliminate offenses, prevent their occurance, or
shield society from them, but rather to distinguish them,
to distribute them, to use them to legitimate technical
intevention. Disciplinary technology need not preempt
those who would break the law or render docile those who
have broken the law if it assimilates the trangression of
the laws into a general tactic of subjection. it is not
rehabilitation that is important, it is the technology of
rehabilitation, the architecture of reason and its other,
that must not disappear. The techniques may change
themselves, but the essence of technology, the architecture
of truth present in the prison, must not change. In fact
disciplinary technology dare not succeed or else it would
weaken its own structure, lessening its justification for
normalizing control, confusing its organization of space
and time, and delegi timating its totalitarian control.
That is the great necessity of our time--the architecture
of human control must not be lost.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ARCHITECTURE OF AMERICANISM
According to the Thinker, the age of Enarchy comes
forth in three forms of world civilization: Americanism,
Marxism, and Nazism. [27] m spite of the radical
differences each might claim against the others, they all,
according to the Thinker, are identical in their essence.
Each of them seeks human subjectivity, the pure will
willing itself. They differ only in the different world
views, the means appropriate to their end, that guide their
actions. Americanism seeks the truth and possibility of
human subjectivity through possessive individualism,
Marxism through collective socialism, and Nazism through
racial purity.
Despite their differences, they all seek a world
civilization in their own image, a universal subjectivity
that knows only their truth of humanity. Each of them
comes forth as an ideology, a totalistic explanation of
's origin and destiny, and each of them provides a planman
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and an imperative for political and economic action,
seeking their own archy, each turns to propaganda to
present their world view, interpreting events within the
historical structure that their ideology projects. In
America, this takes the form of Journalism, the supposed
value neutral re-presentation of the event, whose
"objectivity" nevertheless manages to conceal the
atrocities of American interventionism and exploit the
monstrousness of its other, most recently the Soviet Union.
Ideology closes in on human beings, and, developed as mass
propaganda, forms them in the mold of its simple truths,
sealing them off from any complexity that might call into
question its fundamental postulates.
The result is a "propaganda war," a struggle of world
views, and the thing in question is always who will be
master of the earth, the one whose world view will reign
supreme. The contest centers around a demonstration of who
can best deploy the powers of nature and humanity to best
accomplish man's unlimited mastery. And so it is for
Americans a fatal flaw in the Soviet system that they have
long lines outside their stores and shoddy products inside
them.
The pure expression of struggle between world views,
world war is the inevitable result of each of these
ideologies trying to establish its truth. But war decides
nothing essential because between these three world views
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there is really nothing to decide. The abiding essence of
technology is the same in all of them, and even more so.
Because of war and the preparations for war, humanity is
delivered over into total servitude to the systematic
imperatives of ideology, obliterating any vestiges of
traditional life. War in the age of ideology and world
view is total war, swallowing up non-combatants, entire
economies, art, music, and everything else in its
necessity. Nothing escapes its imperatives or logic
because everything is involved in a world view.
And Enarchy's war does not end in peace, but only in a
"cold war," a war that has only resigned itself to
nonviolent means for the time being. Instead, it will be
fought by propaganda, spies, and intervention in the
internal affairs of peripheral powers.
In no way are these conflicts about morality or at
bottom about politics or economics. The current cold war
begain in America long before the Soviet Union demonstrated
the brutality of its inefficiency. It began with the
success of the revolution in Russia, when the Bolsheviks
demonstrated that they would not submit to the necessities
of capitalism or venerate the individualism of Americanism.
In the first Red Scare that followed the revolution,
America quickly demonstrated it was not a matter of its
morality but of its control by ruthlessly repressing
socialists and communists inside America, stopping their
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presses, illegally imprisoning their leaders, disrupting
their mailings, and waging a ruthless propaganda war
against them. [28] it was during WWI that America first
invaded Nicaragua, repressing Sandino, a rebel leader who
questioned the right of America to control his country.
It is no different today. Inspite of the fact that
the Sandinista's have one of the best human rights records
in Central America (and this during a civil war), the
Reagan Administration ignores these irrelevant facts and
never ceases in its efforts to destabilize the Sandinistas
and to install in power the same National Guard that had
terrorized the population with torture before the
revolution. Like the Bolsheviks before them, the
Sandinistas have thwarted American control, if not
economically and politically, at least ideologically.
As an ideology in the age of Enarchy, Americanism is
the most innocent, concealing its boundless will to power
behind its "objectivity," its "tolerance" for different
world views. Despite its self professed innocence and
because of it, Americanism is the most dangerous of the
three because it is the most incapable of responding to the
monstr ousness that abides in its truth. Knowing itself as
the freedom of press, assembly, and religion, it conceals
from itself its essence which is freedom through control.
It is this innocence, this ideology of openness, that makes
Americans blind to the monstrousness that abides in their
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willing, their consenting, their tolerance.
Please notice, it was not our most evil enemy that
first built the atomic bomb, but America. And, more
monstrously, it was America that first found a use for it
as a weapon of terror against non-combatants, setting the
example of its utility that has haunted the rest of the
century with the threat of total destruction. Whatever the
excuse for using it, the reality of the first atomic
bombing was to demonstrate America's mastery of nature, and
more than that, its willingness to subject the world, and
especially the Soviet Union, to nuclear terror. The bomb
became America's primary instrument of world wide control
and containment. Obey us, submit to our division of the
world, our reason, or we will visit a terror upon you and
your children that even the Biblical prophets of old might
shrink from.
Even though it reigned supreme over a devastated
world, had no enemies that could threaten it in any
foreseeable future, America still went on to develop, test,
and deploy the hydrogen bomb. Nothing was enough. America
was the first to put nuclear bombs on missiles, station
them on submarines, and put multiple warheads on them. And
now, it has initiated a strategy to deploy "defensive"
weapons in space. In almost every step in the nuclear arms
race America initiated and the Soviet Union followed 5 or 6
years latter, just barely in time to provide an excuse for
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another escalation of America's power. These escalating
attempts to be the master of nuclear violence was but the
fulfillment of America's mission to become "the arsenal of
democracy," "the defender of the free world," "the world's
last best chance." Everywhere we have the noble
responsibility to intervene on behalf of our democracy and
freedom-throughout Central and South America, in Korea, in
Vietnam, in Indonesia, in the Philippines, and even in the
internal affairs of our allies-England, Australia,
Germany. And once we had assumed the unlimited power of
the bomb as a means approprate to bringing about the
universal truth of our freedom through control, any other
limited means was appropriate as well--poli tical
assassination, torture, death squads, press manipulation,
election fraud, and disinformation campaigns. As America
increasingly assumed the means to total power it
increasingly assumed the necessity of asserting it. In
Vietnam, Americans turned blow torches on the armpits of
suspected communists, poped their eyeballs out with their
thumbs, pushed them out of helicopters flying over the
jungle, and threw their mutilated bodies into pits where
they were left to starve. And they did this by the tens of
thousands. In Chile and Guatemala, despite our love for
freedom and democracy, they overthrew democratically
elected governments that had excellent human rights records
and installed brutal military dictatorships that
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slaughtered people by the tens of thousands and tortured
and terrorized them by the hundreds of thousands. m
Indonesia they arranged a coup that slaughtered a half a
million, perhaps a million people. m Cambodia they
dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs in a secret
war that killed many innumerable Cambodians, assured
starvation for many more, and made the brutality of the
Khmer Rouge possible. And on and on, till there is not a
corner of the world that has not felt the brutal hand of
America's responsibility as the arsenal of democracy
.[ 29]
When the potential of America's nuclear arsenal for
planet wide death is considered, a potential that America
daily threatens to made a reality, America greatly exceeds
any precedent as an agent of mass murder. In essence there
is no difference between actual mass murder and
preparations for it, for the act of building nuclear
weapons betrays their truth as instrument of mass murder
and commits the nation that builds them to it.
These monstrous actions of America are not accidents,
errors, or moments of corruption that could be corrected by
a return of America to itself, but only the result of
American reason following its logic to its end. The
essence of American freedom is control, the truth of the
American way is power, and the final security of America is
brutal empire. Even if it tries its best to be rational
and humane, and especially then, America must come to
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perform these abominations because to its core it is rotten
with the necessity of total empire. And yet, how can this
be? America, Americanism tells us, is the land of freedom,
the land that taught the world about freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of
speech. And it is America that built the institutions that
protected them, an independent judiciary, representatives
held accountable by frequent elections, countervailing
powers that keep rulers within the bounds of law. In
America, as nowhere else, rulers are under control, limited
in the powers that they, as individuals, have at their
disposal. Because of its institutions, no one can rule in
America at his whim and thereby endanger the freedom of
anyone else.
All too true. This is precisely why America is so
innocent of its true monstr ousness : It cannot think of
power or its tyranny being separate from the individual
human subject. For Americans, people alone possess power
and will it, not institutions, not the market place, not
judicial procedures, not even laws. America, both Foucault
and the Thinker would say, is blind to the true nature of
power. Knowing freedom as only the individual willing his
will and power as the ability of an individual to impose
his will on others, America is blind to the reality of
power. That the rulers of America are under control in no
way limits power or makes it less total. On the contrary.
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it extends it in a more insidious fashion, for power is in
no way the property or will of human beings. They do not
possess it or acquire it because they are in no way capable
of bringing it about, but rather they are always and
everywhere possessed by it and its truth.
The power that would control is not located in any
expressly human intention or capability, but in an
architecture we cannot escape, that is there before we are,
that governs our destiny, our thoughts, and our way of
life. We Americans, because we live as Americans, are
caught up in the truth and power relations of our time, and
no matter how much we try we cannot assert control and
become subjects, because the subject that would control is
already a prison. The American Constitution operates
anonymously, just as the prison does, achieving its effects
without anyone presiding over it intending them. It is a
machine for producing laws, and they govern us because the
truth of the machine governs us before they do.
As as an architecture of control, the aim and purpose
of the prison and the Constitution are the same--to
transfer an unruly and passionate self into a
self-governing self through the effects of mechanisms of
control. As a result of the balance of powers, the extent
of the American state, the accountability of elections, and
many other mechanisms, ambition is made to check ambition,
and all participants in the system, both rulers and ruled.
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internalize the architecture and act in anticipation of 'its
countervailing powers. Just as the modern prison imprisons
not with thick walls and iron chains, but with an
architecture of visibility, the Constitution controls with
the effects of its carefully differentiated institutions.
Because of the technology of our government, irrational
passions, illiberal ideas, and "petty local tyrannies of
the people" are excluded from the mechanism. As a result,
governance in America becomes pure technique. Because of
its rational structure, no one is permitted to step outside
the system and think. The essence of American freedom is
control, the possibility of the will willing only itself,
and the shift in Being that made it possible for the will
to will itself as freedom occured in the 17th century in
Europe.
As suddenly as the architecture of torture disappeared
in the 17th century and was replaced by the humane power of
the prison, the architecture of the virtues that society
celebrated and the vices that it hoped to eliminate by
condemnation changed. All of the activities that
surrounded money making and generally denounced as
vices—avarice, greed, lust for lucre and possessions, were
revaluated and became honorable activites practiced by
rational men. [30]
Even more radical than that, virtue itself seemed to
disappear. Today in America we are no longer innocent
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enough to think that politicians have any virtue. m fact
the word "politician" most often comes to us as the cynical
absence of virtue. Our politicians "pull strings," "play
hardball," and "project public images." We all know that
despite appearances, they are doing it for themselves, of,
if they are a little more forward looking than most
politicans, for their place in the history books. We are
not even cynical about our businessmen as they seek their
interest. They are simply obeying the laws of human
nature, however ugly they may be. z^ny sins our businessmen
commit are instantly forgiven because their industry is so
useful
.
The reason for this change, according to Albert
Hirschman, is that the pursuit of money suddenly emerged as
an instrument of control. In the 17th century people were
no longer understood as sinners but as passionate beings,
driven by powerful and often contradictory desires.
Because of these passions, the life of man was too often,
in the words of Thomas Hobbes, "nasty, brutal, and short."
The age that began with the collapse of the medieval world
and the disappearance of virtue, prided itself on seeing
man "as he really is," accepting as the truth of man
whatever base material motives propelled him. The ground
for understanding man as a coherence of forces, a simple
material being identical with his body, was prepared when
he was understood as having a mind separate from his body.
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a spiritual being that was above his passionate being. At
a time when mathematics, celestial mechanics, physics, and
chemisty, were producing laws of nature, the appearance of
human passions became the possibility of formulating laws,
so called "natural" laws, of human motion. This explains
why people, like Hobbes, Locke, and later Rousseau, were so
concerned with projecting a state of nature. The state of
nature in political discourse, is an artifical projection,
a thought experiment, designed to reveal the laws of human
motion. Like Galileo's hypothetical universe, the state of
nature need never have actually occured in reality in order
for it to establish true laws of human motion, justice, and
legitimacy. Just as Galileo's mathematical projections
were not strictly bound to empirical reality for their
truth (they hypothesized a circumstance that his science
had no access to, an airless, f rictionless environment)
,
the state of nature need never have actually have been. It
is sufficient that it reveals man as a coherence of forces
that can be managed.
The strategic function of the state of nature is to
establish and justify a technology of human control. The
nightmare of a war of all against all is a thought
experiment that removes irrelevant variables (the accidents
of history) by controlling for the relevant ones (the
passions which govern men's actions) and establishes a
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counter-example-see what happens when man is not
controlled.
The first application of the new political technology,
America was designed in the image of Isaac Newton's vision
of the solar system. At the same time that Thomas Hobbes
taught the Founders that the state was an artifice willed
by man to save himself from the irrational war of
conflicting wills, Newton showed them how exactly counter
balancing forces could be structured to create a long
enduring system. Knowing that the planets were maintained
in their orbits about the sun by the exact balance of
gravity and orbital motion, the Founders of America could
conceive of a state that could be made to endure because of
an exact balance of political powers and individual wills.
Once the laws of human motion were known, they could be
used to balance each other and halt the decay of republics
into tyranny. The continuous harmonic motion of the
planets about the sun provided an image for the founders to
emulate. As it was with mathematical physics so too it
could be for political science.
America was the first state to be founded by the
consent of the governed, built acknowledging the causality
of the passions, and structured according to the laws of
reason. It was the first government built expressly as a
means for the will, and for nothing else. As such it had
to rip itself free from the traditions, the irrational.
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unwilled, traditions, that thwarted the will in willing
only itself. Cutting itself off from its past, setting
aside any conception of the good, any acknowledgement of
virtue, America engaged itself in revolution, and willed
itself as "We the People." The will became the originary
archy of the American republic, and government only the
means for securing its command. Because the will must be
left to will, the only function of government was to
resolve conflicts between wills— to protect property,
assure the free exercise of speech, religion, assembly, and
the press. Other than that, the government must let the
will go its way unfettered. Government became a purely
technical activity, knowing nothing of virtue or the good.
They became subjective, private, and, thus, disarmed. The
realm of the will's greatest freedom became the market
place. There, the will could engage in commerce with other
wills freely, each will freely becoming a means for others.
The original argument for capitalism, according to
Hirschman, was not that it, as a technique of management,
could produce more and better washing machines, cars,
airplanes, computers, and whatever, but that it could
gently assert the power of a technology of the will over
man and, through a mastery of it, make man master of
himself, willing his will in a rational way. Capitalism,
like the prison, is in its essence a technology of human
control, an architecture for the government of the self.
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The new science of economics, like the new science of
politics, could emulate the discoveries of the science of
physics and make possible an enduring and harmonic system.
No longer was moralistic exhortation, the example of
the saints, or the threat of damnation enough: the
passions, as causes like the forces of nature, must be
traced back to their source and through a science of their
force, brought under control. The passions were not to be
repressed, or attacked as sin, but channelled and made
harmless, if not useful and valuable. Through the science
of human passion and its control, the passions which
threaten the safety of society like ferocity, avarice, and
ambition, are transformed into the nation's defence,
commerce, and politics. From dangerous and threatening
vices emerge the nation's welfare, strength, and virtue.
Properly harnessed by an architecture of control, human
vices, as if by an invisible hand, become human utility.
The situation of man in a properly ordered state is much
like Mephistophles in Goethe's Faust, who is "a portion of
that force that always wills evil and always brings forth
good .
"
The key to such a transformation is the creation of an
architecture where the passions become interests. An
interest is a rational passion that countervails an
irrational passion. Like a force, a passion can only be
controlled by another passion that either negates it or
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redirects it. For instance, paraphrasing Bacon, an
immodest and forward woman can be made modest and induced
to restrain herself, by appealing to her vanity and self
love, and persuading her that modesty is an invention of
love and, most certainly, the means by which it is
attained. Understood in this way as a coherence of forces,
the passions are available to be used to control or balance
other passions.
As a passion, avarice occupied the hallowed position
of the deadliest of all deadly sins toward the end of the
Middle ages. But when it became apparent that it could be
used to control the other passions it suddenly became
acclaimed as commerce, and given the task of holding back
passions that had long been thought less reprehensible,
like lust for glory. With this reversal, greed became
economic interest, and was understood as the passion of
self-love upgraded and contained by reason. People were
rational to the extent that they pursued their
self-interest, aid furthermore, people could only be
governed through the management of their self-interest.
Self interest made people constant and predictable. Once
there was something constant and predictable, laws of human
behavior could be discovered, like the laws of nature that
physics had discovered. As soon as a person becomes
self-interested his actions become as transparent as they
are predictable, almost as though he were a wholly virtuous
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person.
If the impossible happened and the laws of natural
interest were repealed, if people truly became
disinterested and altruistic, they would break up the
universal homogeniety of human nature and make the
technology of rational government impossible. Each acting
on his own altruism would do whatever his particular form
of altruism lead him to do, and thereby escape the
management of his government. According to Hirschman, who
quotes a number of 17th century writers, self-interest, as
the underlying truth of human behavior, does not lie
because it will not produce any action other than those
that are intelligible to reason.
Even though each is pursuing his own self interest,
the effect as a whole of everyone doing this is a positive
benefit to society on all levels, moral, political, and
economic. Everyone mutually gains from everyone else's
self-interest, if only as a secondary and unintended
result, because self-interest leads people to rational
actions. Rational self-interest bridles boundless
ambition, making government possible, and as commercial
activity, it links everyone to everyone else, so tightly
that the welfare of all must be satisfied as a condition
for the satisfaction of any self interested intention. As
people develop economic interests, they develop a rational
investment in a strong web of interdependent relationships.
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If their property is to be secure, they must develop an
interest in a government willing to protect it, both
against domestic lawbreakers and foreign invaders, and as a
rational extension of their self-interest they will be
willing to pay taxes for it. it is for this reason that
the Founders of America made property a qualification for
participating in government. Property, ownership, was not
only a demonstration of a person's reason, it subjugated
him to it through his self-interest. Furthermore,
commercial interdependence across national boundaries makes
war, the ancient scourage of mankind, less likely because
it becomes a threat to trade.
According to the archy that governed early American
political thought, government derived its legitimacy,
rulers their authority, an laws their justice, from the
consent of those governed by them. Unlike the feudal
monarchies of the Middle Ages, and the states of any age
that has preceded America, the American Republic had its
point of origin in the human subject, its justification in
in the individual control freedom made possible. The ruler
of the feudal realm, according to the archy of the Middle
Ages, derived his legitimacy from his family's descent,
which was understood as a sign from God of his authority.
God put the sovereign over his subjects and his justice was
God's judgement. However, when the state of nature became
an experimental counter-example upon which the legitimacy
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of the state was derived, the human subject displaced the
authority and signification of God. Existing in a state of
nature prior to society, the human self consents, as is its
natural power to do, to the terms on which it will enter
society, accepting certain terms, rejecting others
according to the architecture of human self-interest. Once
the self is understood as a coherence of forces, of
countervailing passions, the only legitimate government is
a government that is based on the human self as its cause
and underlying reality. Mastering itself as a coherence of
forces through its science of passions and its technical
architecture of interests, the self-governing self becomes
its own cause, the governing subject that consents to his
government and finds his will in it. It is thus, according
to the Declaration of Independence, the inalienable right
of the self, being its own master, to revolt against any
state which violates the ends for which the self contracted
to enter civil society— life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Because government has its origin in
self-interested human consent, it is the architecture of
that human consent, the conditions of its possibility and
its own necessity, that will determine the form of the
legitimate government. Since the inception of our archy,
neither force, nor accident, nor the ostensible will of God
can ground the state, only the human subject can. No doubt
this is why democracy is universally acclaimed as the only
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legitimate form of government.
Because men are neither angels nor altruists, but by
nature passionate, contentious, and egotistical beings,
they must create a technology, a way of government that
will govern their passions while fostering their interests.
And so in order to obtain the kind of government that
everyone would consent to, certain transformations had to
brought about in the self. Through a technology of
government, an architecture of control, the self had to be
made self-governing, to feel the necessity of restraining
itself, of moderating its irrational passions for the sake
of its self interest.
In this architecture of the self, the American
Constitution is remarkably like the prison, the other
technology of human control being set in place at
approximately the same time. Like the prison, there are
numerous points of surveillance, minutely specified and
detailed, to insure the precise application of power for
the desired effects. There is the architecture of the
Electoral Commission, which holds the President accountable
every four years to the Constitution; there is the
architecture of selection of Senators by State legislators,
which insures that the interests of the States will be
represented; there is the architecture of popular and
frequent election of Representatives, which insures a
moment of direct representation and accountability; and
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finally, there is the architecture of a life time tenure of
supreme Court Justices, which gives them the autonomy
necessary to maintain surveillance over all the other
countervailing branches of government.
Unlike the prison, which has a central point of
surveillance, the Constitution has many points of
surveillance, or, as it is politely said, many ways of
holding the government accountable. This is necessary
because the Constitution is a prison not for the deviant
portions of society, but for the rulers of the Republic as
well as the ruled.
Once the apparatus of the Constitution is set into
place, and ambition sets watch over ambition, the
procedures of government automatically govern all alike.
Confined within instituions of the Constitution, held
accountable by one constituency or another, forced to
acknowledge the interests of all others in the presence of
countervailing institutions, the ambitious,
self-interested, man satisfying his ambitions in the only
way available to him will effectively control himself as he
rules others. Outside of the the architecture of the
Constitution, and the effects of its surveillance, the
ambitious man is a constant danger to the common good;
inside it, however strong his ambition, the self-interested
man is a promoter of it, the instrument by which passionate
base energy is turned to good effect.
CHAPTER IX
THE COLLAPSE OF THE HOUSEHOLD AS HANDMADE CARE
From the very beginning, we in America have been
homeless wanderers; our ancestors left their homes in the
old world and came to life in the new world. And when they
came, they still did not stop to dwell. They farmed a
piece of ground for a few years, improving it for
speculative sale, then moved on West. If they displaced
the traditional peoples that already dwelled there,
stealing their land, desecrating their sacred places,
destroying the ecology that sustained them, and, on more
than one occassion, slaughtering them with genocidal
intent, it was only done in pursuit of their manifest
destiny, the mastery of an entire continent. It is true
that some Americans did come and stay in one place, and
that they did set about caring for it and building a
community of care around it. But they were always a
minority, and, like the Indians before them, they were
colonized by the necessity of American Empire. Once the
vast majority of people in America, farmers were displaced
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and dispossessed by America's progress. Too soon, they
became a small minority, and the nurturance that was a
possibility for them almost vanished. Now even on the
farm, the farm is no longer a place to live, a dwelling
place to nurture, but a unit of production. Farming is now
a business, bankers assure us as they foreclose, like any
other business, subject to the same requirements of profits
and efficiency. m America people dare not form an
attachment to the place they live at because inevitably
they will have to move somewhere else, perhaps because they
are forced, more often because there is a job somewhere
else. Today in America most families are spread over the
entire continent, seeing each other only occasionally and
on holidays.
Without a permanent attachment to any place, Americans
are loath to care for the place they live at; they merely
use it until it is used up and move on. As a result,
neighborhoods deteriorate until they look like bombed out
shells, toxic waste is dumbed in people's backyards by
their neighbors, and the entire country, America the
beautiful, looks like vomit from Hell. Because farming is
no longer an art of nurturance but a business, at least two
bushels of prime Kansas topsoil are swept away by wind and
water erosion for every bushel of corn that is grown. If
present trends continue, if the carelessness that governs
our farming is not quickly healed, we have only a few
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decades before this country, holder of some of the richest
farmland in the world, will be forced to start importing
large amounts of food. [31]
The most profound effect of modern technology has been
the separation of work places from dwelling places, the
dissolution of the household as the primary place where
things are made and its replacement by the disciplinary
regime of the factory. The way of the premodern household
was a way governed by handmade care, a care that was near
to the dwelling place, responsive to it and the things
that surrounded it. The way of the factory, on the other
hand, is a way governed by necessities far from its place
and global in extent. Cold, vast, built as if time did not
pass for it, it is a way infinitely distant from the thing
and the place that would gather it into being. Its truth
is a truth that is callously indifferent to the dwelling
place, the earth, and the thing, leveling every-thing out
and placing it within the rationality of its global order.
With this dissolution of the place of the household in
the way of things, a radical reorganization of the the work
of the sexes took place. [32] Women remained at home, now
the homemakers, and men went out into the economy, leaving
the dwelling place to make money. Radically reorganized by
the architecture of the world surrounding it, the word
"home" came to be associated with a single sex, the woman,
who, with the home, evoked a particular emotional tone, the
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warmth of the hearth, the security of a shelter against the
travails of harsh industrial work, with the dissolution of
the handmade care of the household, the sexual division
between public action and private morality changed and took
on an entirely new character, transforming women into
passive irrational homebodies, while work was associated
with men, reason, and commerce. In her newly restructured
place in the household, women became the contrast to man's
aggression, domination, and control, especially of and
against nature, with which woman was identified. More
oppressed than ever as the other of the world reason built,
women became subordinated doubles of men, everything they
were not. And their exploitation and submission followed
the exploitation and submission of the earth. With the
departure of men, the household ceased to be a place of
family work and became a unit of consumption managed by
women. If women have always been abused and subordinated,
it is only within the age of Enarchy, the much promised age
of human freedom, that it has become insufferable. Just as
the promise of human freedom beckoned, women were excluded
from it because they became the sex that could not master
it. While men were imprisoned by the world of control
their reason built, women were imprisoned by their sex,
which excluded them from the realm of freedom and reason.
Prior to this time of human freedom, men remained at
home, near the dwelling place, and, though there was a
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sexual division of labor, the aim of work was essentially
the same, to nurture the health of the household and make
it self-sufficient. Food, shelter, clothing, and most
tools, were produced and specifically made for the
occupants of the household. The household drew everything
near to itself and the care of its place, revealing in a
sexual equality united in its differences the necessities
of nurturing care and the responsibilities of each member
of the household.
The term "husband" in an antiquated, seldom used way
still carries with it the meaning that it used to share
with huswife— to cultivate the land, to care for the
dwelling place, the trees, plants, animals, and people in
and around it for the health and well being of everything.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'hus'
originally meant house, and 'band' is derived from 'bua'
and 'boa,' to build, to dwell, to have a household. To
husband means to be governed by care for the things of the
household, to be frugal, to spare things and make sure they
find their place within the household's economy. To
husband, then, following the way of the Thinker, is to set
things free, to let them be their things they are as they
are in the truth, the nurturing care, of the household.
Originally, freedom is sparing; it is the care the lover
shows the beloved. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, freedom is derived from 'beloved' or 'friend'
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in a variety of ways, some of them going all the way back
to Sanskrit. It is derived from the Old English word
'freon,' a cognate of the Sanskrit word 'priya,' dear: thus
the Old English, 'freond,' and later, 'friend,' all meaning
beloved. Throughout its past, freedom has been contrasted
to slavery, a way of being outside the love and nurturing
care of the family. Slaves are not free, because they are
but tools of use, a means violently set upon and
constrained to its utility, while the beloved members of
the household, the wife, the husband, the sons, the
daughters, the near friends and relatives, are spared the
trials and tribulations of a mere being as utility. As a
being, a presence, and a truth, the slave is reduced to a
means, a tool to be used and discarded when it is useless.
In this way, as the one not loved, the slave is not free.
To practice good husbandry is to respond the the
health and welfare of the beloved, to the things that
surround it and assure it, and this means keeping them safe
from harm, nurturing them and letting them be as their
nature calls them to be. The slave is but a tool, a mere
means evoking no such emotions. To be free then, is to not
be governed by the necessities of the instrument, to not be
a means beyond the care of love, and spared the doom of
utility
.
Good husbandry, good house wifery, each in its own
way, is caring for the dwelling place and the people that
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dwell there. in its truth as gathering place of human
concern, the household is the place where all work is
governed by care, concern, and love. Things are brought
forth, present themselves, and become a gathering of
concern in the household as things governed by the way of
love. This means that there are techniques appropriate for
the care of the household, and techniques that are
inappropriate, ways that spare and husband things and ways
that do not. The art of good husbandry and good huswifery
is knowing and having at hand the appropriate ways or
techniques for dwelling in peace.
According to Ruth Schwartz Cowan, the development of
modern industrial technology occured in lockstep with a
corresponding development of household technology and
transformation of the roles of te sexes. Contrary to
popular opinion in our time which sees the household as a
sanctuary from the pressures of industrial civilization,
the modern household is in fact intensely involved in it,
supported, limited, and transformed by the vast systems of
industrial productin outside of it. Quite unlike the
premodern household, the modern household is tightly
dependent on vast energy systems extending over entire
continents for any of its "labor saving" appliances to
work; it is dependent on municipal water and sewage systems
for waste disposal; it is dependent on agribusiness for
food, the housing industry for shelter, the clothing
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industry for clothing, and it is dependent on an
international economy to provide it with tools, income, and
social services. As the consumer which must fit into the
plans of all these systems, the modern household, and the
woman who manages it, is the object of much external
management, usually by the advertising industry, but also
through choices made necessary by the architecture of
industrial technology.
For example, according to Michael Best and William
Connolly, the luxuries of one era become the necessities of
the next because the architecture of consumption on which
everyone is dependent requires it. [33] In the 1920's it
was a common practice to store food in an ice box because
in cities the iceman regularly came around to deliver ice.
Moreover, corner grocery stores were common, making it
possible to buy groceries on a daily basis and bring them
home on foot. But soon the middle class started buying
electric refrigerators in mass and buying groceries at
supermarkets accessible only with cars. As a result, it
was no longer profitable to deliver ice, and corner grocery
stores were forced out of business. While the middle class
could afford the change, it was a harsh burden for poorer
classes. Even though they could hardly afford it, they
were forced to adopt middle class practices and tools.
Even though income distribution between the classes may
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have remained the same, the relative ability of poorer
classes to participate in the goods of society drastically
deteriorated because of the introduction of new household
technologies. For many people it was not a uncoerced
choice to change their practices, but a necessity imposed
by the new architecture of technology. Cars became
necessities because work and the sources of most
consumption goods moved out of the neighborhood. Public
transportation was excluded because transportation by car
was more profitable for the transportation monopolies and
because the government quickly began a massive highway
program for the automobile, establishing a subsidized
architecture of consumption that soon organized the layout
of cities and made other modes of transportation
unava liable
.
In order for the household to assume its destiny as
consumer for industrual factory production, many "labor
saving" devices had to be introduced into the household.
The true function of such devices was not so much to save
woman's labor as it was to provide a market for factory
produced goods and to free men of their household
responsibilites so that they could take their place in the
factory. For instance, according to Cowan, the
introduction of the electric and gas range and the
centralized heating system with automatic feed eliminated
the necessity of chopping wood, hauling it in, and hauling
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out the ashes-all men's work. The introduction of
refrigeration eliminated the need for men to handle ice,
just as the development of the electric vacum eliminated
the need for men to carry out the carpets so women could
beat them. And most significant of all, buying food at the
grocery store, which became woman's work, eliminated much
of the man's responsibility for directly producing and
processing food.
Factories began to make boots and shoes, so that men
no longer had to work leather at home. They also began to
produce pottery and tinware, so that men no longer had to
whittle containers and utensils at home. Piped household
water meant that children and men no longer had to carry it
in. The development of the meat-packing industry, linked
to the development of refrigerated transport, meant that
men no longer had to butcher or be involved with the care
of livestock.
Meanwhile, according to Cowan, the introduction of
factory milled white flower into the home greatly increased
the amount of work women had to do to make bread. Unlike
corn bread, the main staple bread in America prior to
industrialization, which is easily mixed and baked, wheat
bread (and especially white flower bread) has to be mixed
throughly, kneaded, yeasted, left to raise, and closely
watched while baking. While it reduced significantly the
amount of wood men had to bring in, the introduction of the
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stove made it possible, and then socially necessary, for
women to shift from a single course stew or soup to a
multiple course meal requiring more hours of preparation.
Manufactured cloth also served to increase woman's work.
Prior to industrialization, most of the materials of
clothing that people wore were unwashable, being made of
woven woolen goods or of leather, which were simply
brushed
.
As Cowan makes clear, it was not women's labor that
was saved with all the advances in household technology,
but men's, and more than that, women's labor was not only
not saved, but increased, and more importantly, made useful
to the distant necessities of Enarchy's economies.
Instead of being a dwelling place where work was
guided by love for its members, the household became an
instrument of consumption for factory centered production,
a means of extracting profit. The advertizing industry
fostered obsessive standards of cleanliness in order to
create a demand for its clients, the soap manufactures.
Guilt, embarrassment, and insecurity became the means the
advertizers and the advocates of factory technology used to
convince housewives that they had to use factory made
infant formula, that they had to reduce the spread of
infection by using paper tissues instead of reuseable cloth
handkerchiefs, that they could improve their children's
schoolwork by sending them off after a breakfast of factory
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processed cereal, and so on. Like their husbands who
worked in the factories, the women managing the household
were increasingly held as the Reserved for a vast system of
factory production, a means for extracting profit.
The introduction of household labor saving technology
became a means of breaking down the tradition of the
household as an autonomous producer responding to its own
needs and turning it into a consumer controlled by the
technical and economic imperatives of factory production.
Once the household began to be dependent on an industrial
economy, and then enslaved to its logic, it was easy to
suck it further in and subject it to control by means of
its relations of dependency.
Until the 19th century, according to Cowan, most of
the grains available in American households were grown and
usually milled by the household. But because large
commercial mills could do it so much faster and finer and
could generate white flower, households began to become
dependent on the flower mill to process their grains and
eventually on industrial bakers to bake their bread. By
1860, according to Cowan, flower milling was the leading
American industry, and the value of its product was more
than twice the value of the cotton industry and three times
that of iron and steel. The use of factory milled flower
represents one of the first stages of the industrialized
household and of its the collapse of its nurturing
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governance as handmade care.
Because milled flower was a commercial activity,
involving bankers, taxes, stockholders, factory made tools,
and extensive transportation systems, the household had to
have cash in order to benefit from the flower milling
system. Bartering with neighbors and friends could not
grant access to the budding industrial system because it
could not supply it with what it needed, a universal medium
of exchange through which it could link up with its
supporting systems. The only means of access to its
products was by participating in its development, either as
a farmer growing a cash crop, or as a wage laborer, or an
entrepreneur of some sort. Instead of managing their farms
as the nurturative art of husbandry calls on them to,
farmers had to learn to manage their farms in a way that
would fit into the industrial economy. Once farmers began
to participate in the market in order to have access to the
products of industrial technology, their fate was sealed.
Farmers began to seek the new techniques--f actory made
implements, nursery developed seeds, and chemical
fertilizers that could increase their yield and replace
farm workers, increasing their access to more of the
industrial economy while paying off their old debts. As
farmers increased their total production, seeking more
access to the industrial economy, more farmers became
superfluous to it. At the time of the American revolution.
185
13 farmers were needed for every city dweller; by the
middle of the 19th century only half of the population of
the United states were farmers; and now only 2.5% of the
population of the United states are farmers. The
disappearance of the family farm and its replacement by the
Agribusiness corporation is the collapse of the
self-sufficient household, the separation of people from
responsibility to the earth that sustains them, and the
industrialization of the entire population.
According to Lewontin and Bertan, from the early
1900's to the present day the ratio of purchased to self
generated inputs on the farm has increased more than 500%,
and this despite the fact that land, typically the largest
cost of farming, was calculated as a self generated
input! [34] This means that the farmer has changed from
being almost self-sufficient, generating most the inputs
for production on the farm, to almost total dependence on
monopoly capital for inputs. Instead of using last year's
crop for seed, the farmer buys it. Instead of using mules
and horses for power, which were feed on things grown on
the farm, the modern farmer buys tractors, and the fuel,
lubricants, and parts necessary to keep them running.
Instead of fertilizing his fields with crop rotation and
manure from livestock, the modern farmer buys chemical
fertilizer and controls pests with chemicals. With each
introduction of modern technology, farmers became more
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dependent and locked into the dynamics and rationality of
vast systems of power.
It started innocently enough with the self cleaning
steel plow, the early reapers of the 1830's, and then the
combine powered by the stationary steam engine. Farmers
were seduced by the power of the new technology to reduce
labor time and speed the production process. According to
Lewontin and Berlan, the new combine cut labor time by a
factor of eight. Though this first phase radically reduce
labor time, it was limited by the immobility of the
stationary steam engine. Fields still had to be plowed
with horses and the crop gathered up with human labor and
animal transportation.
The dependence of the farmer on the monopoly economy
deepened substantially with the introduction of mobile
power. The internal combustion engine, the differential,
and the pneumatic tire, freed the farmer of dependence on
the draft animal and the natural restraints that they
imposed. Horses could only work so hard and so long,
needing rest or their health would be destroyed. Not so
with the machine. It labored tirelessly and consumed
energy only as it worked. Because the farmer no longer
needed to feed draft animals, the land that was used to
sustain them could be used to grow a cash crop. Up to 28%
more land was available for cash production, and as soon as
it was, surpluses became a burden on the market, forcing
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more and more farmers off of the land.
But this decline in farm ownership has not meant a
loss of employment in agribusiness. On the contrary, for
every farm that was lost, jobs were created for workers who
manufactured, serviced, supplied, repaired, transported,
and transformed farm inputs and farm outputs. According to
Lewontin and Berlan, 50% of the average value added in
agribusines is added after the product leaves the farm.
Moreover, another 40% of the average value added in
agribusiness is explained by the cost of farm inputs.
Farming itself adds, on average, only 10% of the total
value of agribusiness production. And so, though the
number of farms has radically declined, the size of the
food system has not. Instead of working on farms, where
they were free to respond to the earth and nurture the
household, people are now subjected to the infinitely
exacting reign of the factory. The center of food
production and the place of the household is no longer the
farm but the city.
According to Cowan, as each generation of fathers
become increasingly involved in the industrial economy,
ceasing to cut haul, and split wood, to butcher animals, to
build houses, and to care for crops, each generation of
sons knew less and less about how it should be done--and
more and more about finding a job that paid wages in the
industrial economy. Finding their work undiminished, and
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indeed, often increased, each generation of mothers
continued to train their daughters in the pursuits of an
industrialized domesticity. Industrialization has
eliminated the traditional male r espons ibi 1 i tes in the
household, leaving the female ones intact, if restructured
as the management of consumption. This is largely the
reason why men were much more likely to join the labor
force than women. Freed of their responsibilities as
husbands they were "free" to do it; women, made useful as
consumers, were not. As a result of this, the household
has become the reserve of women who have not yet been
"freed" by means of modern technology to join their
fathers, brothers, and husbands in the factories. And it
has become the great necessity of our age to "free" women
as well, to liberate them from the vestages of the
tradition of nurturance that now oppresses them and keeps
them from participating in the world of reason that men
have built. Women are subjects too!
This is probably the ironic truth behind the women's
liberation movement, and the reason why so many feminists
persist in seeing technology as the means to their
salvation. Modern medical technology must be made to
provide them with the means to escape the tyranny of their
bodies with birth control (and perhaps if they are
separatist lesbians, with aritfical insemination);
industrial technology will provide them with factory
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prepared meals, disposable diapers, clothes that don't need
to be ironed, surfaces that are easy to clean, and so on.
At long last, technology will do what it promised to do,
give women their means of escape from the nurturing
responsibilites of the household, just as it gave men their
escape. When this happens the triumph of industrial
technology will be complete over the earth. Freed from
modernity's concept of femininity, freed from the
oppression of the remaining vestages of nurturance, women
will become, like men have already become, workers totally
held as the Reserved by the machine, slaves to a technology
that now requires their "liberation." with woman's final
liberation, the household, as a dwelling place governed by
love, will be completely destroyed, replaced by the
totalitarian organization of the factory, the school, the
government institution, and the prison.
With the liberation of men from the responsibilities
of the household by modern technology, the American
household is increasingly becoming a single mother raising
her children in poverty, supported by stingy, suspicious,
and disciplinary government agencies. Perhaps this kind of
household will soon become the norm, no doubt despite
attempts by "conservative" politicians to save it from from
its fate by managing it properly and removing the welfare
incentives that are breaking poor families up. If it does,
we should not be surprised. Once men were freed of their
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nurturative responsibilities within the household, becoming
nothing more than wage earners supporting it from the
outside, they were left with only their emotional
responsibilities. m the time of Enarchy, emotional
responsibilities bring a heavy economic penalty, being an
irrational investment of time and money. No longer
productive members of a self sufficient household, children
are now an economic liability, needing large amounts of
money for food, clothing, t r anspr otat ion
, education,
health, and recreation. And a wife who does not have a job
may not be much less of a penalty, simply another consumer
to support. Since men are treated like machines at their
jobs, nothing more than tools of production, it is not
likely that they will be able to develop a way of being
that treats anyone else any differently. The wife becomes
simply a source of ser vices--cook
,
housekeeper, nurse, and
prostitute. And children become welfare recipients.
Divorce, child abuse, wife abuse, failure to pay child
support payments--the ethical collapse of the family, in
short--is the final result of the industrialized household.
When the household is no longer tied together by handmade
care, love that is daily reflected in the things people do
do directly for each other, but is supported and sustained
by systems of production and control that spans continents,
it is doomed and must disintegrate into abstract
individuals, people whose being is chained to the factory
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as a system of production.
Once the individual is freed from the household as a
place of work, no longer governed by the care that is near
to him, he is drawn into the control of the factory
organized economy and made into a tool of production. As a
human machine, he is useful as long as a machine is
useful, disregarded as soon as he is useless. Unlike the
household, the factory is governed entirely by a highly
rational economy of means, a technology that knows only the
truth of efficiency and rationality, and none of the
household's truth of care and nurturance. Inputs, and
labour is just one among many, must be minimized against
the maximum output. Reduced to a means, freed of any
responsibility for nurturing care, the worker in the
factory becomes a slave in the fullest, most profound sense
possible. Although our age has abolished the legal
structure supporting slavery, it has deepened, perfected,
and universalized its practice. If the ideal of Enarchy is
universal mastery, the truth is universal slavery. As one
plantation owner in the South sneered as he watched his
workers, ragged, homeless, and impoverished, file off of a
bus, "We don't own slaves anymore, we rent them."
Once his work is freed from the care that governs the
household, the worker's work confronts him as something
alien, a power far from his own home that turns against him
and subjects him to its control. As Marx knew so well, the
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technology that is the fruit of the worker's labor subjects
the worker to a wretchedness that is inversely porportional
to the power and magnitude of his production. [ 35] The more
technology makes possible human mastery, the more the
worker is mastered, a slave to the machine's motions. The
more the machine embodies the highest attainments of human
rationality, the more pathetic and craven the the human
that stands watch over it becomes. The more that the
things the worker makes become alien to him, confronting
him as a system that is independent of his control, his
existence, and his life, the more the worker is cut off
from the earth that sustains him, becoming a homeless
wanderer in his homeland. His life, his reality as
dweller, and his responsibility for nurturance, disappears
and is lost in his work and its rationality, so much so
that despite his greatest efforts, the worker may be robbed
of the things most necessary to his life, and he starves to
death or is poisoned while working in a capitalist
enterprise or in a socialist labor camp.
Outside of the household and the handmade care of the
family, cut off from the earth that sustains his and his
family's life, held in reserve as a means for factory
production, the worker works for something unimaginably
distant, something cold and indifferent to his love, his
gods, and his death. In his life as a worker in the
factory, the worker does not draw near to himself or the
193
thing present to him, but denys his responsibility to the
earth, is not free to love but oppressed, does not develop
as a dweller, but destroys his body, ruins his mind, and
desecrates the earth. m his work the thing he makes is
gathered into a framing that is alien and distant to even
itself, and the thing's thinging is governed not by his
love, but by his doom as slave and tool of Enarchy.
CHAPTER X
HARNESSING THE EARTH TO THE SLAVERY OF MAN
The age of man the subject, the positer of all value,
meaning, use and utility, is the age of the machine because
a machine, in its widest sense, is a man made fabrication,
a system of any kind, material or immaterial brought forth
by man for his use as a means for some-thing. Once the
world is viewed as picture, a series of objects posited and
organized by man and available for his exclusive use, it
becomes a coherence of forces represented in the mind of
man as a means for his willing. Everything becomes a
machine, plants, animals, the motion of the solar system,
and even, most ominously, man himself. God, so far as he,
the first of all beings, is considered, becomes a mere
clock maker and the universe an elaborate clock-like
mechanism, moving in a tight linkage of cause and effect
toward a destiny determined from the first moment.
Once man becomes subject, the underlying reality of
all things, everything becomes an object for him.
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orgainized according to his will and utility. As an object
present as man's will, the thing is exclusively available
as a way of increasing his power and assuring that the will
finds only itself in its willing.
It does not seem to matter much whether Enarchy comes forth
as Marxism, Nazism, or Americanism because in one way or
another everything ends by becoming a means for man, which
is no end at all. True, in contrast to America where
nothing was put in its way, the Nazi movement did begin
with some challenging of the machine, perhaps exploiting
the hidden resentments of the masses at being reduced to
utility. But when it had gained power and was faced with
the pragmatic necessities of conquering the world, the need
for efficiency easily overwhelmed any mystical limitations
the Nazis may have belived in. And it is true that
Communist China did place limitations on the machine,
sacrificing efficiency for a higher metaphysic, social
consciousness. But now under new leadership, pragmatism
seems once again to have won out. Inequalities due to
efficiency and the imperatives of management are returning
and sometimes even encouraged. And in Sweden, it is true
that some attempts were made to humanize the factory.
Instead of working at an assembly line performing
repetitive tasks, workers would be formed into teams and
assemble, say, an entire car together.
But all of these various efforts to challenge the
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unrestrained dominion of the machine were not at essence
fundamental because they only sought to once again assert
human mastery over technology. Seeking human mastery,
recognizing that the machine can dispossess man of it,
these efforts to restrain the machine and humanize the
factory remain in essence too true to Enarchy, for the
aspiration of Enarchy is human mastery through means such
as the machine. If the machine escapes human control and
enslaves man to its logic, as Marxists argue that it does
under capitalism, then the answer is obvious: the creation
of a society that can master the machine. It is, it would
seem, only the logic of individuals acting as individuals
in the marketplace that makes the machine into a monster.
Socialize the machine, subject it to the unmystified,
democratic, and humane control of a society that
understands it as a social instrument, and it will make
possible a new and unprecedented civilization of human
freedom. No longer will man be subject to the cruel
necessities of nature, but, at long last, through the
machine, he will become the master of nature. Marx himself
was one of our age's most devout worshipers of the machine.
Capitalism was to be forgiven its sins because,
simultaneously revolutionizing the relations of production
and the forces of production, it was in the process of
perfecting the machine and making possible the full
attainment of humanity's reality.
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Perhaps it is not even ironic the Frederick Taylor,
the great American champion of the human machine, was
idolized by Lenin himself, who made great use of his
principles of scientific management in the Soviet Union.
If humanity is to come to its subjectivity through the
machine, perhaps it is only after it has been sufficiently
subjected to it.
Human subjectivity is accomplished by being the
underlying cause of what occurs, the archy or commanding
origin of things. To be the underlying cause, the will
that out of itself wills the first motion, the subject must
set about discovering the forces that deny it its mastery,
be it by means of the Marxist laws of history, the dynamics
of psychoanalysis, the learned patterns of behaviorism, or
whatever archy or metaphysic of man is choosen. Once these
forces have been anticipated they can be shaped into
whatever configuration the will wills. It is only through
an understanding of the causes that determine its life that
the human subject becomes its own master. Once it
understands itself as a will subject to causality, however,
the subject understands itself as a machine, a coherence of
forces available for manipulation. All forms of human
subjectivity, be they individual, collective, racial, or
whatever, must proceed by making humanity available for
manipulation--that is to say, into a machine, if only for
the moment that precedes its mastery.
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Seeking human subjectivity through the collect
being of humanity, Lenin no doubt concluded that the
individual experience of the machine could, under the grim
realities of production in the Soviet Union, be sacrificed
for the collective good. it was not the individual's
freedom that mattered, that made humanity into the subject
(capitalism was proof of that), it was the collective's
freedom, the whole of society that mattered. If collective
freedom was possible only by means of subjecting the
individual to the brutal regime of Taylor's factory, then
so be it.
And so it goes. Although many socialists outside the
Soviet Union think that the the Soviet Union has betrayed
Marx, that it is a horrible abortion of the revolutionary
process, it may only be revealing the full brutality of
humanity appropriated as machine. Other systems may not be
as brutal--they would call themselves more humane--but in
essence they are all the same: the machine governs their
being.
As an instrument of man's command, a machine is a
train of parts, of resistant bodies, connected or chained
together in certain way so that if one moves, all receive
the motion of the command. Viewed in terms of its
function, a machine is a system of interdependent motions,
setting action against action, force against force, in
precise, predetermined ways, combining them together into a
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coherent whole that accomplishes the will of the subject
that wills it into action. The human use of a machine is
constituted, limited, and deployed by the resistances that
the reaction of its parts against each other make possible.
Resistance is a strategic deployment of the command within
the machine, a hardness used to transmit motion to other
parts, which act together to perform its function.
A machine becomes better able to fulfill its command
as a result of a tighter, more precise and unambiguous
connection between the parts or resistances. The machine
architect's aim is to constrain the resistances of the
machine's parts, to precisely define their shape and
nature, and to juxtapose them so that the possibility of
any but the desired motion is eliminated. The more
resistances are constrained to the planned motion the more
complete, the more useful, the machine is as an instrument
of command. A machine wears out, becoming ill suited to
fulfill its function, as the resistances wear against each
other, producing slack and making possible ill functioning
and unwilled deviations from planned motions. The
perfection of the machine, and its utility as instrument of
human willing, depends on the hardness and precision of the
resistances constituting it. Parts must retain their
shape, their strategic resistance, remaining within defined
tolerances, in order to fulfill their function as utility
for man.
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The more sophisticated and useful the machine is as an
instrument of the command, the more essential it is that
all the parts are constrained to their defined tolerances.
If they aren't, if there is the least bit of slack, some
part somewhere in the mechanism could make an unplanned and
unwilled motion. Because command wills a machine tightly
linked together in a chain of action and reaction, this
unplanned motion could have a disasterous effect--the more
catastrophic the more complex, interdependent, rigorously
linked, useful and powerful the machine is. Either it would
make the machine produce something that wasn't planned on,
or, more likely, cause it to destroy itself by putting its
parts into unplanned configurations that they would destroy
themselves in, like a worn out car engine throwing its rods
through its valve cover.
As Marx knew well, and yet not well enough, the
decisive thing about the machine in our age of machines is
not its internal structure but its relation to man, its
alleged master. For Marx, the machine is an instrument of
production, a tool that does the same thing that the
craftsman did. Since man is appropriated as instrument of
production, the machine displaces him from his craft,
subjecting him the the rule of the mechanism. So much so
that what was once a craftsman becomes a mere instrument of
the machine, dwarfin, mishappen, born to a life of craven
toil, and his life measured and valued according to his
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measure and value to the machine. with an awesome
assertion of its power, as yet too near to us to be seen
with the amazement it deserves, the machine breaks man free
of his past and draws him into its coldly rational
mechanism, claiming him, body and soul, as part of itself.
The scientific management of the human machine in the
time of Enarchy entails the division of labour, not only
the social division of labor, where people specalize in
certain crafts, but the detailed division of labor within
the factory and the craft. The worker no longer practices
his craft as a whole, as he did in the household economy,
but is relegated to a narrow segment of a production
process organized by the disciplinary regime of the
factory
.
As the worker is denied the whole of the making of
things, as the household ceases to be the place of
nurturing care, all that is holy in it is driven away too.
Work becomes a cruel and alienating compulsion, driven by
structures, relationships, and imperatives far from the
worker's dwelling place.
Holding humanity as Reserved and machine, Enarchy
eventually destroys the worker's skill, his craft, and his
openess to the earth by seeking to rationlize his work
within the architecture of production and to subject him to
his role as its slave. As operations are separated from
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each other and assigned to different workers, they can be
analyzed in isolation and made more efficient through an
elimination of unecessary motion. As the productive
process is analyzed into separate parts and dissociated
from the worker's craft knowledge it may be separated into
motions which are simpler than others and each of which is
simpler than the whole craft. And once this happens, it
becomes increasingly possible to precisely comprehend the
worker's motions, set them within the architecture of
factory production, and replace them with a machine. And
even if that is not possible a highly skilled worker can be
replaced with a less skilled, perhaps even totally
unskilled worker, transforming the skilled worker into a
replacable slave. Destroying the craft as an art revealed
in the hands of a craftsman and near to his life, Enarchy
degrades the craftsman into utility and reconstitutes the
craft into a production process under the supervision and
control of scientific management.
The subjugation of the worker, of its own logic,
brings with it an architecture of the command, techniques
for its pure transmission. The first technique in the
command's architecture is to give scientific management,
the agents of reason, the responsibility for gathering
together all the traditional knowledge which was possessed
by the craftsman and then of making it
rational—classifying, tabulating, and reducing this
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knowledge to rules, laws, and formulas. The aim is to
dissociated the worker from his craft knowledge, rendering
the production process subject to the command by being
independent of craft, tradition, and the worker's life.
This technique enables scientific management to command the
production process, to identify norms of labor, subject
workers to it, and to make it proceed according to the
projected plans. The second general technique in the
architecture of the command, dependent on the first, is
that all thinking, all craft knowledge, should be removed
from the actual production process itself and centered in a
planning department where it can be organized rationally.
The possibility of command requires that not only must
scientific management gather all knowledge of the
production process and organize it according to the
necessities of reason and control, it must insure that
workers have no need for skill or reason in their work and,
thus, no possibility of control over it. Separating
conception from execution, thinking from planning, this
technique insures that the worker becomes a pure agent of
the command, alienated from any irrational care for the
thing made, far removed from the reason governing the
production process.
Following its responsiblity for commanding the
production process, compelled by it to make a complex
process rational and efficient, scientific management
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develops a need for space to keep books, records, and
desks, as well as a hierarchy of planners to define quotas,
make specifications, and coordinate the production process.
Subject to the architecture of the command, scientific
management must plan out how it is going to accomplish its
plans. It is a testament to the necessity of planning for
Enarchy that the most ubiquitous characteristic of
industrial production, both socalist and capitalist, is
planning
.
The third technique in the architecture of the command
is the one that gathers the first two together and applies
them to production in the factory, the actual movements of
the enslaved and homeless worker amid the machinery of the
factory. If the first technique is the rationalization of
all knowledge of the production process, and the second is
the concentration of all power into the hands of the agents
of reason, scientific management, the third is to use this
knowledge and its concentration to build the world that
reason requires, the machinery to control each step of the
production process, integrating every motion into the
process as a whole.
Because of these techniques, or rather, the
architecture of reason bringing them forth, craftsmanship
gave way to repeated detail operation, and the worker was
reduced to an appendage of the machine, a slave to its
motions and a slave in truth to the end of his days.
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Seeking to secure its command, Enarchy's primary aim
is to make the production process as efficient and rational
as possible. Toward this end it seizes hold of the
bringing forth of things from the earth as a way the
craftsman reveals the world's worlding and reconstitutes it
as a rational process conducted by scientific management.
As the process is analyzed into its constituent parts, and
the motions of the worker simplified and normalized to a
regular routine, it becomes increasingly possible and
logical to replace the worker with a machine. Since the
truth of things is not their mystery but their utility for
man, there is no need to respond to the earth, to the
uniqueness of the dwelling place. As a result of the new
truth of things, man becomes an instrument in the
production process, displaced and reassigned according to
the advance of mechanization.
Frederick Taylor first popularized the time study as a
technique to get control over the worker and displace him
from his craft. [36] A time study a measures the elapse of
time for each motion in a work process, normalizes the time
it takes to do a motion, and then evaluates specific
individuals against a hierarchy of possible time values,
rewarding them or punishing them according to their
utility. The prime instrument of the time study was the
stopwatch
.
But Taylors's lime study was inadequate to scientific
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management's need for, projection, calculation, and formal
planning. Time studies could only be done on an actual job
in an actual factory, not against universal standards of
what the human machine was capable of. As a result, it
could not be used to plan, develop, and build more
sophisticated factories, but only improve existing ones
haphazardly after they were built. For the planning and
efficient development of assembly lines, a more formal and
mathematical theory of human motion was necessary, a
general and abstract theory that could be universalized and
then applied.
Frank b. Gilbreth, a follower of Taylor's, responded
to scientific management's need for generality and
abstraction with the time and motion study. To Taylor's
time studies he added the concept of a motion study, that
is, he investigated and classified the basic motions of the
body independently of concrete work. In a time and motion
study, basic movements were defined, their duration
measured, and broken down into units that were projected as
the building blocks of any productive activity. These
units of motions were called, in a variant of Gilbreth's
name spelled backwards, therbligs. To the stop watch, as
instrument of control, were added the chronocyclegraph, and
stroboscopic pictures, (which were photographs of motion
paths superimposed) , and eventually the motion picture.
The result was a catalog of the amount of time it took the
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human body to do certain motions-for instance, the
individual amounts of time that it took to select an
object, grasp it, transport it loaded, transport it empty
and so on. Once these basic motions were cataloged, they
could, as building blocks, be assembled in any way
necessary for work on a production line. Eliminating the
need for repeated and expensive experiments and
modifications, the catalog of human motions greatly
assisted the planning and construction of assembly lines
because with them, engineers could plan out the speed of
the assembley line and the division of labor in stations
along it. With Gilbreth's therbligs, the motions of the
human body became as precise an object of definition and
control as the other machines on the assembly line. And
that was very precise indeed. Eventually, according to
Braverman, the therblig was refined into units of one
hundred-thousandth of an hour, or thrity-six thousandths of
a second. With the therblig, scientific management gained
control over every instant of time, coming close to leaving
nothing that was unproductive, irrational, or inefficient.
As the machine evolves, asserting its metaphysic of
power on things, man evolves with it, becoming increasingly
possessed by the architecture that governs it and its
destiny. As the machine draws near to its destiny as a
means for the command what is essential is not its evolving
complexity, size, speed, or technical sophistication, but
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the way in which its operations are controlled. Similarly,
the application of power to such hand tools as drills,
saws, grinders, wrenches and so on need not change the
nature of the handcraft, it may merely make it easier. As
long as the guidance of the tool and the skill behind it
remains entirely in the hands of the craftsman, whatever
the power added to it, it can remain near to the life of
the dweller.
It is only when the machine's tool is constrained to a
fixed path by the machine's own apparatus and it thereby
becomes available for control by some command other than
the craftsman's truth, as it can be with drill presses,
lathes, sewing machines, triphammers, and so on, that the
machine begins to take on its modern character. But this
is only a beginning. The person controlling the process
can still, to some extent in some circumstances, be thought
of as a craftsman, responding to the calling of the thing
he is making. Under the regime and truth of scientific
management, however, the fixed motion paths of these
machines can reveal new ways to rationalize and constrain
the motion of the tool, removing it further from the hands
of the craftsman and subjecting it to the command of
managment. According to Braverman, for example, a lathe can
be easily automated so that it runs through a cycle by
itself once a workman starts it on its way, directly
transmitting management's command to the product. Once
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that improvement is made, it is another easy step to have
the lathe automatically change tools after a cycle is
complete and start itself on another cycle performing
another function, and so on, in a specified sequence until
the machined product is finished. In these kinds of
specalized machines the sequence of management's command is
built directly into the machine and cannot be changed
without changing the structure of the machine. The motions
of the mechanism are not, as yet, so much automatic as
predetermined, since the control of motion is fixed within
the mechanism and has no links with external control or its
own working results.
According to Braverman, the next step in the evolution
of the machine toward its perfection as instrument of
command is the introduction of automation, the control of
the machine's motions with information coming from outside
the direct working mechanism. At a simple level, this may
take the form of a feedback mechanism that measures the
machine's output or regulates its motion, turning it on
when its task is done or keeping its motions safely within
the limits of its design. Examples of this kind of
commanding could be a thermostat or a govenor. At a more
sophisticated level, the automated machine may measure the
results of its work while it is in progress, compare the
results with the design specifications, and make
adjustments on itself as it proceeds, continually checking
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its production against the plan and adjusting itself to
conform to it.
With automation a limited reversal takes place. Prior
to the introduction of automation, the evolution of the
machine was from general purpose to special purpose, from,
say, the hand held drill to the single machine in a factory
that simultaneously drills many holes in an engine block,
mills its surfaces to final finish, taps threads where
needed, and so on. Such large scale machines could have no
other function than the specific one they were designed
for. The single machine that drills holes in a car block
would be completely useless for a slightly bigger or
different engine. These machines are made only when the
continuous volume of a specific product can cover the cost
of elaborate equipment. Under these circumstances
production lines are very carefully designed and planned
out. However, with the introduction of automation, some
flexibility for commanding is regained. A lathe, for
instance, can be made to do a variety of things and be
controlled by r eprogramable magnetic tape rather than
mechanical construction. This process of making the
machine more flexible is accelerating with the development
of computers, artifical intelligence systems, and robotics.
As the machine becomes more flexible, it becomes more an
agent of reason, responding ever more surely to
nagement's commanding. In modern car factories robotsmai
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are able to spot weld different makes of cars one after
another, assemble a variety of different components on
different makes of cars, and spray paint different colors
on different cars, without even slowing the assembly line
down. As robotics develops, robots will become more
adaptable to different tasks, becoming more responsive to
the command.
With the introduction of external control and the
increased flexibility of the machine it makes possible,
scientific management expands its control over the
production process, assuring the greater security of
reason. The same factory is able to adapt to different
plans, different products, and perhaps, different materails
without stopping to modify machines. As automation
centralizes control, making the production process
increasingly subject to the command, it removes the worker
further from the thing he makes, the governing care of his
craft and his place on earth. Responses to the calling of
commanding reason, automation and computerization are the
primary source of homelessness in our time, making possible
the final dissolution of handmade care.
As an assembly line becomes more automatic and
rational, the seperate machines along it become more
adapted to each other, timed and regulated to complete
their tasks in harmony with each other. Conveyors and
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chutes transport the various components of the product from
one processing machine to another just as they are needed,
becoming almost indistinguishable from the processing
machines themselves. When automation reaches this point,
the factory ceases to be a series of machines put in
stations along an assembly line, and becomes a single
machine. Instead of many machines performing many separate
tasks, we have a single incredibly large and complex
machine performing a single task. The design of the
machine then ceases to focus on a part of the production
process but on the process as an integrated whole.
Factories become, as Lewis Mumford puts it, megamachines
,
pure expressions of rational production. Perhaps the best
example of this is General Motor's Saturn assembly system,
where the entire production process, from design, to the
initial processing of raw materials, to the fabrication of
parts, to their transportation and assembly on the factory
floor, to the delivery of the finished product to the
customer, is linked and managed by computers and computer
controlled machines.
It is generally assumed that any increase in
technology, the potential for command of the earth,
requires an increase in the skill (and may we wonder, the
dignity?) of workers. And why not? Every advance in
technology is an advance in man's mastery of the earth.
This assumption, almost a tautology in our age, is piously
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decorated with the opinions of experts brought out every
time a new innovation threatens to displace more workers.
Economists, the primary apologists for the rationalization
of industry, assure one and all that although workers will
be displaced from their jobs, the technology that displaces
them will require more highly skilled, more highly payed,
jobs somewhere else. Indeed, it is actually in the
interest of workers to support every technological advance,
even if it does require dislocation, because it only
secures man's dominion over nature. It would seem that
anyone who is opposed to technological advance is totally
crazy and irresponsible, a Luddite, as it is commonly said.
But our brave empiricists who insist so mightly on
actual evidence to support any proposition seem to have
been struck blind when it comes to supporting the claim
that advancing technology increases the skills, pay, and
dignity of workers. Perhaps it is so obvious that it
doesn't need to be supported. At any rate it is seldom
questioned.
One of the few exceptions, according to Braverman, are
some studies in the 1950's by James R. Bright of the
Harvard Business school on the managerial implications of
automation. After watching actual production in a variety
of what were considered highly automated factories of the
time, interviewing three to four hundred industrialists,
and presenting tentative conclusions to a dozen or so
214
industrial audiences, Bright concluded that in general,
with some exceptions in plant maintenance, the need for
skill decreased, sometimes becoming non-existent, with
advances in automation. in fact, for Bright the myth of
skill advancing with technology was dangerous because it
raised expectations, created disillusion and resentment
when expectations were not meet, and destroyed valid job
standards by setting skill standards that were unnecessary
for the job. Here was an honest social scientist!
Bright set up a "mechanization profile" of seventeen
levels, each specifying a specific machine or hand function
and its opperating characteristics, from the most backward
to the most advanced. On mechanization levels 1 to 4,
where the tool remains in the worker's hands. Bright
observed that skill was increasing with every advance in
the tool. On levels 5 to 8 where control is constrained by
the mechanism but still dependent on the worker, some
skills are increasing but most have turned downward. In
levels 9 to 11, where the machine is partially brought
under external control or automated, most skills turn
downward. And in the higher levels, where automation
increasingly takes control of the machine, every skill
required by the worker plummets to nothing or almost
nothing. The result of Bright's observations on skills is
a curve that shows an increase in skills needed through the
first four levels, where the tool is hand held, a decrease
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as machines
.
are increasingly constrained by their own
structure, and a rapid plunge in the skills the worker
needs as machines are increasingly controlled by external
sources.
The decisive point for the worker is when his work
ceases to be a handcraft and becomes the controller and
moniterer of machines, when Marx would say that he becomes
an appendage to the machine. That is when the machine
enables management to increasingly subject the worker to
its reason, command, and control by rendering his skills
increasingly unnecessary. The machine replaces the
craftman's skills, transforming him into a replaceable
component in the production process, an instrument or means
for the command. In his work, the worker becomes what he
already was in his being in the age of reason, he becomes
identical with the machine, a slave linked to its commands.
It should come as no surprise that the worker loses
his skill because the very architecture of the command
dictated as much. The three techniques of the command
hinge on the ability of scientific management to separate
the worker from his work, transforming him into a means to
it, and subjecting him to its rationality. Since the
worker is seized body and soul as a means for the command,
he must submit to the imperative of efficiency as evey
other instrument does. Since skill is the antithesis of
Enarchy's command, an unquant if iable , unmeasur able
,
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unspecifiable, and unmanageable variable, it must be
eliminated as much as possible, and whatever remains
subjected to disciplinary organization.
This transformation of the craftsman into degraded
worker and object of man's utility, occurs most fully in
large scale production where management is able to impose
its plan on labor. But in agriculture, where
centralization and the full rationalization of production
has not yet occured, the farmer's skills have not suffered
nearly so precipitous a drop. In contrast to the "skilled"
laborer in the factory, who becomes a skilled worker in 6
weeks or at the most 6 months time, it takes many years for
a person to develop the skills necessary to be a modern
farmer, in fact it is almost impossible unless one is born
to it. And unlike many factory skills were a worker can
get as good at his job as he is going to get in a couple of
months time because they are precisely specified, a farmer
can always become a better farmer. And yet, according to
Wendell Berry, the skills of farmers too have been
declining with the introduction of the machine. [37] Until
the the self-powering machine was introduced to the farm,
each introduction of new technology brought with it an
increase of skill needed by the farmer. The digging stick,
the first tool of agriculture, made necessary a new skill.
Instead of gathering plants where they grew by nature's
power, the early farmer cultivated nature's ways and
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brought them forth from the earth. Cultivating nature
brought with it a building responsibility to the earth, the
seasons, and the gods. Early farming was an act of
worship, a cultivating of the gods. it did not set upon
the earth and demand that it submit to man's mastery, nor
did it know nature as pure utility; it brought the fruit of
the god forth and revealed the truth of the god. So far as
he knew how, the early farmer had a responsibility to renew
and replenish the earth which, with a godly mystery of
fertility, yearly brought forth its fruit by means of human
nurturance and cultivation. Under the governance of the
gods, each new advance in technology--f ir st the use of
stone implements, then metal, then the use of
animals--brough t with a greater responsibility because as
more and more was disturbed, more and more had to be
preserved. As the word "cultivation," by means of its
root--the word "cult"— implies, the ideas of tillage and
worship are joined in culture. To till is to bring forth
the god. All these words come from an Indo-European root
meaning both to revolve and to dwell. To be human, as the
word "humus" reminds us, is to take up one's place on the
earth, care for it; and worship the god whose truth governs
its fertility. All these ideas are bound up with the idea
of a cycle— the cycle of seasons and the cycle of life,
death, and fertility that renews the earth. To cultivate
is to dwell, to remain and respond to the cycle of
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fertility that renews the earth and sustains the household.
With the introduction of the draft animal, the need
for skill and the limits it responded to grew together.
Now humanity had to respond to the animal in a new way, as
Wendell Berry argues, not as food from the hunt, but as
collaborator. Two different kinds of beings were involved
now in the health of the farm and the nurturance of the
household, animal and human, and the health and welfare of
each required the development of new skills.
According to Berry, it requires more skill to use a
team of draft animals than a machine because the
relationship between man and animal must be cultivated.
The machine is simply used. Between man and animal there
are limits of natural health that must be respected or
death destroys the collaboration. Between man and machine
there are no limits, no need for care, and no need of the
skill that responds to limits. Within the possibilities of
its mechanism, the machine is a pure expression of human
will, starting, stopping, and functioning as its manager
wills it. It requires no nurturance, no cultivation, only
maintenance. It has no connection to the cycle of life on
earth, and therefore does not reguire moral restraint on
its use. In its being, it is purely at the disposal of
human willing.
Cut off from the fertility of the earth, indifferent
to the cycle of the seasons, the machine, as an instrument
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of reason, enables man, the metaphysician, to abstract
himself from the complex web of the earth's replenishment,
and assert his mastery over it. m agriculture, as
culture, there is a responsibility and a necessity that
makes skill a necessity for maintaining a balance between
fertility and use, between gain and continuity. The fruit
that is taken one year must not be allowed to decrease the
fruit that is taken the next year. The cycle must remain
complete, no part of it broken. Maintaining the cycle
requires skill—erosion must be prevented, the way of life
for all kinds of pxants, animals, and insects must be known
and then cultivated so that each provides a balance to the
rest, and wastes must be returned to the soil so that its
fertility is renewed.
But the machine does not require these nurturing
skills. It enables man to interrupt natural cycles and
balances and take what he wills. Instead of a skill that
knows the life cycle of pests and their predators and uses
them to maintain a balance of health, the machine gives man
a poison that kills indiscriminately. Instead of the skill
that knows how to keep the health of the soil with crop
rotation and humus that has been made from waste, the
machine gives man the power to apply factory made chemical
fertilizer. Instead of the skill that knows how to use
draft animals, the machine gives man almost limitless power
to till the soil at will.
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And the development of the agribusiness machine has
resulted in the deterioration of the farmer's skill in
another way. When the machine was first introduced on the
farm, it was relatively simple and farmers quickly
developed the new skill necessary for reparing it. As farm
machines became more complex, farmers developed their
skills as mechanics. But recently farm machines have
become too complex for even the most skilled farm
mechanics. As farm machines increasingly use advanced
electronics, high pressure hydraulics, high powered diesel
engines, complex traction systems, and exotic materials,
repair and maintenance of farm machines must be turned over
to specialists, who often need the equivalent of a college
education to understand the new farm machine. And so, the
machine's advance has deteriorated even the farmer's
skills.
And as the machine destroyed the farmer's skills, it
increasingly is able to replace them. One day soon,
perhaps only 250,000 farmers will produce 90% of the food
in this country. Between now and then at least 1 million
farms will disappear.
The mechanization of the farm was instrumental in the
creation of the factory and the enslaved worker. Without a
surplus of farmers, management would not have had
sufficient workers willing to submit to its disciplinary
regime for its labor force. The triumph of machine
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technology would not have occured unless it had set upon
the farmer, broken him free of his traditional practices,
and then of his land, transforming him into a rootless
worker vulnerable to the necessity and rationality of the
factory. In a real sense the Industrial Revolution was
built on the destruction of farmers and their way of life.
They, almost exclusively, bore the initial sacrifices
necessary to create the modern factory. But more than that
the skill of many farmers was lost. The governance of the
dwelling place, the responsibility for nurturing the earth,
and the life governed by the near at hand was lost as well.
The mechanization of the farm was the first step in a chain
of events that drew everything together into a totalitarian
system of production that was unresponsive to the earth,
the cycle of life, and the place of humanity. No one or
thing could escape it, because once they participated in
it, they were made more dependent on it, chained to it, and
then they were doomed to it.
A skill is a knowledge of the right thing to bring
forth. It is an ability to discriminate, to separate
things out, know their differences, and to put them in
their places. As a sense, more intuitive than rational, of
what is right, appropriate, or fitting, a skill is the
ability to hear and respond to the earth that governs the
revealment of things. From the earth, the mystery that
conceals, it draws things forth, letting the world world
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through them. Situated in a place and in a time, a skill
is appropriate only to that place and time. m a different
world, governed by a different technology or way of being,
it may be entirely useless, as the skill of electric
welding would be in any pr eindust r ial age
As the Thinker would say, a skill is the ability to
hear the whisper of the world worlding and let it speak
through the hands of the artisan, bringing the thing
brought forth near to the dwelling place of the artisan.
The deterioration of skill, as merely technical skill,
is not the absolute measure of humanity's degradation in
the face of the machine. Although reason requires as much
as possible an elimination of skill, in the age of Enarchy
there remain some highly skilled workers. But, because
they are at the beck and call of reason, these people are
in essence no different than the most degraded of workers
because their skills are not directed to dwelling but to
control and exploitation. Advertizing, for instance, is a
real growth industry, and it does require highly skilled
people to bring the consumer under its control, and yet it
is an entirely depraved skill because it holds the consumer
as Reserved, utilizfing him as an instrument of profit.
There are many skills, but only some are revealed in
any one age as useful skills. The mark of our age of
reason is the slavish depravity of our most useful skills,
where they exist, and the absence of skill where they do
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not. Many of the skills that this age finds most useful
are skills for controlling other people and making them
available for some sort of use. in America most new jobs
are opening up in such occupations as labor relations,
public relations, private and public security, correction,
advertizing, political lobbying and campaigning, and so on.
The primary imperative of reason has been to increase
the technology of control over workers, skilled and
unskilled alike, displacing them from their place. By
displacing the craftsman, by removing the tool from his
skilled hands, and placing it in the control of a mechanism
that is determined by its rationality, the technology of
management eliminates any need to respond to the earth, to
the place of humanity. Once this responsibility is lost,
the worker is at the mercy of management, useful only as
long as he is docile. As an instrument of reson the
machine divests the worker of any responsibility for his
work, any possibility of his building flowing from his
dwelling. The history of the machine's advance, then, is
not the history of man's conquest and mastery but of his
enslavement to the world reason has built.
As the machine evolves to meet its destiny it is
followed, step by step, with the social degeneration of
man. Under the reign of the machine, whether he has any
skill reason can use or not, he has become a pathetic
slave, or collectively, a rabble, a heap growing in
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ignorance, incapacity, irresponsibility, and impotent
anger. Asked (but in reality forced) to do nothing more
than tend to the machine, the worker becomes incapable of
doing anything else—not of being a citizen of the
republic, not of attending to the whisper of the world
worlding, nor of fulfilling his destiny as guardian of
being. His death comes with a pathetic whimper, when it
comes, and his life is lived as if it never would. Death
is the great terror of the modern slave because if the
thought of it is ever let in, even for a moment, it becomes
the measure and truth of the slave's life, and, since
reason knows no meaning except its own, it finds too little
to justify it. Such horrible deaths we die! Let us pray
that it sneaks up on us, a thief in the night, and takes us
before we see it coming. Let us build immaculately clean
hospitals and pay doctors to anesthetize us so that we can
die without pain, without even suspecting we are dying.
And after we are dead let us give our life's savings to the
mortician so that those that survive us can deny our death
when we no longer can. And on our tombstones let it be
written "just sleeping."
As Hegel knew, the slave dies a cowardly death, when
he dies. This is because fearing death and fleeing from
it, the slave submits to being an instrument for another,
thereby living his life by despising himself, knowing
himself as a failure. Quaking to the core of his being in
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the face of his death, he submits himself to a life of
necessity, allowing himself to be ruled, to be linked to
the necessity of the machine and governed by it.
Death is a horrible judgement, more terrible now than
ever before, because as it brings our life to an end it
surrounds it as a whole, revealing it as a meaningless
totality, and measures it against the nihilism reason
imposes on it.
CHAPTER XI
THE VULNERABLE MACHINE
According to Time magazine (March 3, 1986), the
Pentagon believes that the command, control, and
communications system necessary for nuclear war fighting is
so vulnerable that it could easily be decapitated, making
it impossible to use America's nuclear weapons as
instruments of coercion or destruction. As soon as top
Defense officials read a report made by Bruce Blair,
commissioned by Congress's Office of Technology Assessment,
they immediately upgraded it to a supersecret clearance
level. So high is its classification that only the
President and a few top Defense officals are now permitted
to see the paper. Even the author of it, who has a top
level security clearance himself, is not permitted to see
it. According to one senior military officer: "This is the
single most dangerous document I have ever seen." The
Pentagon hastily sent an offical with a top security
clearance to round up all the stray copies and destroy them
in a high-security incinerator in the offices of the Joint
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Chiefs.
The Pentagon's panicky attempt to maintain the secret
of its vulnerability does nothing to change the fact of it.
Enarchy's power systems, military, political, economic,
social, and energy, are inherently insecure and vulnerable
because they create vast, tightly linked, and highly
organized, systems and subject them to centralized command
and control. No doubt that is why we spend so much money
on defense. But it is all in vain. in all probability, a
small group of competent saboteurs, using less than a
million dollars of armaments, striking at select points in
the systems supporting America's war machine could
effectively neutralize vast segments of it, perhaps all of
it eventually.
All of the most sophisticated weapons in America's
arsenal are dependent on the integrity of an extensive
military support system and even more on an functioning
industrial economy. Without a continuous supply not only
of exotic parts, fabricated only in a very centralized,
complex, and interdependent industrial economy, but of vast
amounts of exotic fuels and more mundane things like food
and clothing, America's vaunted war machine would grind to
a screeching halt, a giant crushed by its own strength,
rationality, and technical sophistication. Some idea of
the extent of the support system necessary to put our high
tech weapons into battle is contained in the fact that it
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directly takes up to 50 technicians and service personel to
keep one F-15 or F-14 fighter ready for battle.
And because parts inventories are the first items cut
from the budget, there is seldom a stockpile of parts
capable of handling anything more than peace time
operation. Any interuption in their supply would quickly
lead to a deterioration in the war systems dependent on
them. This fact is amply demonstrated by what happened to
Iran following its revolution when the United States cut
off supply to the Shah's largely American made war machine.
Although Iran's war machine was one of the most powerful
and well equipped in the world, second only to Israel's in
the Middle East, it quickly deteriorated to such an extent
that Iraq, formerly a distant rival, could dream of a
successful invasion. Of the extensive fleet of F-14
fighters that the United States had supplied Iran, only 2
or 3 could be kept in th air at anyone time, and even t at
surprised American experts.
The PLO could be surprisingly effective in
accomplishing its aims if it learned from the example of
Iran, as would Libya, the Sandinistas, and any other nation
or terrorist group that was hostile toward America or was
in danger of intervention or invasion from America.
Although Israel has its own armaments industry, it is,
like Iran was, dependent on the American economy to sustain
it. Without the support of America, and spare parts.
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financial aid, and ultimately military backup, Israel would
soon become as vulnerable to its Arab neighbors as Iran
became for Iraq. And although Libya and Nicaragua, two
likely candidates for an American invasion or attack,
cannot hope to best the United States on the battlefield,
they can easily insure that the United States is not strong
enough to meet them there. By sending small groups of
highly trained saboteurs to the United States to attack the
vulnerable points in America's power systems they could
seriously, even fatally, dislocate and disrupt the
industrial economy that sustains the war machine that is
attacking them.
It is a strange irony of the modern age that it is the
strong, the technologically powerful, that are the most
vulnerable. Despite the most intensive and most accurate
bombing campaign in the history of warfare. North Vietnam
was able to continue its war effort, and, even more,
eventually defeat the most powerful, most technologically
advanced, nation in the history of the world. North
Vietnam was able to survive this onslaught because its
economy was not centralized, dependent on large-scale power
systems, or sophisticated factory production. The bombing
campaign against North Vietnam has often been compared to
the bombing compaigns of WW II. Vietnam is supposed to
have received several times more tons of bombs than were
dropped by everyone in WW II. But this comparison
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drastically underestimates the potential effectiveness of
America's bombing campaign against Vietnam, ignoring the
Air Force's much improved capabilities for accuracy and
intelligence. A bomb is not very effective if it misses
its target or if the intelligence governing target
selection is faulty, and in WWII most bombs were quite
ineffective. But not so in Vietnam. Because of satellite
intelligence and very sophisticated targeting devices, the
Air Force had a good chance of hitting anything that it
wanted to hit the first time it tried--and it didn't do any
good. North Vietnam still doggedly carried on its struggle
to eventual victory.
If, however, even a small portion of the bombing
campaign, with all its accuracy and intelligence, that was
directed against Vietnam was turned agaist the United
States, we would be living a life much more primitive than
anything that was lived in Vietnam. This country has yet
to learn the most important lesson of the Vietnam war, the
radical fragility of our way of life.
Mastery is the essence of Enarchy, distant power the
measure of its truth. Knowing all things as man's utility
and means to more power, Enarchy conceals all other ways of
being, shutting itself off from the mystery of the earth,
imposing its rationality on everything. To know the truth
of things, for Enarchy, is to know everything as a chain of
actions acting against other actions and resitances, a
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coherence of forces emptying themselves out into each
other. TO live the way of Enarchy is to use this knowledge
of the thing as object to accomplish the command, to gather
everything into its reign of power and control, and insure
that humanity encounters only itself in its willing.
Seeking power, Enarchy links everything together into
a tight totality subjected to a center of command and
control. In order to accomplish their destiny as a means
for human willing, the links must be precise, sharply
defined, and resistant to any force that would make them
different, because they must efficiently transmit the
effects of man's power throughout the whole system. Slack,
noise, or ambiguity in the system means that control will
not be effectively transmitted and will not arrive at all
the dispersed parts with the same command information that
it had at its inception, thwarting the will that willed its
being. Control is being able to effect everything, no
matter how vast the system, how distant the constituent
part from the point of command, in precisely the desired
way. As the effect of the will bringing forth and willing
ever greater means to itself, modern technology progresses
when it makes possible a more efficient and precise
mechanism for transmitting command and asserting control
over vast distances.
Oil, chemical, nuclear, and electrical power are some
of the means by which our age gives man the means to
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transform cause into effect and transmit control over vast
distance. Though some of these means of giving cause to
effect have been availabe to other cultures, other times,
ours has developed them to an unprecedented extent, and,
more decisively, set them up in unique conf igur ations-the
megamachine, or the large-scale networks that encompasses
distant extents and resolutely asserts centralized human
control. Linking everything tight with everything else so
that its control can be transmitted, it creates huge,
interdependent systems that can assert their power over
vast distances.
Totalitarian because its truth is total, Enarchy
gathers everything into itself, linking everything tight
with everything else, and revealing it as the Reserved.
The totality asserts itself as primary, having assumed all
as means necessary to its control, and reveals anything
that does not fit within its precisely constrained
mechanism as danger. The slightest ambiguity or lose
linkage can cause a reversal of meaning, which, transmitted
throughout the tightly organized system would put all of
the parts of it into fatal configurations.
The primary concern in the time of Enarchy is
security. Slack, ambiguity, play, friction, out of place
matter or dirt, non-normalized behavior are threats, total
threats because the system must be total in order for it to
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assume its destiny as instrument of human control. But
this concern with security reveals the vulnerability of the
systems that Enarchy has brought forth. Although they
are enormously powerful, god awful powerful sometimes, they
are all brittle, able to be shattered, sometimes with only
the slightest of forces that were not incorporated into
their plans. When Enarchy's systems of control fail, all
of the interdependent relations and functions that they had
sustained, maintained, and performed fall apart, cascading
like dominos falling into each other, until there is
nothing but ruin. Because everything has been drawn into
them by the necessity of extending power and assuring the
triumph of the will, the ruin will be as total as the
systems of control were powerful.
In nature's anarchy, as in Enarchy's economies, things
are interdependent, linked in complex ways that interact
throughout their entire extent. For instance, the World
Health Organization launched a program to control
malaria-carrying mosquitos among the inland Dayak people of
Borneo with DDT. [38] The program worked, at least within
its defined limits of preventing malaria. But it also
caused the roofs of the Dayak people's longhouses to start
falling down, made them more vulnerable to sylvatic plague,
and killed off their pets. Besides killing mosquitos, the
DDT also killed a parasitic wasp that had previously
controlled the caterpillars that lived by eating their
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thatch roofs. Furthermore, their cats started dying off
because they accumulated lethal doses of DDT from eating
the lizards that had eaten the poisoned mosquitos. without
the cats, the woodland rats multiplied, and with them the
flees that carry the plague. A major outbreak was
prevented only when the World Health Organization began to
parachute live cats into Borneo. Manipulating one part of
nature's economy quickly spread to other parts, threatening
the entire economy with collapse.
Vulnerable as nature's organic ecomomies are to
outside intervention, they are not nearly as vulnerable as
Enarchy's machine economies are. This is because nature's
economies are not linked together by the truth of a center,
the possibility of unambiguous command, or the necessity of
efficient control. Nature comes forth as anarchy.
Different species in nature adapt to and coevolve with
their environment, each dispersed according to their own
nature. They are linked together not by the necessity of
transmitting precise, unambiguous commands throughout the
system, but by their existence as co-dwellers, participants
in nature's local household. In nature's economies there
is room, even a necessity, for slack, ambiguity, and play.
To a limited extent different species can occupy the same
place or nich in the economy, partially duplicating the
role of the previous inhabitant. As a result of this
anarchical dispersion, the more complex nature's economies
235
are, the more different participants there are in the local
household to fill different roles, the more likely it is to
be stable. For instance in an economy where rabbits are
the only source of food for coyotes, the populations of
both species will fluctuate widely, sometimes nearing the
point of extinction. As the population of rabbits grows,
the population of coyotes, finding it easy to sustain
themselves, will grow also. But they will eventually grow
to a point where the population of rabbits will not be able
to sustain them. Competition for the declining rabbit
population will grow fierce, and the coyotes will follow
the rabbits to a point near extinction, declining until
there are so few coyotes that rabbits can again multiply.
If, however, there are alternative sources of food for the
coyotes, mice or grasshoppers perhaps, and alternative
predators with somewhat different tastes, bobcats maybe,
each species will be able to respond to different food
sources based on their availability, giving the other
species the slack they need to maintain their numbers.
Similarly, if there was some way of dispersing the
regions within which the coyotes and rabbits interact into
subregions, separated by, say, a mountain chain, between
which either animal can move with some delay and
difficulty, stability would also be promoted. Slight
random variations in the population dynamics between
subregions enables one region to recolonize another, since
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the population cycle of growth and collapse would be out of
step among the subregions. Even if one animal became
extinct in one subregion it could be recolonized by the
other. Because nature's economies are dispersed and
heterogeneous, that is to say anarchical, they can be
stable over long periods of time left to themselves and can
regenerate themselves even when subject to considerable
stress
.
Enarchy's mechanical economies, on the other hand,
brought forth and organized around the archical imperative
for human command, have none of nature's anarchical
tendancies toward dispersion and heterogeneity. Indeed,
seeking mastery throughout its whole extent, the pure
transmission of the will, dispersion and heterogeneity are
obstacles for Enarchy to overcome. In order to link its
systems together so that it can give cause to whatever
effect it seeks and accomplish the will that commands it,
Enarchy must eliminate any heterogeneity or dispersion, all
ambiguity or slack, in its economies, drawing everything
together in a tightly woven, efficiently linked, network.
Heterogeneity, dispersion, ambiguity, anarchy, and slack
dampen, confuse, and disorganize the crystalline clearity
of the command, threatening mastery with its nemesis,
chaos. Unlike nature's economies which are more stable the
more complex they are, Enarchy's economies become more
unstable and more difficult to manage as they become more
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complex. AS Enarchy's machine economies become more
complex, the interactions between different parts grows
many times faster. Each new part, makes possible new
relations between different parts. But unlike nature's
anarchical economies, all of the new relations must be
subjected to the will, made rational, and organized
according to plan. Despite accelerating complexity, all
contingencies must be known and anticipated so that the
operation of the system becomes fail safe and the security
of control assured. That which escapes its plan, the
freak, the monster, insanity, irrationality, the poor
fitting part, becomes all the more dangerous to it the more
extensive and rational the plan—dirt wearing against the
fine tolerances of a complex machine. Recognizing this
threat to its security, seeking to maintain its control in
the face of the unplanned, Enarchy raises the complexity of
its systems of control to new heights to deal with it. But
because no system is complete, able to formulate all of its
truths within itself, this only generates more complexity
needing to be managed--and more problems and more
vulnerabilities. [39] Another layer of control over a
complex system may perhaps solve the immediate problem, but
it will add to the network, changing relations within its
complex mechanism in unplanned ways, often generating more
problems, perhaps more severe, elsewhere. The more Enarchy
seeks its destiny, the will willing only itself, the more
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it must plan and the more it plans, the more that escapes
the plan. Having invested so much of itself in the plan,
Enarchy has no choice but to attempt to gather into the
plan that which escaped it yet another time. The attempt
to master the earth becomes a death spiral, ever tightening
in around itself as more and more escapes the limits of
its plan.
For instance, prior to the Great Depression, the
advocates of free enterprise knew the role of the state in
the economy as largely a "night watchman," a guardian of
private property, contracts, and civility. Unlike
socialism, which makes everything available for
self-conscious control, liberalism, restrained itself,
thinking that the market was self correcting. Like an
automatic machine, supply would closely follow demand in a
competitive privately owned market. But then the Great
Depression occured, bankrupting many capitalists and
throwing at least a fifth of the working population of the
United States out of work. Following the lead of Menyard
Keynes, liberals suddenly recognized the need for
governmental "fine tuning," management by economic
technicians, because the capitalist had a contradictory
relationship to the worker. On the one hand, as an
individual, the capitalist wanted to pay the worker as
little as possible for the work he got so he could maximize
his profits. On the other hand, as the salesman of what
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his workers made, he needed all workers to have a good
salary in order to sell his product at a profitable
rate. [40] Inevitably, as an individual locked within the
imperatives of a competitive marketplace, the capitalist
choose to keep the wages of his workers as low as possible,
hoping that other capitalists would go out of business
before he did. The result of all capitalists doing this
was that there was not enough demand to sustain profits and
a depression started. Keynesians thought that growth could
be regenerated by a taxation and spending policy that
redistributed, to some degree, the capitalist's surplus to
workers, increasing their demand and stabilizing the
capitalist's profits. As a result, it suddenly became
apparent that the national economy could be stabilized
through the management of a national debt.
Keynesianism was an attempt, made neccessary by the
collapse of the household and its displacement by the
market, to expand control over the economy, to master the
business cycle and regularize profits and employment. As a
recognition of the limits of free enterprise to correct
itself, it was a recognition of the necessity of technical
management on a national scale, an ideologically awkward
acknowledgement that weakened liberalism's traditional
separation between public and private. Throughout the 60's
Keynesianism worked well as an instrument to manage the
economy, at least by the standards of mainstream
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economists, but it soon became evident that the economy had
to be managed in another dimension. Yet more things had to
be gathered up and subjected to control.
According to the arguments of taditional liberals, the
marketplace is supposed to insure that buyers, at least on
average, pay for all of the costs of production, and
usually a small profit to the producer. The market justly
and perfectly distributes all of the costs and burdens of
production to everyone who benefits from them. If this
argument ever was plausible, it became increasingly
implausible in the late 60's and early 7G's. As a result
of industrial development, a whole array of
externalities—costs of production not included in the
market price—became unavoidably apparent. The environment
was being polluted, the worker's health was endangered in
the factory, farm land was being eroded far faster than it
was being rebuilt, energy was being used up at a rate below
what it cost to replace it, toxic wastes were being dumped.
In all these cases, real costs of industrial development
were being sloughed off onto people who either did not
participate in or benifit from the market exchanges. The
full costs of production were put off on future
generations, communities that lived downwind or downstream
from the factories, or on a population and a workforce that
was increasingly vulnerable to cancer, birth defects, and
ill health. The political technology of the free market
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was inadequate to its task.
Liberals, like Charles Schultze, who recognized these
externalities and failures of the market, attempted to deal
with them as the Keynesian's did-with expanded technical
management. [41] Schultze's plan for drawing the
externalities that escaped the market system back into it
was to have the government research the costs that escaped
market control, and, though they are more often qualitative
in nature than quantitative, fix a price on them. The
government would then tax the industry that was profiting
from these externalities at a rate that would allow no
profit, and give capitalists every incentive for ending
their socially disruptive behavior. Through technical
control, the public would make use of private interest,
channeling and regulating it in a way that once again would
make market costs reflect real costs.
However, Schultze's plan for handling the
externalities of the market place, if it solves anything,
would more likely introduce more problems elsewhere. One
of the problems, as William Connolly has argued, is that
Schultze's attempt to manage externalities through
technical control implicitly depends on public managers
having vast reservoirs of civic virtue, and Schultze's
theory of human motivation, upon which his whole theory of
management depends, explicitly acknowledges that such a
reservoir of civic virtue is unlikely to exist. [42] People
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are self-interested and are most likely to respond to their
self interest. And even if people aren't primarily
self-interested, but in fact are capable of patriotic
action, treating them as if they were exclusively
self-interested and interpreting all their actions as
self-interest will make it so. We can expect, therefore,
that our public managers would be prone to corruption, an
externality that could poison the republic. Perhaps they
would take bribes from the industry they are supposed to
be regulating, but more likely they would overlook a
"little" fact here, bend an "insignificant" rule there, so
that the industry they are regulating might, say, reward
them with a high paying job latter on. Once the government
becomes an instrument turned toward corruption, the
citizenry will no longer feel bound by its rulings and will
seek their interest outside of it too. As a result of no
one's patriotism providing a limit to their interest, the
republic will disintegrate into a corrupt anarchy.
Schultze's dilemma is the dilemma of management and
technical control in the age of Enarchy—how is the
controller himself to be controled so that his actions keep
the system he is controling within the limits that sustain
it? The answer, invariably is that a higher order of
technique is necessary to control what had escaped it, a
procedure or apparatus that renders the actions of managers
visible, normalizes them against a pattern of acceptable
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behavior, and Inscribes them within it by means of reward
and punishment.
But this raises the system of management to a higher
order of complexity, creating new relationships, new
systems of surveillance and control, and new feedback
loops. Inevitably, these new dynamics will have results
that are unplanned, not contained within the system but
needing to be. The technology of management is doomed to
grow, vainly attempting to bring under control everything
that escapes its necessity while adding new elements that
escape control, making the system more unmanageable as it
becomes more in need of management.
Enarchy's doom is its necessity for continually
seeking out its other, that which lies at the margins of
its systems of power, outside its borders and yet limiting
its control, and subjecting it to its rationality. Once
reason knew unreason as its ontological limit, accepting
its mystery as God's will. Now, that it is man's
instrument and not God's truth, reason knows unreason only
as disease. That which once escaped reason, and thereby
revealed God's judgement, is now safely contained within a
classification of difference and degree, aetiology and
symptomology , and the mystery of unreason is only the
inability, one day certain to be overcome, of extending
man's classification to all phenomena .[ 43
]
As man's instrument, reason imposes crystalline
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projections on the visible domain of data, sharply defining
boundary, category, measure, and difference according to
man's utility. within this grid of rigorously posited
knowledge, the specialist takes his place, accepting his
boundary and extending the power of reason within his
speciality. Seeking total control within his enclosure,
the specialist defines variables, simplifying the
complexity of his domain with unambiguous categories of
difference, which he then makes available for mathematical
manipulation. Through the analytic procedure of the
specialist, any variable can be controlled for, revealing
in its differences its law like relation to other
analytically defined variables. By means of his developing
ability to manipulate variables mathematically and control
their effects, the specialist is able to move from the
total control of the laboratory and the experiment to build
systems for Enarchy's economies. The analytic procedure of
the experiment is identical with the analytic procedure
that builds Enarchy's political, economic, industrial, and
military systems. They both yield their results by
simplifying the complexity of the earth to the utility of
man.
As the specialist posits variables and manages their
relationships, he closes himself off from the earth and
conceals from himself the world's real complexity. Seeking
total control within the simple enclosure of analytic
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procedure, the specialist abandons everything that escapes
his system of definitions, leaving it totally out of
control. A pragmatist seeking escape from the tyranny of
irrelevant dynamics, the specialist repudiates and ignors
the complex, subtle, and mysterious patterns that cross his
boundaries, working in subtle unknown ways against his
logic. Because he cannot control everything, and yet tries
to, and builds his systems as if he did, the specialist's
attempt at total control in the systems he builds, is
doomed to end in total disorder. And this is the more
certain the more rigid and exclusive his boundary, the more
precise and exact his definitions, and the more total his
control. Because precision, rigid exclusion, and
unambiguous logic, as artifical man made instruments, are
impositions on the world's complexity and the earth's power
to come forth in unknowable ways, the abstract forms of
truth that Enarchy projects are never adequate to the
earth, and yet Enarchy builds as if they were.
CHAPTER XII
THE ARCHITECTURE OF INSECURITY
Over the last half of century, the world economy has
become dependent on continuously supplied power from a
world wide network of energy installations to deliver
electricity, oil, gas, coal, and uranium. Because that
supply depends on many large and exacting machines
operating in precise synchrony across entire continents it
is inherently vulnerable to catastrophic failure. And the
danger grows. Called into being by Enarchy, the nature of
the network, the size, complexity, interdependence and
control of this vast energy machine, is evolving in a
direction that increasingly makes anarchical chaos
possible
.
So much has Enarchy subjected everything to the
command that, according to Amory and Hunter Lovins, the
United States at the point where:
(l)a few people could black out most ot the country by
attacking a few vulnerable parts of the nation's power
grid.
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grid.
(2) a small group could shut off three quarters of the
natural gas supply to the eastern and midwestern United
States in one evening without leaving Louisiana.
(3) a small number of terrorists could seriously
disrupt the oil supply network within the United States,
throughout the Middle East, and the world.
(4) one saboteur could incinerate a large city by
attacking certain natural gas systems.
(5) a few people, perhaps only one, could release
enough radioactivity to make much of a continent
uninhabitable
.
(6)and a single hydrogen bomb, exploded in outer space over
the United States, could do all of these things
simultaneously by destroying the automated computer systems
that control all modern power networks. [44]
Our technological organization is becoming so
vulnerable to catastrophic failure and anarchical chaos
that our civilization increasingly depends on a concurrent
majority—everyone has to support it or a small group, or
perhaps one person, could veto everything, shattering the
archy that governs our life. And this is at a time when
our civilization is increasingly losing its sense of
legitimacy at home and abroad. As the high, and usually
rising, occurance of worker absenteeism, suicide, drug
abuse, alcoholism, murder and crime of all sorts.
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terrorism, fundamentalist movements, all suggest, people
within the united states and all around the world are
increasingly disillusioned with the civilization of
productivity and grow tired of being degraded and enslaved
by the machine. Abroad, many third-world countries and
popular movements have been hounded, harrassed, humiliated,
destroyed, and made subject to brutal tyrants because of
Super Power intervention.
It is only a matter of time before someone, somewhere,
strikes out against the technology that has possessed them,
and hits it in one of its most vulnerable spots, when that
day comes, our civilization is going to experience a
catastrophe that has never been equalled in history. All
of the systems that our lives have come to depend on will
fail and we will be left naked, homeless, thirsty, and
hungry—and, too probably, caught up in a war of all
against all. But more than that, we will experience a
crisis of Being. Much like the experience of the American
Indian in the face of the white man's triumph, our truth,
archy, and way of being, will lie shattered at our feet.
And our despair will be complete in the face of our doom
and our death.
The modern megamachine is most vulnerable to
disruption through its automated control mechanisms--those
which, as a result of the architecture of command and
control, are meant to affect its operation the most by
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applying the least perturbation. As the megamachine
becomes more useful as an instrument of command, more
productive, efficient, and powerful, spreading its control
over a vast area and becoming more complex, the volume and
speed of information flow needed to control it grows until
only the computer, as a centralized system of management,
can deal with these demands. As its use as instrument of
command dictates, the computer is undiscr iminating in what
it is commanded to do, no matter how dangerous or
nonsensical. As a result of the megamachine
' s commanding
power and computerized automation, small groups of
disgruntled systems analysts, programers, or terrorists
with bombs, can now constitute a national threat. A simple
computer command can disrupt systems that are essential to
the economy— the nation's power grids, oil and gas pipe
lines, communications systems, financial records, military
systems, and so on.
Of late, computer hackers have made a hobby of
penetrating computer systems and causing relatively
innocent mischief--f ree phone calls, telex, water,
electricity, gas, gasoline, photocopying, computer time,
and cable TV. Their ingenuity generally keeps them ahead
of whatever security precautions are taken against them.
Using their home computers, or main-frame computers that
they have taken over, they can break codes and discover
passwords by automatic dialing. Once they break into a
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computer system, they can read, delete, or change
supposedly protected data and programs on computers
anywhere in the world that their telephone has access to.
using exotic false names, they collaborate with each other
by means of computer teleconferencing networks,
newsletters, and bulletin boards, some of which are
specifically devoted to illegal activities. Despite
considerable effort to make computer systems secure against
their activities, computer hackers generally manage to keep
their links untraceable and their names anonymous.
Sometimes, the activities of computer hackers are not
so innocent. According to Amory and Hunter Lovins, there
are some anti-system technology newsletters that describe
ways to crash telephone and time-sharing computer systems.
Apparently, one person, without compromising identity or
location, can crash an entire communications network and
keep it down, perhaps causing significant damage to
electromechanical componets in the process. Since these
communications networks are necessary for the management of
the economy, their failure would have cascading
consequences that extend far beyond the immediate network.
Modern systems are not only vulnerable to outside
intervention by computer hackers, but, more profoundly,
they are vulnerable to failure as a result of their own
architecture. Because modern systems are so large and so
complex, the failures that they are prone to are seldom
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simple or possible to always anticipate. The Lovins's
argue that any analysis of the vulnerability of big systems
cannot stop with assessments of the vulnerabilities of
separate parts, but must look at the system as a whole.
Failures of separate parts, in themselves quite innocent,
can combine together in ways that have not been anticipated
to result in system wide failure. Despite the obviousness
of such a warning, the Lovins's claim that most
vulnerability studies go no further than simply adding
together the individual vulnerabilities of, say, fuel
sources, processing plants, storage and transmission
networks, and distribution facilities. But in such complex
systems, the whole is considerably more than the sum of its
parts, and no assesment of its vulnerabilities is complete
without consideration of various interactions,
combinations, and feedback loops within the system, as well
as higher order consequences to the environment outside the
system, and the links accross the system boundary to other
systems. The complexity of modern systems is so great, the
possible states of complex systems so numerous, and
possibilities for unstable links so hard to completely
define, that a total assessment is simply impossible. No
one can imagine all possible failure modes, and no computer
program can simulate their reality. As a result, the
failure rates of big systems is usually substantially
higher than anticipated and the causes of them when they
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occur are often totally unanticipated. The space shuttle,
according to the Lovins's, fails twice as often as the
probability analyses of highly skilled and dedicated
technicians think it should. m another instance of this
phenomenon, a technician who was testing for air leaks at
Browns Ferry nuclear power plant with a candle accidentally
started a fire that burned sixteen hundred electrical
cables—
a totallly unanticipated failure mode—br ingi ng the
plant dangerously close to a meltdown. Similarly
unanticpated, though more complex, interactions of
mechanical and human failure brought the Three Mile Island
nuclear reactor close to melting down and actually caused a
meltdown at Chrenoble in the Sovit Union.
The failure of big systems in unpredictable ways is
often a result of multiple parts, designed to be
independent and redundant, failing at the same time from
unplanned and unforseen events. The Lovins's tell of
another example where a technician at a nuclear power plant
adjusted the trip points in several independent safety
channels to the wrong calibration, making them all
inoperable because he had set the switch on his calibrating
tool on the wrong decade position.
Nuclear power plants seem to be especially vulnerable
to the failure of independent systems for the same
initiating reasons. Several times at nuclear power plants
a failure of a single source of power has resulted in the
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failure of supposedly independent safety circuits, and
another time redundant machines were all disabled by the
same contaminated lubricating oil. More spectacularly, in
1969 the Oak Ridge Research Reactor came close to melting
down when its after heat removal system failed, despite
having three identical channels backing each other up.
Each channel failed because there were three separate
operator errors in each channel, two separate equipment
installation errors in each channel, and three separate
design errors in each channel. Despite all of these
failures, the system would have worked if any one of these
twenty-one failures had not occured. Each failure was a
serious threat to the system only because of being in the
context of twenty other separate failures. There is no way
that conventional reliability analyses or single failure
analyses could have anticipated this outcome. The system
was too complex, the failure too improbable, for it to be
managed by a plan that anticipated and compensated for
every possible situation. The more that managers attempt
to make the architecture of the system fail-safe by making
it more redundant (and thus more complex and in need of
control)
, the more difficult it becomes to control and the
more vulnerable it may become to failure.
The more the command asserts its power over anything,
the more that anarchy threatens it with dissolution. When
systems get complicated enough and the problems associated
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are
with managing them complex enough, more problems
created with every one solved. This, according to the
Lovins's, was what 2 IBM scientists found out as they
attempted to debug a huge computer program. The more they
wrestled with the program the more bugs they introduced
into it, generating ever more weird side effects in
supposedly independent parts of the program. They finally
gave up trying to debug the program and wrote another one.
Because of the complexity of modern systems, and the
problems that arise from them, and because every attempt to
fix the system, to incorporate within its plan and subject
to its command everything that had previously escaped it,
only generates more complexity and makes more problems, it
may well be that our civilization will reach the point
where it will collapse of its own weight, crushed beneath
the weight of failing to manage unmanageably complex
systems
.
Most of the energy in the United States is produced
and delivered by means of a long, interacting chain of
complex processing machines, delivery networks, and
management controls, working together in a delicate
synergy. From the oil fields of the Middle East, Alaska,
and Mexico, oil is extracted from deep in the ground by
means of a highly complex and expensive process, sent over
thousands of miles of piplines to be refined and stored in
refineries and tank farms covering hundreds of acres. The
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refined products then move more thousands of miles by means
of elaborate networks of pipelines, ships, trains, and
trucks before they are finally delivered for use. Coal,
electricity, and natural gas get us by means of similar
processes.
These processes are marked by their need for massive,
highly capital-intensive, long-lead-time, technically and
socially complex facilities. it is in these unique marks
of modern energy systems that their bittle vulnerability
lies, according to the Lovins's. Like glass, these systems
can support incredible weight, as long as it is a steady
pressure within the tolerances of the system. But, like
glass, a sudden sharp blow, an unplanned disruption, will
shatter them completely. Once broken, they cannot recover
their shape easily.
The value of Enarchy's power systems for Enarchy is
their power, their ability to subject things over vast
areas to command. The vast extent of Enarchy's ambition,
which is everything, and the essence of its planning, which
is command, determine the architecture of its power
systems.
Because the command must have mobile and flexible
means, it must use concentrated power sources, fuels with a
high energy density. Otherwise it could not stockpile and
transport power efficiently over its vast extent and supply
large-scale machines on demand. Because it is diffused
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over a vast extent, has a low energy density, is hard to
stockpile, is generally tied to a place, and is not always
immdlately available on demand, solar, wind, and other
natural sources of energy are unacceptable for Enarchy's
power systems.
Even gasoline, a fuel so common we think it natural,
has startlingly high energy density. a gallon of gasoline
has as much energy available in a moment for today's
engines as a strong horse produces in forty-nine hours of
work. Unlike the horse which can do only so much work and
no more in so much time, gasoline can be used to collapse
time, to concentrate its effects within so little time as
is necessary. Unlike windpower, solar power, or horsepower,
gasoline is available on demand and its effects can be
concentrated on demand. It can power a large truck,
hauling perhaps 15 tons over a trip of hundreds of miles in
a matter of hours, and then sit idle for a long time
without using any energy. A team of horses, even many
teams of horses cannot accomplish such a trip as this so
fast, and when they are not being used they must still be
cared for and fed. Time moves at a constant rate when
natural energy sources are used, but it can be collapsed on
human command by Enarchy's power machines and energy
sources.
Designed by the necessity of efficiency to cause great
effect with minimum bulk, the high energy density of
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Enarchy's power sources makes them inherently dangerous.
According to the Lovins's, a nine thousand gallon tank
truck of number two fuel oil contains the energy equivalent
of a small nuclear explosion-three tenths of a kiloton of
TNT. And fuel oil has a relatively low energy density.
Pure fissionable materials, such as uranium or plutonium,
are more than a million times as powerful, pound for pound,
as pure hydrocarbon fuels. But they are as dangerous as
they are powerful. Before they are used they are mildly
radioactive, after use they may be extremely radioactive,
sometimes for tens of thousands of years. And as a toxic
metal, plutonium is one of the most poisonous elements
known. An ounce of plutonium, widely dispersed, could
cause millions of cases of lung cancer.
The high energy density of Enarchy's fuels makes them,
of themselves, highly dangerous. And the large scale that
Enarchy undertakes to organize them makes them more
dangerous. Stockpiles that cover hundreds of acres are
quite common. Liqified Natural Gas (LNG) is particularly
dangerous in the large scale stockpiles necessary for
handling and storage. Too bulky to store and transport in
large quanities, natural gas can be cooled to a temperature
of two hungred sixty degres Fahrenheit below zero, reducing
its bulk 620 times. The equipment necessary to liquify,
handle, transport, and change it back to gas, is very
expensive, very large, and very sophisticated.
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Although LNG has thirty percent less energy per cubic
meter than oil, it is potentially
.uch more hazardous. if
it is spilled, LNG boils into natural gas, spreading into
the surrounding air, turning the mixture into a highly
explosive combination. But because the gas is still at a
relatively low temperature, it stays close to the ground,
flowing into any crevices or open sewers, spreading over a
large area. According to the Lovins's leakage from a
tanker spill would extend three miles down wind in 10-20
minutes, perhaps reaching 6-12 miles in more time.
Eventually it would encounter a spark that would ignite it,
starting an explosion that would start other fires over a
large area, potentially devastating a large city. A
standard LNG tanker carries enough potentially flammable
material to be the equivalent of 7/10 of a megaton of TNT,
an explosive force larger than most of the nuclear bombs in
America's arsenal.
Because they must operate continuously and in
synchronic harmony over vast areas to keep the user
connected with his source, some energy delivery grids are
totally, and most potentially, vulnerable to failure at any
isolated point. The isolated failure cascades throughout
the delivery grid, causing rippling failures far from the
initial failure. Electric grids, the most vulnerable of
all of Enarchy's power grids, must have all of its
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generators spinning in precise synchronism. The power
flowing through these grids is an alternating current,
going first in one direction then the oposite in recurring
cycles. unless all of the generators hooked up to the grid
are spinning in synchrony, they will fight against each
other. As a result, any deviation, caused perhaps by a
broken power line, can spread throughout the system unless
it is quickly isolated, throwing other generators out of
synchrony, and endangering the mechanical components of the
system with load fluctuations that they cannot tolerate.
Gas grids are much like electric grids. Distribution
pressure must be maintained at all points within it or else
the entire grid loses pressure and all of the pilot lights
served by the grid go out, including the ones in unoccupied
buildings. If this happens, a trained army of people must
immediately go into each building and turn off the gas
supply in order to prevent explosions and latter return to
light all of the pilots. Developed latter with more
advanced technology than the New England grid, the gas grid
serving the entire midwest is tightly linked together. A
failure in some major pipelines would disrupt supply over a
vast area. If it occured in the winter time, it could
cause much damage to plumbing lines, food products, and
many other things vulnerable to freezing.
The failure of any one energy grid would very possibly
spread to others. In a thousand different ways, it takes
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oil to make electricity, deliver coal and natural gas; and
electricity to refine oil and deliver coal and natural gas,
and so on. Nothing in these supposedly independent energy
systems truly is independent. The total failure of the
electric grid would almost immediately disrupt the other
energy grids because electricty is often directly necessary
for their processes. Less immediately, but just as
certainly, the failure of the oil system would also result
in the failure of the electric grid, if not because oil is
often used for generation, because oil prducts are
necessary to keep the various components (generators,
switches, service vehicles, underground lines, and so on)
of the electric grid maintained.
Most home furnaces burn oil or gas, but electricity is
needed to ingnite them, pump their fuel, and run the blower
to distribute the heat. Pumps at gasoline stations also
depend on electricity. Because of this, a failure of the
electric grid would closely be followed by a failure in the
transportation system, which could feedback and make it
harder to repair the electric grid, by gridlocking highways
and streets and making it impossible to deliver replacement
parts to where they are needed. Most municipal water
systems need electricty to pump water, to distribute it,
and to control it. And the water system in turn is needed
to fight fires, run power plants, and cool refinery
columns. If electricity was not available to supply clean
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water, people might be forced to drink contaminated water
polluted with industrial toxic wastes, and a major out
break of dangerous diseases would be likely. Electricity
is so necessary to most oil refineries that a disruption in
it would cause serious damage to the system, stopping
refining processes at delicate and damaging points,
clogging pipelines with cooling tars. About half of the
oil wells in the United States depend on electricity for
pumping. On the other hand, all of the heavy equipment
used throughout the energy industry depends on a continuous
supply of high quality lubricants and fuels from oil
refineries. Good lubrication is so necessary that a
lubrication failure for even the briefest moment in, say, a
big generator could cause tens of millions of dollars of
damage and and a lengthy down time for repair.
If electricity is not available to pump the water out
of coal mines, mining would have to stop because of
flooding. Except for the small amount of coal transported
in coal slurry pipelines, almost all coal transportation
depends on diesel fuel. So, stopping the delivery of oil
would stop the delivery of coal as well. In addition, many
power plants, and especially nuclear stations, depend on
diesel generators to run their safety systems while they
are shutting down. Without their safety back-ups they
could not risk running or starting up.
Any disruption in one energy system, if widespread
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enough within it, would spread to the others, paralyzing
them by means of an intricately linked web of dependency
rippling outwards from primary supply to end use, making
the initial failure much worse than it is immediately in
itself.
Energy systems are the most complicated, technically
sophisticated, capital intensive investments in a modern
economy. According to the Lovins's, a central power
station requires several times as much investment for an
annual dollar of output as a highly mechanized factory. As
energy systems become more sophisticated and as the energy
resources are exhausted and must be extracted from
difficult locations (the Arctic and offshore) this
investment intensity increases. Synthetic fuel and
frontier oil and gas systems need about ten times as much
capital investment in order to deliver to final users the
same amount of energy as traditional energy systems built
around more accessible resources did. Nuclear power
stations are many more times as capital intensive than this
even. Carrying costs for such capital intensive plants is
enormous, many of which must be paid whether the plant runs
or not. This has direct operational, social, and economic
consequences for the vulnerability of energy systems,
consequences which are similar whether the technique form
managing the economy is capitalist or socalist.
Designers of plants will be reluctant to invest much
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on redundancy and safety devices because they cost a lot
and are seldom used. Once plants are in operation the
working time tolerances of machines will be pushed to their
limits and there will be reluctance to spend anything but a
minimal amount of time with the plant shut down for routine
maintenance. Small leaks and minor malfunctions in
equipment that are known but dismissed as unimportant and
not fixed are in fact important. Minor and in themselves
unimportant malfunctions combined with working time
tolerances pushed to the limits can add together with other
minor malfunctions to cause a catastrophic breakdown in
the system, as we saw earlier. Moreover, leaks expose
workers to toxins and carcinogens, whether in nuclear power
plants, oil refineries, or pumping stations. Their health
risks become an externality that must be sloughed off in
the name of system efficiency. Furthermore, because
commonly replaced parts to the plant's machinery are so
expensive in themseves, because they are often specifically
made for that system alone, there will be a tendancy to
keep spare parts inventories as small as possible. This
could greatly increase the amount of time to repair a
system if it breaks down.
The largest network of pipelines in the world, the
Plantation and the Colonial pipelines supply most of the
Eastern United States with refined oil products. And the
control center for both of them is in the same building.
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vulnerable to the same distrubances. The vulnerability of
the system is increased by the fact that control of the
pipline system is dependent on a continuous supply of
electrical power. it doesn't have its own emergency power
source. According to the Lovins's, many oil industry
control centers were shut down in 1981 when there was an
electrical power failure for forty miles around New
Orleans, a major pipeline and oil gathering center.
As Enarchy's power systems proceed to their truth and
fulfillment, they increasingly develop a need for
specalized technical labor, exotic and unique parts, and
complex technical and control requirements. Although
disciplinary technology has regularized people, making them
into replaceable components in the productive process, and
although the factory has made many exotic things cheap and
common, the power system that makes all of this possible
has been becoming increasingly dependent on small numbers
of highly trained technicians and unique, custom made
machinery. It is precisely because they are so monolithic,
so centralized, so extensive, and so true to the necessity
of control, that Enarchy's power systems are incapable of
any sort of flexibility, interchangeabili ty , adaptability,
or tolerance.
The small number of highly trained irreplacable
technocrats controlling these systems can use their
strategic position to blackmail governments and
.4
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corporations for political or economic gain. According to
the Lovins's, Iranian oil field and electric power workers
contributed to the downfall of the Shah in 1978 by shutting
down their country's oil and gas exports and blacking out
most of Tehran. Labor Unions in Britan have repeatedly
done similar things. A coal strike in 1974 threatened the
nation's economy and brought down the Heath Government.
The drastic and brutal response by the Reagan
administration to the Air Traffic Controller's strike is
indicative of the extent that the government fears these
technicians and of the technical necessity for keeping them
under control. As automation concentrates control in
centralized systems, a coresponding expansion of control
over the technicians managing the system becomes necessary.
Their backgrounds must be checked, their thoughts
monitered, their politics controlled.
Instability, chaos, or anarchy of any sort is a
profound threat to the power system. If social, political,
and economic, conditions turn out to be different than was
planned, there will be a necessity porportional to the size
of the system endangered for bringing social, economic, and
political conditions within the limits of the plan. In a
society that calls itself a democarcy this may well result
in the corruption of democratic institutions. Politicians
may be bribed, the government will certainly be called on
to assume unplanned costs, and the consumer will ultimately
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be forced to pay unnecessary costs. Large scale power
systems are inherently slow to adapt to changing
conditions. Since Enarchy has so much invested in them,
has concentrated so much power in the institutions managing
them, and in its truth does not allow escape from their
imperatives, life will have to adapt itself to its
necessities, truncating whatever freedoms that become a
threat. Decision making will be centralized and made the
special domain of technicians, aspects of life previously
escaping control will be organized, and dissent will be
stiffled. Totalitarianism is the political technique most
compatible with modern power systems. It is no accident
that the modern age has had so much experience with it.
CHAPTER XIII
THE ARCHITECTURE OF DOOM
Enarchy's concentration of power in central locations
in order to secure the command creates possibilities for
chaos and destructuion of a kind and a extent never before
possible. Despite some military recognition of this fact
in both the United States and the Soviet Union, neither
country has taken any significant measures to limit its
vulnerability.
The development and use of the integrated circut for
automation, information processing, and control has made
the world's industrial economies radically vulnerable to a
powerful e lectomagnet ic pulse (El^P) . Integrated circuts
are about ten million times as prone to EMP burnout as
vacuum tubes, according to the Lovins's, and vacuum tubes
are not immune to it. [45] Outer space testing of nuclear
explosins in the 50's burned out vacuum tubes throughout
the Pacific. According to the Lovins's, a single one
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megaton nuclear exploded in outer space can produce a pulse
o£ electro-magnetic energy that would be strong enough to
damage integrated circuts over a radius possibly up to
fourteen hundred miles, enough to cover most of the United
States. The gamma radiation from the blast interacts with
the electron cloud surrounding the atom's nucleus, striping
them off. The result is a very powerful electromagnetic
field that very quickly reaches its peak intensity, about a
hundred times as fast as lightning. Because it reaches
peak intensity so fast, vulnerable circuts cannot be
protected by, say, lightning arresters.
Any metal object picks up the pulse like an antenna in
porportion to its mass. Power lines, piplines, telephone
lines, railroad tracks, instrument cabinets, and so on,
pick up the pulse, focusing its energy into any unprotected
circuitry in any way attached. The result would be an
instantaneous, simultaneous failure of all of Enarchy's
electronic systems—among them the electric grid, pipeline
controls, the telephone system, the radio and TV network,
the systems keeping airplanes in flight, and the electronic
ignition systems of most modern gasoline engines, and
perhaps even nuclear command and control centers
The damage may not be limited to integrated circuts.
Power lines, for instance, would collect the pulse over
great distances, building up a very powerful surge that
could damage insulators, transformer windings, and probably
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anything like a motor that was attached to the grid. In
addition a blast of EMP would very possibly cause many
nuclear power plants, especially the newer ones, to
meltdown. They would suddenly lose the computers necessary
for automated control of the system, the instruments
necessary for monitering it, and perhaps the
electro-mechanical machines necessary to manage the system.
Possibly the most complex instruments of power ever
built, nuclear power plants are the most vulnerable of all
of Enarchy's power systems, reproducing in one system all
of its dangers. Even after the nuclear chain reaction has
been shut down with dampening devices, the radioactive
decay from the isotopes that it has created continues. The
heat and radiation from this radioactive decay cannot be
reduced or controlled in any way. All that can be done is
to have fail safe devices that contain the radiation and
keep the decay heat from damaging the core. At shut down,
according to the Lovins's, the radioactive decay heat is
six to ten percent of the heat produced at full power. The
total decay heat of the fuel in the core is enough to melt
down through a solid iron pillar ten feet in diameter and
700 feet long. And though the decay heat slackens, rapidly
at first, it is enough for weeks after the shutdown to melt
the hundreds of tons of nuclear fuel in the core. Unless
the decay heat is carried away by cooling devices, it
builds up, generating steam, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and
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making possible a chemical reaction between parts of the
core that will generate father heat. The decay heat and
its effects can build up to such an extent that it ruptures
containment, spewing tons of highly radioactive waste over
the country side, causing thousands, perhaps millions, of
deaths, many billions of dollars of property damage, and
long term ecological damage over possibly thousands of
square miles. In addition it would, no doubt, generate
intense social, political, and economic chaos, perhaps
throwing the country into a deep depression as the economic
institutions linked to the nuclear industry were thrown
into bankruptcy.
Like all of Enarchy's machines, only more so, the
security of a nuclear power plant depends on everything
working, or at least the back-up machines. Nuclear power
plants, then, despite considerable effort to make their
systems secure, are quite vulnerable to deliberate attacks
against them. Besides the effects of EMP, nuclear power
plants are vulnerable to terrorism, and at a relatively
simple level. Since most of the shutdown system depends on
electricity, terrorists could simply disrupt offsite power
from the grid and onsite power from the station's own
switch yard and diesel generators. This would cause the
cooling system, the operator's instruments, and control
system to fail.
Low technology is quite adequate for stopping both
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onsite and offsite power. Attacking the fuel pumps of the
diesel generators with a hammer would take care of onsite
generation, and shooting down the incoming power lines from
the grid with a high powered rifle, or running a truck,
tractor, or a car into some of the transmission towers
would take care of offsite power. The history of nuclear
power plant security amply demonstrates that anyone who
really wanted to could probably get past plant security
with simple deceptions.
Reparing Enarchy's power systems after they have
collapsed because of war, terrorism, natural disaster, or
miscalculation is made difficult, if not impossible, by
their monolithic character. For many of the same reasons
that they are vulnerable to catastrophic failure, Enarchy's
power systems are difficult to repair, since the repair
systems are not independent but often rely, if indirectly,
on the same system that they are reparing. By attacking
repair facilities along with power systems, terrorists
could greatly extend the amount of time that is necessary
to revitalize the system, if not making it altogether
impossible. The more time that a power system is down, the
greater the possiblity that its failure will cascade,
causing failure in systems that have comparatively loose
links. For instance, stopping only a portion of the
nation's power, say the Pacific Coast power grid, for only
a couple of months would effectively stop the supply of
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many industrial components, especially computer chips,
necessary for the world's economy. Because these chips are
a necessary part of computer systems that manage industrial
systems the world over, any stoppage in supply that
exceeded stocks on hand would force many other industrial
systems to start shuting down, at least until substitutes
were available. Depending on how long the shutdown lasted,
the economic cost to these systems could force them into
bankruptcy, which could multiply the cascading effect until
the entire world, perhaps even communist countries, were in
a severe depression. Quick repair is essential to stop the
cascading effects of system failure because sustained
failure will exceed the tolerances that dependent systems
have built into them, forcing them to fail as well
eventually. Because Enarchy's economies are built around
the imperative for efficiency, the tolerances of most
systems are designed to only handle ordinary circumstances,
the normal business cycle, typical natural disasters, peace
time bottle necks. Extraordinary occurances—war extensive
natural disaster, severe depressions, or terrorist
attacks--would easily exceed planned tolerances, making
quick repair as necessary as it was impossible. Only
Israel has built a national power system that has any
tolerance for extraordingary circumstances, such as war and
terrorism. American power systems, according to the
Lovins's, have especially low tolerances, and are only
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capable of responding to variations internal to the system.
Any disruption outside of the planned tolerances has no
corresponding repair system capable of managing it. It is
as if we live in a technological paradise where the plan is
an adequate map of reality and everything always goes
according to plan.
Enarchy's power technologies often achieve their
greatest technical efficiency only by being specially
designed for the specific system. Because it draws
everything into it so that it can command it, linking
everything to a single monolithic system, economizing by
means of large scale, there is a necessity for custom
making most of the components of the system. Assembly line
production is not useful because each time a power system
is built, it is likely to be designed somewhat differently,
a technical improvement here, a cost cutting measure there.
The result is that the the components of any one power
system is unique and not easily replaceable with the
components of any other power system. This custom made
uniqueness would make repair much more difficult in harsh
circumstances.
According to the Lovins's, electric utilities used to
keep on hand a variety of extra par ts--generator coils,
generator bearings, transformers, and so on. But now, with
higher unit costs, due to greater sophistication, larger
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size, and greater manufacturing specalization, and also
because of higher taxes, higher interest rates, and,
recently, lower rates of profit, spares have greatly
dwindled. only small, cheap, and frequently used parts are
kept in stock. Thus, replacing any of the larger more
expensive parts of a power system has to be planned far in
advance, often as much as a year. Failure and wear out
rates have to be known, and if anything major fails before
the plan anticipates its failure, whatever portion of the
power system is dependent on it simply has to stay down.
Also, because they are often warehoused in ordinary
buildings close to where they will be needed, spare parts
can be damaged by whatever destroys the original. For
example, a hurricane that causes a power outage can also
destroy the warehouse where the parts needed for repair are
kept.
Because the machinery for Enarchy's power systems has
become so complex, and so tightly specified, and because
the equipment necessary to repair it has become so unique,
few energy companies have retained machine shops for doing
their own repairs. Instead, they rely on the manufactures
and specalized contractors for repairs and consultation.
Many parts, such as large transformers, are simply sent
back to the factory for repair.
According to the Lovins's, three-phase explosion-proof
electric motors, an essential part of most oil and gas
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plants, have astonishingly low inventory levels. m 1969
the total stock of the four main US manuf acutur es was only
22 motors. Just replacing the explosion-proof motors of a
single crude oil plant could use up the nation's entire
stock. Other key parts of the power system seem scarcer
yet. Large transformers have especially low stock levels.
Severe damage to large scale power systems typically
takes many months, sometimes a year or more, to to repair.
And repair requires a complex array of supporting systems.
The repairs usually require not only small tools and
welders, but heavy cranes, hoists, and a well functioning
parts supply system. Transportation of things like
generator rotors and large transformers is very difficult,
requiring extremely heavy equipment and much coordination
and organization.
The manufacturing capacity for repacing key components
of power systems cannot be expected to deal with much more
than routine demand, and certainly could not be expected to
come any where near to dealing with wide spread disruption
and a 10, 100, or 1000 fold jump in demand. Cannibalizing
some systems to get other systems working is seldom
possible because of severe matching problems. Wide spread
disruption would quickly exhaust the small pool of highly
skilled technicians necessary to make such repairs. The
technical complexity of modern power systems means that
they require exotic materials and fabrication techniques.
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which will only be available if a highly interdependent
industrial economy is intact, and only if exotic minerals
can be imported from a number of unstable third world
countries. A single nuclear power plant, according to the
Lovins's, needs for its replaceable core one hundred nine
metric tons of chromium, two and two-thirds of gadolinium,
and over eleven hundred tons of hafnium-free zirconium
(which is available from only one American vendor).
Once the infrastructure supporting the power industry
is disrupted, it would be very hard to reestablish it
because it itself depends on the power industry for the
power it needs for its exotic fabrication techniques. If a
major power source fails, its interconnections with other
power sources may help it to reestablish itself, assisting
it with backup and restarting, but more likely it will mean
that its failure is propagated throughout other systems,
rippling outward until it is as total as the rationality
Enarchy imposes on all things. Because the time of Enarchy
has woven so many things so tightly together, linking
divergent systems technically, economically, politically,
and socially, a failure in any one power system entails
disruption in others, threatening the totality of the
civilization that Enarchy has built. Chaos would then
become the being of all things, an apocalyptic revelation
of the final thought of our time of Enarchy.
Enarchy' s technology is never near at hand, able to be
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governed by handmade care, but is far flung and global in
extent. its tools of power do not draw near to the
dwelling place, responding directly to its needs, the way
that solar, wind, and animal power can, but orders
everything into a vast power system whose rationality is
measured by its totality, not by its purpose.
Since everything becomes a tool in the time of
Enarchy, a means for the command, the use of anything is
never limited by an interpretation of what its end use is,
the thing it is for. Instead, everything is drawn up in
the aimlessness of the will willing itself. it does not
matter what a tool is for, only that it increases man's
power
.
As the Lovins's point out, this nihilism results in
totally thoughtless results. The engineers and businessmen
who build Enarchy's power systems build them on the
assumption that the progress of humanity depends on
continual expansion of energy supplies. Mathematicians in
everything they do, they point to graphs that show
continual expansion of energy supply and demand in the
past, extrapolate this tendancy, and conclude that the
economy will need X units more energy in the future--this
despite the fact chat in order to consume this amount of
energy the typical family might need several huge
uninsulated houses, a fleet of gas guzzling cars in
continual use, and several helicopters.
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But we do not need to move into the future to find the
utter thoughtlessness of our engineers, politicians, and
businessmen. According to the Lovins's, if we operate on
the assumption that a gallon of gasoline saved is
equivalent to a gallon produced it would be cheaper for the
American government to give away fuel efficient cars than
to subsidize coal gasification plants. The failure of our
engineer's, businessmen's, and politician's thinking lies
in the fact that we do not need X amount of energy for
command, we need energy for heating homes, lighting up our
dark hours, preserving and cooking our food, and so on. An
X amount of energy at our command is totally useless unless
it does something we need done. As a result, we should
build our energy systems according to the things we need
done at home. Passive solar heat is a simple and elegant
way of making our homes comfortable, since a well
insulated, well designed house only needs low grade energy
to accomplish this. Using a nuclear power plant to create
temperatures of many thousands of degress, channelling the
heat through a complex generation system, and sending it
perhaps a thousand miles to heat a house electrically is,
in the words of Amory Lovins, "like using a chain saw to
cut butter." Because Enarchy's managers fail to think
about what a thing is for, because Enarchy degrades and
enslaves human beings, threatens the earth which sustains
them and distributes their burdens and benefits unequally.
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it cannot be certain of humanity's continual and universal
submission to it.
In the age of Enarchy, an new basis for conflict
between human beings comes forth. it is not a struggle as
Hobbes might have characterized it, a struggle of all
against all for scarce resources, but a struggle for
dominion as master of the earth. This struggle is entirely
new and unprecedented because it is the result of a new
understanding of man's humanity and freedom and of the
attempt to make it true. To be human and free in our time
is to be a subject, to impose the distinction between
subject and object on the world. But this attempt to
become subject must bring men into conflict with each other
because for every man who seeks his humanity, every other
human being is an object, a means which, like the rest of
nature, is a resource that is to be used for the will's
triumph. As a result of this new understanding of
humanity, the humanity and freedom of man is predicated and
built on the possibility of subduing the will of
individuals, using them as a means to man's own security
and freedom. This objectif ication of humanity and need for
its submission is revealed in all realms of human life.
The pursuit of freedom as control brings about universal
slavery and unlimited conflict. In politics it comes forth
as a technology of propaganda and ideology, which organizes
man for conquest and rule. In economics it comes forth as
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a technology of organizing man and machine for the
exploitation of nature.
Viewing the world as picture, the human truth of our
time transforms everything holy and natrual into world
views—customs, conventions, and values that vary across
cultures. In their truth before social science, these
different "world views" become a means of exploring our own
world view, for mastering our society and subjecting it to
its rationality. Once the gods have fled, and our time
becomes aware of our institutions as historical
fabrication, they become the means for building a science
of society, a way of making man more rational, more human.
Myths must be vanquished, fetishes seen through, false
consciousness' s overcome. As master of himself, man must
return to himself by subduing himself, coming to a
universal knowledge of himself as the source of all that
is. As a condition of his freedom, traditions become a
plastic material needing to be shaped by man's own will, a
means of creating the new rational order. They are
politicized, criticized, and analyized, a human consent
rationally given becomes the ground of their legitimacy.
But because technical systems demand the consent of
subjects, while undermining the possibilities for it by
treating them as objects, political technologists must set
about manufacturing it. And as a result, increasing
portions of Enarchy's economies are devoted to managing
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people's consent.
instead of being a place governed by handmade care,
the household has become a site of consumption, a factory
of need where individuals consume products that are
produced and packaged for the utility of a distant master.
Instead of politics being a gathering of people united in
their concern for the thing, a gathering at which the world
may world, it is a means of handling credibility problems,
of managing perceptions, and of developing images. Instead
of being the art of the statesman, politics has become the
art of the political campaigner, the speech writer, the
advertizer, the computer technician, and the voting
analyst.
An instrument of a distant master, modern technology
distributes benefits and burdens unequally, partly as a
method of control, as we saw earlier with Foucault, and
partly because large centralized systems must of necessity
affect local populations differently than they do the
general population. The coal that flows through coal
slurry pipe lines and runs the power plants that lights up
large cities comes from fragile ecosystems where the locals
are pushed off of their land, exposed to health hazards,
and lose their water to the pipeline. The large scale so
necessary for Enarchy's control must divorce local costs
from local benefits, revealing the whole as a totality that
must homogenize the will and level all differences. Any
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difference, local cost, or externality must be sacrificed
for the security of the whole system. Any will that seeks
its humanity and wills only itself, is a will in conflict
with reason, a will that must be made into a object and
subdued
.
Because the will cannot be willed without the
submission of some wills, the consent that is imperative
from the vantage point of the whole system is likely to be
denied by local communities. The archetypal example of
this is the long-running feud politically conservative
farmers in northern Minnesota have had with the utilities.
By night they sabotage and dismantle the high voltage power
lines that cut across their fields, built as a result of a
political process they believe unjust and illegitimate. By
day the utilities rebuild them and vainly attempt to hunt
the saboteurs down. (None of them have ever been caught.)
Similar rebellions can be expected and have occured around
nuclear power plants, coal slurry pipelines, large
hydroelectric dams, oil refineries, coal gasification
plants, chemical plants, toxic waste dumps, and radioactive
waste dumps. Problems like acid rain, ground water
pollution, air pollution, economic dislocation,
unemployment, poor health from work place hazards, and
other externalities also distribute benefits and burdens
inequitably.
People may resist the systems that enslave and
283
unjustly exploit them in a variety of ways. They may break
completely and violently with the system, becoming
terrorists, saboteur s , and revolutionaries, but much more
likely and more commonly, they may become dissatisfied with
their work and their function within the plan, depressed
and alienated for no reason that they can articulate, and
fail to do it well enough to sustain the brittle
system. [46] Or, if they become conscious, as slaves are
all too apt to do, of some injustice inflicted on them,
they may become politically active, putting pressure on the
system to reform its practices in ways that undermine its
ability to reproduce and sustain its rigid structure. Or
the managers of Enarchy's power systems may fail to
completely understand its future necessity for certain
resources, such as properly trained and docile technicians,
exotic minerals, or an accepting public, as a result of
contradictions within itself that it did not recognize and
overcome. Not being fully self-conscious of itself,
capitalism is especially vulnerable to this. It may, for
example, not recognized the necessity of overcoming the
contradictions between the social costs of education and
the individual costs, running the risk of having too many
lawyers and not enough plumbers. More ominously, because
of the ideology of free speech, it may fail to sufficiently
stamp its ideology on the youth of the nation, failing to
moniter the things that dissident intellectuals teach them.
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Because Enarchy must internalize all human willing,
making it its own, it has spread over all the earth,
bringing third world nations, dissenting social and
political movements, and diverging cultures under its
control. The necessity for this is as great as the
vulnerability of Enarchy to the externalities that escape
its plan. If a socialist government in Chile promises to
nationalize the copper industry, threatening the control of
American multi-national corporations over a strategic
resource, and if successful, threatening to become the
first in a wave of revolutions that would make other South
American nations uncontrollable, it must be destabilized,
repaced with a government that will be responsive to the
plans of multi-national corporations, no matter how brutal,
tyranical, and repressive it is. If a traditional people
in Afghanistan resists cultural modernaization, refusing to
allow the liberation of the women it oppresses, and
threatens to spread Islamic revolution into the Soviet
Union, disrupting the ideological hegemony of the Communist
Party, they must be re-educated, and, that failing,
eradicated. In all cases control must be extended, the
externalities internalized, the unplanned made manageable,
the will made universal, the command secured.
But such attempts to extend control and universalize
the will, to secure the archy of the human command, are
bound to encounter and engender resistance, total and
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perhaps, monstrous resistance, that would sacrifice
anything, do anything, in order to escape the hegemony of a
universal will and the slavery it would be. The mastery of
chaos, the imprinting of reason upon the will, is
essentially violent, objectifying, enslaving, and
degrading. if the enslaved strikes back at Enarchy's most
vulnerable points, its centralized technologies of command
and control, the slave rebellion is bound to be successful.
The more the organization of the world is linked together
into a great archy, each part mutually constituting another
and all together, the more the will becomes universal, the
more vulnerable it is to a deconstruc tion of its command.
Anarchy and Chaos are the other of the command, the
concealed truth of its way, the resistance to its control
that it denys and seeks to silence, but which threatens to
irrupt with a roar that disperses everything, shattering
all links between things. Enarchy's doom, ultimately is to
be mastered by what it denys, the monster it makes with its
order and archy, the monster that escapes through the
cracks of its plan.
Resistance to Enarchy has thus far failed to
deconstruct it because it has participated in it, sought
only its extension, willed it, though in a different guise.
Every revolution in the modern age, save perhaps the
Iranian, has only made Enarchy more secure. The Soviet,
the Cuban, and the Chinese revolutions all achieved only
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what the previous regime dreamed of, mastery without limit.
CHAPTER XIV
THE MONSTER
At about the same time that Mary Shelly was writing
her tale of a man-made monster, another monster, a
nonfictional one even more terrible than Mary Shelly's, was
haunting the mind of Europe--the Marquis de Sade. it seems
strange that one man could provoke such an extreme
reaction, unless he represented something that was all too
near, too true to the reality of the time.
Why has Sade been so throughly censored? Why has he
been imprisoned, locked up, and isolated from the rest of
society? Was it not because his moral anarchy, much like
the horror of Mary Shelly's monster in her famous novel,
was the ultimate threat to the thoughts, the personal
identities, and the morality of his time? Was he not
locked up and isolated not so much for the crimes he might
have committed, but for the contagion he represented, for
the scandal he made possible, and the threat to civility he
posed? Could it be that Sade was, and no doubt still is,
the unwelcome guest of our time, a monster representing an
anarchical counter-order which must be denied, isolated.
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silenced; and despite all of this, carefully examined (most
preferably by medical doctors), studied, and carefully
answered. A good scientist of morals cannot just ignore
Sade, just jail him and censor him; he must have reasons;
he must examine him (if in secret), and not fail to have
the most complete answer for the isolation and denial of
Sade's sort of contagion; for to fail to get this monster
under control is the most serious failure a science of
morals is capable of. The reasons for Sade's thought, the
causes of his immorality, the constitution of his mind, his
body, and his soul, must be made to speak, to render up the
truth of themselves as irrationality, to confess their
secret knowledge, so that Sade and the elements, whether
social or organic, which made his obscene anarchy can be
manipulated, controlled, subjected, and then, most
importantly, made rational. Nevertheless, a terror haunts
us: as we think about the ways in which our technical
mastery of morality might circle back on itself, defeating
its own ends and purposes, on the ways in which it, itself,
helps create what it denys, we begin to wonder if it is not
Sade who has trapped us, if it is not possible that the
more we try to deny him, the more levers and fulcra we
reach for to pry him out of our lives, the more his reality
shapes our reality, defining what it is we think and what
our unconscious desires and fears are.
If Enarchy, which carries with it the necessity for
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mastering all the earth, cannot help but produce a double,
an uncontrolled shadow of itself which it seeks to
demystify and control, if it must create a will, mode of
behavior, or grouping of people— ter ror ists
, delinquents, a
rabble of skilless welfare dependents, sexual
perverts—which must be identified, controlled, changed,
and made useful as a demonstration of reason's truth, then
the vulnerability of modern technology is part of its
essence
.
When monsters like Sade irrupt out of nowhere, as
tradition has always known, they appear as a warning, a
divine omen of an evil yet to come. The Old French word
"monstre" is closely related to "monere", to warn. The
appearance of the monster, then, is something marvelous, a
divine portent or warning, ^4oreover, as its root in the
French word "montre" shows, the monster appears as the
effect of monitering, of watching, displaying, showing. As
an abomination, a divine portent of evil, the monster is
put on display (the freak show is the modern variation of
an ancient practice) for all to take heed of and respond
to as a warning. And yet, as we moderns are apt to forget
as we attend freak shows, as if by some monstrous
compulsion within, and pity the objects put on display
there, the monster is more than an abortion of nature, an
accident that reason makes harmless with an aetiology of
its being as a coherence of forces. It is a truth, an
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irruption of Being, that reveals the evil in man's being
and warns him to change his ways. As a divine warning, the
monster reveals the depravity of a way of being and calls
on man to change it.
we moderns, however, know no monsters because we know
of no evil. Concealed from the gaze of science by the calm
assurance of reason, the monster as divine portent is
unknown in our age, and yet this age, of all ages, is the
age of the monster. Because of its truth as object of
utility, the world is watched, put on display, viewed as a
picture, just as the monster is put on display in a freak
show. But it is not the monster that is monstrous in this
display of the world as picture, it is the watching, the
way of looking upon the world. The watching effects a
subtle transformation on the watcher. Seeing the world as
an object of his will, the watcher assumes a way of being
in the world that excludes its nurturance, allows the
possibility of love of others or compassion for the
unfortunate—any relation to the world that makes it into
anything except a means for the will to will itself.
Nothing is left to break forth from the earth of itself and
left to be itself, but rather is gathered up in the tempest
of man's willing it as a means to his willing. This way of
being conceals the monster while bringing forth the
monstrous
.
Seeking their subjectivity, their freedom as masters
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of the earth, men become monsters to each other. Knowing
each other as the will's utility, they enter into a world
wide struggle that degrades everything it touches. As they
encounter each other as the other's utility they become
something truly horrible, a hellish hatred that knows
itself as hatred, despises itself in all its depravity and
monstrousness, and yet wills itself, even exceeds itself,
as such. The divine pref igur ation of all monsters is
Satan himself, the fallen angel, the monster that God made.
In Frankenstein, a tale of a man-made monster, Mary
Shelly was issuing us a warning that goes right to the
heart of this time of man made men, a warning that has been
ignored as much as it has been transformed into myth. [47]
Frankenstein is the story of a brilliant scientist who
overcomes many technical obstacles, discovers the secret of
life, and uses it to create a human being in his
laboratory. As soon as he succeeds, and his creation
awakes, Frankenstein is filled with horror, and abandons
his creation to its own devices.
Living in a hovel near a family that he spies on, the
monster quickly develops his human skills for reading,
speaking, and listening to a language. He discovers his
unique situation as the first man made man from
Frankenstein's notebook, which he took with him when he
left the laboratory, and which contains Frankenstein's
final reaction of horror to his creation. Wherever he
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goes, whenever he encounters another human being,
Frankenstein's creation is quickly made the object of
violent assault. He flees from man, becoming an outcast
from the human race. Profoundly alone, he desires
companionship desperately. He seeks out his creator and
prevails upon him to make him a woman. But, fearing the
consequences, Frankenstein breaks his promise and the
monster turns against his creator in revenge, killing
everyone that Frankenstein loves. Once he has lost
everyone he loves, Frankenstein follows the monster to the
Arctic, seeking to kill him, but he dies before he can
accomplish his goal. His revenge satisfied, overwhelmed by
a most terrible self disgust, the monster destroys himself
in a firery inferno at the North Pole, far removed from any
human habitation.
Contrary to the myth, but very true to it,
Frankenstein is not the name of the monster, but of the
scientist who made him. Cut off from society by his
monstr ousness , the monster has no relation to someone who
would name him. In this curious reversal and forgotten
fact lies its own truth--it is not the monster that is
monstrous, but the making that made him, brought him forth
from unconcealment . But we see in the novel that
Frankenstein himself, save for perhaps some minor flaws of
character, is no monster either, but as the monster himself
concludes, "is the select specimen of all that is worthy of
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love and admiration among men."
The monster comes into the world not, it would seem,
as the issue of some cruel and sadistic hand which despises
the world and seeks its torment, but as the exact
realization of the dream of its creator, the highest
attainment of the most excellent of scientists. The
monster was to be the scientific demonstration of the
mastery of the secrets of life, of the power for bestowing
animation upon lifeless matter, renewing life where death
had devoted the body to corruption. it was to be the proof
of a self-conscious knowledge of humanity that would be of
inestimable benefit to mankind, a total mastery of nature
and man's beginnings.
But the moment that the experiment was complete, and
the creation opened its eye, demonstrating the full
accomplishment of human self consciousness, the creator was
suddenly repelled by his creation. It ceased to be a
technical triumph and became an abomination, ugly and
hideous to look at. Frankenstein fled from it in horror,
hoping that death would take it back into its grave.
The dream of complete self-consciousness became a
nightmare, the reality of the will being able to will
itself a terror. However much he now despised it, the
monster that Frankenstein created was not an accident, a
miscalculation, or a failure, but the accomplished reality
of being able to give a total representation of man, of
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being able to master the coherence of forces governing the
origins of man to the point of being able to create one.
It is that technical capability for self
-consc iousness
which is so monstrous and makes the monster so horrible.
If only an abortion of nature, the monster would merely
have been ugly, but as a creation of man, the full
expression of his will being able to will himself, it was
an abomination, the truth of humanity as an object of
science and technology. Mimicking God's creation of man,
man's creation of man became the effective death of God as
creator. All that was holy in man and nature was
vanquished by the new Adam, becoming nothing more than the
re-presentation of a human will, with the new Adam, things
were as man willed them to be and nothing more. Everything
became an object for human subjectivity, even man himself.
Technology had overcome the last obstacle, the mastery of
man himself. With its triumph, man became a slave to
himself, an object of his own utility.
Frankenstein was repelled by his creation because it
brought with it a radical diminution of his own status as a
subject and of the subjectivity of everyone he loved. If,
by means of his chemical manipulations, he could create
human life out of inanimate matter, asserting his will over
it, he had also re-'' iced human life to inanimate material, a
coherence of forces available for human manipulation. With
his success, people became their bodies, inanimated objects
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composed of dead matter.
The night that his creation had opened its watery eye
and breathed its first and Frankenstein had fled his lab in
horror he fell into a wild and fitful sleep. m his
dreams, he thought he saw his beloved Elizabeth in the
bloom of health, walking the streets of the town where his
lab was. Delighted and surprised because she was in
reality many miles away, he embraced her, but with the
first kiss, her lips became livid with the hue of death;
her features changed and she became his long dead mother.
A shroud covered her and he could see the grave-worms
crawling in the folds of her dress.
The monster killed everyone that Frankenstein loved
twice, the first death, which occurred when the monster
opened his eyes, was much more terrible than the last,
which came directly at the monster's hands. If
Frankenstein could create human life out of dead matter,
equating the two in his chemical equations, then, by simply
reversing his equations everyone that he loved was dead
matter and object of human command. As the story develops
and the monster kills everyone that Frankenstein loves he
only completes what Frankenstein had in truth already
accomplished with his creation. Throughout the rest of
the story, with each succeeding death of a beloved friend
or family member, Frankenstein is overcome with guilt, and
he says repeatedly that he has killed them. Everyone
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dismisses this as incoherence inspired by grief, but
Frankenstein is entirely correct and entirely coherent.
His creation, by the sheer truth of its being, has killed
everyone he loves by destroying their humanity, turning
them into an object for man's utility.
The monster is Frankenstein's double, the object of
his subjectivity, and the re-presentation of his power as
technician. On the surface the double appears as a negation
of the self, but more profoundly, the double is a
completion of the self, an other, which combined with the
self creates a whole. Each exists only because the other
exists. The monster is monstrous because the will which
drove Frankenstein to create him, his will to power through
human technology, is monstrous, an abomination that
degrades everything into the will's utility. Despite its
gentleness, its care and concern for humanity, its
overwhelmingly human need for companionship, Frankenstein's
creation was doomed to become a monster, an anarchical
terrorist at war with society, because of its very being as
a man made fabrication. In its essence as inanimate matter
made living by the hand of man, the perfect representation
of man, it was the incontrovertible denoument of man as
subject and architect of the world. As the highest
accompishment of man's technology, the fullest
demonstration of his subjectivity, the monster was the
other truth of man, the representation of man's being as
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the object of his own technology.
Throughout the book, Frankenstein seeks only to
accomplish the full humanity of man, to protect human
subjectivity. When he realized that his creation was not
the instrument of humanity's freedom but the demonstration
of its slavery, he sought to protect humanity from the
terrible truth he so brilliantly demonstrated. This is
what Frankenstein was doing when he refused to give the
monster the female companion that it desired. Creating a
companion to the monster would only be a further
demonstration of man's non-humanity, with the monster the
woman that he was creating could reproduce, perfectly
duplicating and representing the reproduction of the human
species. In order to prevent this perfect man-made
re-presentation of the human condition from taking place,
Frankenstein had to place a limit on his power to
manipulate in order to protect humanity from the
subjectivity of man. Risking his own life against the
rage of the monster, Frankenstein breaks his promise and
rips apart the almost completed female, seeking, as always,
the greatest benefit to society rather than his own. Man
must be master and nature must be represented as his
object. Any confusion of this essential difference, as the
monster was, must be suppressed, denied its
re-presentation
.
This is the final insult to the monster. Knowing that
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he will never be anything except his utility, he begins h
reign of bloody terror and revenge. Contrary to the myth,
the monster was not created evil, his brain coming from a
sadistic criminal, but became that way because of his
relation to technical man as his other. Frankenstein's
creation developed as Rousseau's natural man developed. At
first he was benevolent and good, rescuing a child from
raging torrent, secretly helping an impoverished family
with its housework, but as his social consciousness
developed, and with it his awareness of the crulties
inflicted on him by society, and especially his creator who
only made him as a means for his knowledge, he was
possessed by bitter resentment. Everywhere he saw bliss;
from which he alone, the hideous other, the object of man's
utility, was irrevocably excluded. At first benevolent and
good because he wanted to participate in society, to have
friends and to be a friend, his exclusion and being as
utility made him miserable and a fiend. But in contrast to
Rousseau, the monster became evil not because society made
him that way but because he was excluded from the humanity
of society because he was its other, the demonstration of
its subjectivity.
For Rousseau, an author that Mary Shelly is obviously
deeply indebted to, men are by nature isolated and
solitary, yet, as they mature and begin to develop their
social nature, they cease to be alone. [48] In fact, in the
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fuzzy transition from the state of nature to civilization,
in which the dividing line between the natural and the
artifical and social is never clearly drawn; it is the
social passions, naturally derived, which lead men to form
the social contract. Though the legitimacy of the social
contract rests upon the interests of individuals, its
formation rests upon the recognition and humanity of
others, upon the moral claims that others have on the
self's actions, beliefs, and commitments. For Rousseau
(and Mary Shelly, I think), it is love and hate, the fear
of death and the ambition to dominate--all socially made
emotions, not given by nature--that lead to the development
of language, the formation of the social contract, and the
evolution of society from equality to inequality. It is
not pure self interest which put society together, nor
individual calculations of marginal utility, but the
passions, progressively developed within society, that
makes the ties that bind, the reason which considers, and
the morality which obligates. For Rousseau and Mary
Shelly, as indeed for the entire epoch of Enarchy in one
archy or another, our moral commitments to one another,
embodied in social conventions, are the products of
society, and within the notions of property, love, hate,
ambition, and friendship there is the implication of
intersubject ivi ty , community, and the recognition of others
as a will deserving respect.
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Although Mary Shelly's monster is a social outcast, he
nonetheless develops into a human being as human as anyone
else. This is his great tragedy. By his being as human
creation, he is irrevocably excluded from humanity. He
must remain in his place as humanity's object.
As his self consciousness grew, the monster became
aware of his differences, and the act of exclusion that
denied him his humanity. An artifical creation, attached
to no place, no family, no home, the monster had no
relationship to anything, save his experimental utility to
his creator. He had no father to watch over his childhood,
no mother to bless him with smiles and caresses, no one to
lament his pain or his annihilation. The first man
produced by the new technology was, despite the sociality
of his passions, simply an atom, an island of sheer
existence surrounded by an endless sea of his utility. As
the monster increasingly became aware of what he was and
how his being as man made man made him different, how that
it excluded him from his humanity, his awareness
incressingly became a torment to him. What was he? A
monster certainly, something different, something horrible
and evil--a fallen angel, perhaps? No, not even a fallen
angel. Even Satan had his companions, fellow devils to
admire and encourage him.
Cut off from society, excluded from any relation that
could satisfy his social passions, knowing himself as a
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monster, despair and desolation took the place of his
kindness and benevolence, hatred and rage the place of his
love and sympathy. a howling revenge, borne by the hell
within him, became the purpose of his being. unable to
give love or get it, he could still give pain and death and
get terror as his reward. Made human, but denied his
humanity by his role as other, the monster declared
everlasting war against the humanity of man, and especially
against the humanity of his creator.
Radically repudiating every value and meaning that
humanity had celebrated and in which he had joyfully
participated, the monster became the active agent of
nihilism and anarchy. If he could not be as he wanted, a
human being with a home and a place, no one else would be
either. Everything human would be destroyed. With
no-thing thinging for him, no gathering of care to restrain
him, no home or archy to give him a responsibility for
anything, but knowing everything that he lacked and haunted
by it, the monster began killing with a devilish despair.
He did not strike directly -it Frankenstein, killing him
cleanly and directly. That would be too easy and kind, too
human. Instead, he struck at the love that surrounded
Frankenstein, the love that reflected his humanity and gave
him a home and a place. And as a result of each murder,
Frankenstein became more like the monster, a homeless.
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loveless, man, possessed by a raging necessity for revenge.
A Slave to his hatred, and the instrumentality his creation
had Imposed on him, Frankenstein became the monster he
despised.
Just as Frankenstein used his knowledge of nature to
master lifeless matter and create a man, the monster, now a
subtle scientist of morals, used his knowledge of society
to manipulate Frankenstein, to reduce him to an atom of
revengful utility, an other whose pain is testament to his
mastery. And thus, the master becomes slave through
technical knowledge and the slave becomes master, in an
inward spiral of technical mastery which denys everyone
their subjectivity and eventually closes in on a desparing
death for all in a cold arctic wasteland far from any human
habitation. Such is Mary Shelly's warning and prophecy.
Enarchy breeds monsters by reducing humanity to
slavery, manufacturing its own doom with each step it
advances toward its perfection. Unlike other possible ways
of being, the doubles that it calls into being are truly
monstrous, hateful, rancorous, beings bent on terrible
revenge because the humanity that this age exaults is
denied them since their only being is as utility. In our
newspapers and TV newscasts, we hear daily reports of
helpless old people being tortured and robbed by young
thugs, of terrorists who hold a plane or a boat hostage, of
people murdered on city streets for a few dollars, and of
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people who for no apparent reason go on hunting sprees
fast-food joints, seemingly killing other people for the
sheer fun of it. Save for the terrorists who stage manage
their terror for the media, this is but an impotent rage
expressed by impotent people who know nothing of the true
possibilities for death, destruction, and terror that
Enarchy makes possible. The person who has recently been
contaminating Tylenol capsules with cyanide poison has come
much closer to understading the possiblities for death and
destruction a centralized distributing system brings.
Perhaps Sade would have understood why they did it.
For Sade, the pain and horror of other people, inflicted by
a master of torture, is a delightful intoxicant, a sign of
difference and inferiority that separates them from the
godly self. Other people's pain, degradation, enslavement,
and death are testaments to their utility, a subtle
demonstration that they have been mastered. Power is the
truth of the other's pain, and rape, whether actual or
symbolic, is always its technique.
The problem Sade, as the literary monster of our time,
poses for Enarchy's ordering is this: how can all the
economies of production, hierarchies of control, and
systems of order, which hold the individual as the Reserved
and which curtail, constitute, and circumscribe his actions
as its necessity, justify its morality? If there is no
truth to it but its own, if the only meaning that exists
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for humanity is what it gives itself as convention, if
morality is man made and given to us by history, then what
is there in man's humanity that requires us to submit to
it? If morality is a tool of human control, as it is for a
scientist of morals like Rousseau, a tool which must be
made subject to the will of man, why must we submit to it
in a herd, why not assert our mastery as an individual and
make our own morals as our nature prompts us? what is it
in modern morality that requires us to recognize the
humanity of others, to accept moral virtues, to subordinate
our private will to the general will? The truth that,
being memebers of society, we are inescapably implicated in
our humanity, that we are moral beings and have always been
so, says nothing about why we, as the masters of our
morality, should continue to be such. Our mastery of our
morality, reflected in our being toward it as social
convention, entitles us to make of it what we want. Our
technical being toward morality, our recognition of it as
utility and tool, gives us the license to do as we, as
individuals, wi ll--whatever we will, be it the tortured
death of the innocent or the genocidal death of the
multitudes. Because it knows everything as human
instrument, Enarchy has no argument, save its own power to
censor, control, and render the other monstrous, to
directly counter this with, since it itself is the will to
mastery through human technology and it itself makes
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everything into utility.
Rousseau, Sade's most venomous double, formulates in
the social Contract the conditions in which man can be
master and moral at the same time. [49] Indeed, he goes so
far as to make man's mastery contingent upon his social
morality. For Rousseau, like Hobbes, man's moral
obligation to others is derived not from immediate nature
and not from God, but from the agreement which makes
society possible, the social contract, which is the most
secure ground of the will. Contrary to Sade, the natural
fact of physical power or force does not in any way
legitimate or justify the rule of the strongest. Although
force is a physical power, as natural as it is real, no
morality can result from its effects because yielding to
it is an act of necessity and possibly of prudence, not of
human will. And although Rousseau is willing to agree that
all power comes from God, he is not willing to agree that,
that in itself makes it legitimate because God is as much
the source of illegitimate power as he is the source of all
illness. Just as we need not hesitate to call a doctor
when we are sick, we need not hesitate to build a
legitimate state. Much as Nietzsche did latter, Rousseau
locates man's freedom in the correspondence of his will to
his being, not in a supernatural beyond. Because roan's
being is social, the circumstances of his freedom and his
willing must be social. Since force produces no right.
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nature no natural authority, and God no special privilege,
man .ust find in himself his own source of legitimate
authority. And the measure of his legitimate authority
will be the extent to which his state establishes and makes
possible man's correspondence with his being, his freedom
as master of himself. Man realizes his place as his will
willing itself when the general will, the commitment to the
common good, is identical with each particular will. This
only occurs under the most ideal c i r cums tances— a small,
egalitarian, self-sufficient, isolated, agrarian state that
has had a long history of conventions and traditions that
support democratic participation in the affairs of state.
Under these conditions the social contract, subordinating
the ends of each to the goals of all, defends and protects
the person and goods of each associate, even while each
individual obeys only himself. The act of association, in
which all agree to subordinate their private will to the
common good, produces the virtues and the moral obligation
necessary to fulfil the terms of the socal contract. The
general will, through the developmental act of association,
is the means to freedom for each individual. Because his
freedom and humanity as a man is realizable only through
his sociality, the individual can be, and should be, forced
to be free if his particular will differs significantly
from the general will.
Children of Enarchy, both Rousseau and Sade recognize
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its first truth, the man made nature of man, the artifical
nature of his morals, and the necessity of grounding
everything on a technology of the will. [50] For both
Rousseau and Sade, man is the master of himself, and,
through himself, of all the earth. This certainty that the
will is the fundamental reality of man is the truth that
unites them throughout their most extreme differences.
While Rousseau recognizes the necessity of placing limits,
an architecture of its own possibility, on the individual
will in order for it to come to its own truth, Sade rejects
any limit or architecture to the will's willing, not God's
commandments, not man's being in his conventions, morals,
and traditions, not even nature's promptings. Since
everything is human instrument, everything is to be as
instruments are used, for the will's willing. Since the
truth of humanity is the degradation and instrumental use
of everything human, the individual is entirely in his
right to use the humanity of others as the satisfaction of
the monstrous passions his own being as utility for others
has brought forth in him. Sade is thus the ultimate truth
of Enarchy, the pure expression of it as the monster whose
willing knows no limit. Because it knows no human limit,
it cannot be universalized in a general will or archy of
any other sort, but must find its satisfaction in the
anarchical nihilism of a unique will, a single governing
will which knows the entire world as its own instrument of
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play. The unique one knows itself as master, and giddily
affirms itself as such, by its violation of everything that
opposes its willing-man's virtues, God's will, nature's
inevitable death, and the sanctity of innocence.
The central point around which Sade's being revolves,
the main thought which he celebrates, and yet, secretly
despises, is that he is alone in his willing-prof oundly,
awesomely alone. So alone that not the most terrible
agony or need of other people can penetrate the isolation
of his will. Between the will of the unique one and all
others, there is an unbridgeable chasm, a separation of the
experience of self that transforms all others into the
will's utility. The most terrible agony of others,
unexperienced by the unique one, is nothing to it, while
the faintest touch of pleasure that is felt is everything,
and should be prefered to the universal sum of others'
miseries. [51]
Seeking Enarchy's freedom through anarchical willing,
Sade has a very complicated relationship to other people,
much like the Master in Hegel's Master-Slave dialectic. On
the one hand, their will cannot be known as a will since
they are inescapably other, the object of the will's
utility, and on the other hand, their will can be known
because their pain, experienced as their pain, is a
demonstration of their otherness, their objectivity, and of
the unique one's mastery over them. The consciousness of
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the other is a necessary moment in the Master's affirmation
Of his will and freedom. m his zest to dissposses other
people of their will and freedom, to prove that they are
nothing but the will's utility, Sade betrays his profound
dependence on other people, if only because he needs
victims to feel his power, to acknowledge his mastery in
their slavery. if other people actually are nothing but
their utility, why is pleasure gained from torturing them;
if other people are just as noble or ignoble as the worms
which chew on their corpses, why won't the worms do as well
for a ventalation of Sade's energy? No doubt it is because
other people are singularly capable of experiencing and
knowing the power of the Master. in its final certainty of
itself as master, as the command that commands, the will
can know itself as will only through the destruction of
another will. Such is the depravity of Enarchy comes to
when it knows freedom as only human control.
As objects of utility, other people are especially
valuable because their consciousness knows their
degredation and subjugation, and through it acknowledge the
master's mastery. Worms do not. People can know
themselves as slaves, tools subjected to necessity and
mastery. Worms cannot. The unique one's mastery and
freedom depends upon the denial of it to others, even
though it is also dependent on the recognition of it by
others. Despite the fact that others are nothing, Sade
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writes books; he seeks the recognition of others, he
desires to be their desire, and the vague realization of
this torments him, driving him to the flash of an anger and
the depth Of a hatred that is truly monstrous. Sade needs
Rousseau because his humanity is the perfect tool for
Sade's master. The virtue that Rousseau celebrates is
useful because it can be violated, demonstrating and
affirming the mastery of the unique one.
The laws which Rousseau saw as being the means by
which the individual could come to his freedom, being the
truth of his implication in the general will, are for Sade
a constraint on his freedom, denying him his will just as
they make possible the full expression of his will. Forged
for universal application, leveling all differences to the
tyranny of passionless reason, laws are by nature in
perpetual conflict with the individual's will. Contrary to
Rousseau, the laws the general will fabricates for his
freedom are in essence an unnatural tyranny over the will.
Their being is entirely alien to the will's being as its
own master. If on occassion the laws protect the will,
they more often hinder it, trouble it, and fetter it,
denying it the limitless assertion of its mastery. Sade
goes to such a length in reversing Rousseau's notion of the
law being the will's means to come to its freedom as master
that he claims it is wrong for the law to kill, while it is
acceptable for an individual to do it, for the law is alien
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to the will and opposed to it, while the individual's
natural passions, which inform his act of murder, are not.
The particular will, being closer to its truth as master,
is always the true means to human freedom. Any limit
placed on it is a tyrannical limit, unjustified and false,
placed on human freedom.
As a simple coherence of natural forces, and nothing
more, man is no different than all the plants and animals
of the earth for Sade. He is born like them, like them he
reproduces, lives, and struggles, like them, he grows old
and sinks like them into the earth at the end of his life.
Like all other beings, man is inescapably subject to the
laws of nature, an object like all objects in his utility
for the will, and whatever he wills as an individual,
nature wills through him. There is only nature, a
coherence of forces, subject throughout its entirety to
its own laws of causality. Nature can be nothing else than
the object of man's use, because man himself is nothing
more than an object of utility for the will.
Organizing itself without limit, Enarchy produces
monsters who will without limit, and will without control
and against it. Trying to subject it to control, Enarchy
sets upon the monster, it seeks him out, trying to inscribe
him within its plan, or that failing, to destroy him. But
he cannot be destroyed because the will he wills is
Enarchy's own truth, absolute power.
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The monster's resistance takes on an entirely new form
of violence. A revolutionary resitance, quite unlike any
that has yet occured. Instead of being drawn on by the
dream of reason, a perfect organization of everything, the
monster dreams only of its destruction. The monster spares
nothing, just as Enarchy has spared nothing. He does not
hesitate to strike at Enarchy's most vulnerable points
because, as its other, they are his to destroy. He does
not fear the chaos that reason fears because they are his
true being. He is a multiplicity of forces, without center
or focus, a dispersion that seeks no unity. He is a man
born dead, more indifferent to his own death than he is of
his victims. In his presence nothing is made the real
truth of everything, and he becomes a death which rolls
over the land as a mighty tidal wave. Nothing gathers him
into its care, because, outside of every human care, he
cares for nothing. The monster's life is horrible, a hell
without limit because it is a hell that, in full possession
of itself, knows its own depravity.
CHAPTER XV
THE TURNING
It is not our truth as command and control that shall
set us free, but rather it is our truth, the things we know
and cannot deny or believe otherwise, that enslaves us,
imprisoning us with its reason, necessity, and doom. The
idea, so obvious that we cannot deny it, that truth is the
means to freedom, the way to power and command, is for us
in our time a monstrous prison. We shall not escape the
terrible fates that awaits us—nuclear war, ecological
disaster, economic collapse, political totalitarianism—by
means of it, we shall only eventually assure something like
it with it. Indeed, unless we turn from our way, we will
die of our will to truth. The power that our freedom gives
us is a subtle poison that corrupts our Being, denying us
access to the earth, our essence, and our place. It cuts
us off from that which can save us.
The most dreadful, dangerous, and monstrous truth of
Enarchy is that it does not reveal itself as a monstrous
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doom. on the contrary, it seems evident to all that modern
technology is but a simple tool, a value neutral means to
power in the hands of man, and that, properly applied, it
can save us from any horrible fate. We only have to use it
properly for it to save us. But man is not the master of
his fate or his technology; for it is man himself, as lord
and master of all the earth, that is ordered forth by
Enarchy, a way of being that precedes man's mastery. As
master of the earth, man is the subject of a subjugation
more profound than himself. He is not the master of his
technology, the will that orders its use, but, as master,
is the one mastered, enslaved, and ordered into use by
Enarchy.
But, that man is not his own master does not mean that
humanity is forever delivered helplessly over to the
command, pure slave to a master that does not die. On the
contrary, we are doomed to monstrous slavery only as long
as we are called to be masters. Our unique doom is that
our way of being, Enarchy, does not allow us to know that
our understanding of freedom as control is the destiny
directing us to our monstrous doom. Enarchy denys us the
possibility of thinking any thought that says that our
freedom is not our salvation but our prison. Knowing
freedom only as command and control we thoughtlessly push
on with it, reasoning that somehow, someway, it will save
us. According to the Thinker, this doom that has been our
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destiny for so long, is in its own way moving toward a
decision that will reveal another destiny, enabling us to
think of freedom in another way than as control. [52]
A destiny blooms forth in its own way from the earth,
and the world it becomes is continually adapting itself to
it. As a world, a destiny carries on a dialog with the
earth, revealing it until the earth breaks its limits, its
time, and becomes another destiny, another world.
Destinies do not change in a rational way, limited by the
logic of the history they must assume, but break radically
and incommensurably with each other, becoming a destiny
that cannot be any other destiny than its own.
But, if a change in the destiny of Enarchy occurs and
another destiny, another way of freedom, breaks forth and
takes its place, this, according to the Thinker, does not
mean that the technology whose essence for us lies in
Enarchy will be done completely away with, that we will
necessarily assume the most primitive way of life excluding
any use of things. No, in its essence as the way of
revealing truth technology is the way of man on the earth;
humanity cannot be without bringing things forth from the
earth. But we can think about our technology and we can
adopt a way of bringing things forth that spares the earth,
preserves the world, and leaves the mystery to itself.
Thought in its essence, technology is neither the
means by which we attain our mastery, nor the means by
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which we are mastered. Always preceding it, it is
something wholly other than the dialectic of master and
slave because it is something other than a human doing
founded merely on itself. it is that which worlds the
world, things the thing. This presencing cannot, at
bottom, be mastered any more than it can master. it simply
is. And so, bringing things forth is not mastering them,
but revealing the truth in them. Freedom is not control,
but allowing truth to happen. Responding to the governance
of the world worlding, we reveal truth when we use our
technology. We are free when the earth speaks in what we
reveal
.
Between humanity and world a complex interplay occurs.
The world's worlding in the gathering of the thing occurs
only in the presence of mortal humankind. It is under our
care and guardianship, our life and our dwelling, that
things are brought forth and interpreted as the things they
are. Because of this, the doom that is the truth of modern
technology cannot change over into another destiny, another
truth, way of being, or interpretation of the thing,
without the cooperation of humanity. According to the
Thinker, thinking is a handcraft, it must draw near and be
near to the thing it thinks. The coming to presence of the
destiny and the truth that will spare the earth and free
the thing to itself will occur in the lives of the thinkers
who will open themselves up to the earth and think another
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way of being. Their way of being, their technology, their
interpretation of othe thing, must change and be
appropriate for the destiny the earth calls them toward.
AS this change in their ways occurs, new things, unthought
of, undreamed of before, will rise up from the earth and
appear in their presence, calling upon them for their
thought. The coming to presence of technology as a thing
to be thought, the turning to the new world, will occur in
a way that restores it into its yet concealed truth.
According to the Thinker, this restoration of technology to
its truth as a way of revealing Being is similar to what
happens when, in emotional terms, one gets over grief or
pain. The sudden absence of that which was so near to
one's life, the loss of links and ties to another, leaves
one disoriented for awhile, lost to the cares of life. The
ties that governed one's life, gathering its actions into
meaningful acts, still pull even though the thing calling
them no longer is. Everything loses its meaning in the
absence of the interpretation of things that governed the
thinging of all things. The world appears as a dream, a
distant twilight, but then gradually things draw near
again, though in a • different way, calling for a different
interpretation of things. And dwelling in in the midst of
one's cares occurs again.
Moving from one way of Being to another, humanity must
open itself up to the earth as the destiny governing the
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things brought forth from it turns toward it. m keeping
with this governing interpretation of the thing, all that
is near to the lives of specific, living, and doing people,
all that is true to humankind's dwelling place, must first
open itself up to the place of technology, the bringing
forth of things from the earth. But before mortals can
become attentive to the place of technology, before it is
possible to have a dwelling relation between the essence of
technology and the essence of humanity, humankind must
first and above all else, find its way back to its dwelling
place and begin to interpret things as originating in the
abyss of Being, the earth, and not as the Reserved for the
far flung imperatives of Enarchy. The dwelling place of
man receives its place from the world's worlding, and it is
the most true responsibility of humanity to become the
world's guardian, to spare the earth on which it dwells,
and to let the world world through it. Unless humanity
opens itself up to the earth in all its mystery, and there
takes up its dwelling, it will not be capable of anything
it is called to be. It will remain entrapped in the links
of Enarchy.
Thinking is not governed by the architecture of
reason; it does not know universal and eternal truths, but
rather it brings forth temporal and local truths--t ruths
that are near to the dwelling place. It does not command
things forth according to the self refering logic of its
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origin, but rather opens itself nr. *-oFt;ub c it up to what appears from the
earth, even if it appears in a chaotic dispersion.
Thinking is anarchical, without a guiding principle to
command it. As such it is radically different than
anything that Enarchy knows.
Before they can dwell as the earth calls them to\
mortals must learn to think. For thinking, according to
the Thinker, is an earthy activity, a handcraft that means
lending a hand and a care to the earth as it brings the
thing forth. Thinking means building a place for the world
to world, opening up a way for the thing to rise up from
the mystery of the earth and become present at. This
occurs in the way we live our daily lives, and it is
reflected in the language we use. The Thinker calls
language the House of Being, because language is the
interpretation that gives presence to everything that is.
It is language, preceding the speaker, speaking itself
through him even as he speaks, that calls for thinking.
Never simply the tool that is the means of expressing
reasons, feelings, and a will, language is the primal
gathering within which humanity is first able to draw near
to its place, to dwell within its world, and know the
mystery of the earth which rises up through it. This
primal drawing near, this building of and dwelling in the
House of Being is thinking because it draws near to what is
close at hand and comes from the earth. When the Thinker
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traces the meaning of a word back into its earliest
origins, a seemingly pointless exercise in pendantry, he is
not trying to drag us back into a past that would tyrannize
over our present; on the contrary, he is trying to reveal
what is essential, and yet concealed, in the things that
are present to us in our time. It is not an attempt at a
correct definition, nor a historical elaboration of a
word's evolution and development, but an attempt to think
about a word that names a thing near to us and interpret
its presence. By tracing a word's origins, we are shaken
lose from its formal meaning structured by the imperatives
of Enarchy, opened up to the earth that rises up in it, and
can think the thing the word names in a way that lets the
thing thing in the midst of our dwelling place. By
listening to our language, interpreting the things present
in it, we can hear the gentle whisper of the world
worlding, and through its calling, we can come to the most
radical changes. True revolutions, real changes in Being,
come not with the thunder of ungodly force, the roar of
cannons, and the screaming death of those condemned, but on
the wings of butterflies and the soft paws of cats, in the
gentle murmur of the words we use and the truths we know.
And suddenly the world is different.
Enarchy is the governing power that throws
things into an oblivion, concealing their place, their
origin, their truth, and cutting them off from the earth
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that nurtures them. As the accomplishment of this doom,
Enarchy turns away from its own coming to presence, denying
and repressing its own truth with instrumental reason and
making difficult, if not impossible, the task of thinking.
Knowing freedom as the command, Enarchy conceals from
itself the possibility of the turning that would turn it
toward the thing at hand in the dwelling place and truly
set it free, thus guaranteeing the fate that is our doom.
But perhaps one day the doom that conceals itself will
come to presence as an archy, a monstrous command governing
our life, and we will at last begin to think, to build, and
to dwell in a way that does not submit to the archy. We
would then be able to open ourselves up to the anarchy of
the earth. [53] No longer imprisoned by the monstrous
necessity of Enarchy, the need to subject everything to the
command, the thing will be spared, the world will world as
world, the earth will be left its mystery, and we will
dwell in peace.
This turning is not an instance of the subject
returning to itself out of a truth underlying itself that
it has denied itself, willing at last itself, because it
occurs without any mediation whatsoever. The subject, as
self-conscious object of its humanity, requires mediation
or representation, an externa Liza tion of itself as object
that it, immediately, is not, but which it, mediately,
nevertheless is. Through this representational dialectic
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between the immediate and the mediate, sel f-conscousness
grows. But this is not the way that the turning occurs,
because the thing prompting it is not the subject coming to
itself, the will asserting its mastery, but Being turning
inside of itself without cause or effect. Nothing, no
archy underlies, determines, governs, or precedes the way
in which the world worlds or Being comes to presence,
nothing but Being adapting itself to itself. The turning
is entirely anarchical, without an architecture of any
sort. Responding entirely to that which it has concealed
from itself, to the earth which of itself rises up. Being
brings itself to pass into its own time. And at last the
world is as world and the thing is as a presence and not an
archetype, an underlying metaphysical truth of some sort.
Perhaps we who follow the Thinker on his path to
anarchy, and try to think the thoughts he thought and the
ones he left unthought, perhaps we stand already in the
shadow cast ahead by the advent of the turning. But we who
live with our doom hanging heavy on our shoulders, dare not
think we can plan out how humanity will dwell without an
archy, what technology they will use, what gods or
goddesses they will know, nor dare we lay down heavy
prescriptions that they should fill. To imagine how
mortals will build after the turn, to dream of an anarchy
where the horrors of our world are not possible, is to
ensure, yet again and more terribly, that our doomed archy
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prevails. To dream of things as they might be is to make
them over, ever more securely, into things as they are.
TO attempt to save the world from its doom is only to
further ensure it, for any such attempt would at bottom
rely on that which is bringing it, the truth and reasoning
that Enarchy's technology reveals. Chasing after the
future, planning, calculating, and extending the incomplete
truths of our time in the hope of creating an order that is
not ensnared by our reason only continues and extends our
prevailing attitude of mastering the world through
technology and calculating representation. Though they may
reveal our doom, all attempts to anticipate our fate in
terms of decline and fall, of fate, catastrophe, and
destruction, remain locked within our present technological
order, only serving to enumerate and increase the variety
and extent of the Reserved. Any dissecting of our
historical situation, any historographical representation
of our future or subsequent plan for it, will bring us into
a proper relation with our destiny, because our destiny is
our doom. All of our technological plans, though still
useful to us, can never arrive at the essence of
technology, nor even come near the boundary of the horizion
that surrounds it. Our hearing, our seeing, our living, is
still ordered and disciplined by the organization of the
technical world around us, a world that we cannot escape
because we cannot cease to be near to it.
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But this does not mean that we must helplessly submit
to our doom, only that we must be careful about the way we
free ourselves from it. We free ourselves from Enarchy by
thinking of it as a doom sent to us, by becoming aware of
how all the horrors and monstrosities of our time, such as
the arms race, the desecration of our land with toxic waste
dumps, the collapse of the household, and the slaughter of
the whales, are possibilities sent to us by our truth, our
archy. Once our truth is present to us as our doom, a
monstrousness governing our lives, and once we know that it
conceals the earth from which it springs, the way is opened
to anarchy, a way of bringing things forth without
subjecting them to an architecture that commands them forth
as man' s utility.
The Thinker quotes one of Holderlin's poem in
supporting this point:
But where the danger is, grows
the saving power also.
Thinking this poem more essentially than Holderlin thought
it, the Thinker interprets it as saying that the saving
power does not appear incidentally, as random unconnected
externality, but as part of the very danger, the monstrous
doom, itself. Enarchy, the doom of our age, is also its
saving power, because, as the concealed, it calls on us
from concealment to turn to an-archy, to open up to the
earth. Precisely because Enarchy conceals itself as an
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archy it makes it possible for us to open ourselves up to
the concealed, to live without an archy. m Enarchy
concealing is present. when he appears, the monster
appears as a divine warning, a portent calling on us to
think our doom as something that, till now, has been
concealed from us. The monster, as a monstrous truth, is a
presence that calls us to think about what brought it
forth, the archy that made it possible. The monster is a
portent irrupting from the earth, its distrubing unplanned
presence turns us toward the mystery which brought it
forth. The monster makes us think the concealed as the
concealed and as the ultimate source of that which becomes
present to us.
To save means to free, to spare and husband, to
protect and guard, to let the thing thing. The danger that
the saving power would save us from is the doom that
condemns us to live in a place that is always something
other than itself, a placeless place in which all
presencing is determined by a metaphysic that, removed from
the earth, is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. When
the truth governing our lives is present as doom, when all
about us everything is present as something monstrous, a
desecration of the earth, and known as the Reserved, then
the nothingness that is the origin of all things rises up
and calls on us to think it. As we mortals draw near to
this abyss of mystery, silence, and nothingness we are
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called on by the world's worlding to speak to the silence
and to the no-thingness, to address our thought to what
Being, as Enarchy, has concealed from us, the monstrous
presence of man as will willing only itself. Thus saved
from its own silence, recognized as oblivion, the silence
is no longer a silence, a nothingness pure, absolute, and
unknown, but the place from which the saving power grows,
the place from which things are no-thing. with such
turning, the oblivion that is the destiny of Enarchy is no
longer a nihilism that silences the truth of its own place,
but rather an anarchical turning that spares and preserves
the abyss of Being as the mystery of the earth.
The turning that separates one time from another
always occurs suddenly, without explanation, anticipation,
or cause. Things come forth from the earth, are present,
in an entirely different way, and an entirely different
truth presides over whatever is brought forth. According
to the Thinker, in our time when the turning reveals our
doom, the clearing belonging to the essence of Being
suddenly comes into the open clearing in a lightning flash
and is lighted up by its own presence. Turning in on
itself, becoming present to itself as a doom and as the
oblivion of the thing, the world then comes to presence as
the injurious neglect of the thing, a closure that has cut
itself off from the earth, and calls on man to be the
guardian of Being.
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only when humanity ceases to be as subject, renouncing
the will to power, and lets Being be as an abyss from which
things mysteriously appear, only then will it assume its
calling to live without an archy and dwell in its place on
the earth, under sky, before the holy ones. Only then can
the holy ones become present or their absence recognized as
absence. The holy ones, when they are not absent, are
beings and can only truly be when they are thought as
presence or absence. When they are as delusion and myth,
as first cause, or as a metaphysical reality, they are not
present as presence, but as something else, as some
archetype or metaphysical truth and thus, they are not
present at all. Athiesm, agnoticism, and theism are in our
time, alike in all their differences, for the god has fled
from all of them. For the Thinker, the modern age is the
time when the gods have fled and the time of divinities
that are coming because it is the time when the oblivion of
Being turns into the oblivion of a presence, and comes to
know the absence of the gods as an absence itself. Being
becomes an abyss whose mystery must be thought. As a
result, the Thinker describes his own thought as preparing
a place for the Gods and he does this because it reveals
their absence in our age of mastery and metaphysics.
The first step toward thinking the world as presence
is to be humble enough in this arrogant time of reason to
be aware that we are not yet near enough to the thing to
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prescribe how it should be interpreted and brought to
presence. still surrounded, constr anined
, and imprisoned
by the bonds of a totalitarian technology, we do not dwell
in that world yet, and so we must not describe the way that
mortals would dwell without an archy governing their lives,
in a world that knew the presence of a god or a goddess.
But we can think about that which which is all too
near to us, the archical doom that threatens our
civilization, the complete collapse of our industrial
economy, the exploitation of our earth, water, and air, the
possiblity and near certainty of universal death in nuclear
war, the degradation and numbing despair that reigns in our
factories, the destruction and disintigration of all our
ethical ties with one another, and we can think about and
do the things that would spare what we love. In this time
of doom, when the heavens are already rolling with thunder,
we must build Arks, strong places of protection that are
not linked to the systems that rule our age. With Arks, we
can save the things we love, the treasures of the earth,
from the doom that awaits them as the Reserved. The Ark can
take many forms. It can be a zoo that saves endangered
species from extinction. It can be a household that is not
linked up to any of Enarchy's power systems. It can be a
community that has resolved to live a life that spares the
earth. Whatever it is, the technology that we build the
Ark with must be appropriate for the task at hand, be it
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the preservation of species, the household, or the holy,
against the doom of nuclear war, toxic pollution,
totalitarian necessity, or whatever.
CHAPTER XVI
BUILDING DWELLING THINKING
Before I wrote this work I built a home for myself on
my family's farm, an underground house with a greenhouse.
Though I was unable to reach its perfection, the thought
that guided my building was the Arks that the New
Alchemists had built. [54] My purpose was to separate and
protect my life and my thought as much as possible from
participating in the logic and imperatives of Enarchy.
With only a small amount of money, about $6,000, and some
help from my family, I was able to build a family size
house that stayed comfortable with just passive solar heat.
It seldom went below 6.0 degrees on even the coldest and
windiest of Montana's winter days. I had less luck feeding
myself with the food that I grew from my garden because an
exceptionally severe drought had produced a plague of
grasshoppers that stripped my garden to bare ground several
years in a row. Some day I hope to build wind powered
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electrical and water systems to make my house completely
independent of the utilities. My highest aspiration is to
one day live a life that is not dependent on the systems
that Enarchy has built. m my life, I want to open up a
way to think what anarchy would be.
In this age when our planet's doom seems almost
assured, when the nuclear war machine that the United
States and the Soviet Union have built needs only the
slightest nudge to start its awesome and apocalyptic work,
when the world's industrial economies threaten the entire
biosphere with the twin perils of the greenhouse effect and
the depletion of the ozone layer, when the ecologically
essential forests of the Amazon are being mowed down to
provide profits for the fast food industry, when the
topsoil of almost every country in the world is eroding
many times faster than it is being rebuilt, it seems like a
pitifully small thing to build a house that does not need
utility heat. And perhaps it is. Time is so short. There
is no promise that the Turning will come in time to spare
the earth or humanity. But it is especilly when time grows
short that there is need of careful though t--thought that
is free toward the reason that has built th systems that
endanger the whole earth. Acting without turning against
Enarchy's reason will only assure that everything will be
rebuilt again as it was. If it is to survive, humanity
must come to build and live differently, to respond with
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care to the earth, the sky, the sacred, and the death of
all mortals. The links of Enarchy must be broken where
they are the most secure, in the thoughts of those who
build and dwell. Until this turning is done, nothing will
change
.
This does not mean that we must set about managing the
thoughts of others, training them to act as we will, but
rather that we open ourselves up to Being and listen to the
whisper of the world worlding. Then, as an-archists, we
will build and dwell in a way that does not destroy the
earth. As the Thinker argues in "Building Dwelling
Thinking," thinking is essentially the same as building and
dwelling. [55] Doing one enriches the others.
Surprisingly, the Old English and the High German word
for building, 'baun,' means to dwell, to remain, to stay in
a place. The orginal meaning of the verb 'bauen,' namely
to dwell, has been more or less lost to us. But in the
word 'neighbor,' in Old English 'neahgebur,' a trace of it
remains. 'Neah' means near and 'gebur' means
dweller--near-dweller
. Not only does the old word 'baun'
tell us that to build is really to dwell, it also suggests
what dwelling brings forth. In German, the old word
'bauen' is also related to the words 'bin' and 'bist.'
Thus, ich bin, I am, and du bist, you are, mean I dwell,
you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the way in
which we, as mortal beings, are upon the earth, is as
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dwellers. To be a human being is to be a dweller, a human
whose life is built amid a place on earth.
Notice also that the word 'human' suggests humus,
organic matter, that formerly living, is now dead and
decaying. To be human, to be, is to be made of earth, tied
to piece of earth, a place of dwelling.
To be human, of the earth, is also to be mortal, to be
certain of a death which will return the body to its
source. As the Bible says, "Dust you are, and to dust you
shall return." Mortality is the life of human dwellers.
Building also means, though less commonly now, to
cherish and protect, to bring forth as a preserving and
caring, and especially as a cultivating of the earth.
After many years of careful work, after a farmer has
cultivated a rich layer of humus in his soil, he says that
his soil is built. As cultivating, building is a caring
that brings forth the gods. Made possible by them, it
takes place before them and seeks their blessing and their
gifts in a bountiful harvest. To practice the art of
agriculture, as the origin of the word suggests, is to
cultivate the favor of the gods, to bring their message
forth, to attend to the earth that conceals it, and to
abide with the truth brought forth.
But not all building is tending to the soil, since
ships and temples are also built. This distinction does
not, however, mean that building as cultivation and
334
building as construction are two different things,
contraries that must oppose each other. within their
origin, both modes of building bring forth the god that
governs dwelling.
With the coming of modernity, however, building as
cultivating is eclipsed, and building as willful
fabrication comes to the foreground, concealing the
originary meaning of building as dwelling. This is a
decisive occurance: dwelling is no longer experienced as
man's being, his way of living in the world. In a way that
is mysterious and little thought about, language withdraws
from man its simple and high speech, and cloaks in silence
man's essence. This silence can yet be listened to, heard
beneath the clattering noise of modernity's architecture of
definitions that it deploys in the service of reason.
If we cultivate this silence, the Thinker says, we can
still hear the primal calling that calls us to think
building as dwelling, to acknowledge our mortality as the
essence of our being on earth, and to understand building
as cultivating growing things and as the constructing that
erects buildings for dwellers.
If we listen to the silence that now surrounds the
primal thoughts concealed in building, we come to
understand that we dwell not because we have built, have
erected houses, bridges, and roads, but we build and have
built because we dwell, because we cultivate the god. Just
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as we cannot speak language, master all its ambiguities,
and subject it to a rational ordering, but must yield to
its appropriation of our being, allowing it to speak us, so
too we build only because we dwell, only because we
already are gathered into the gathering of care that
governs the thinging of the thing.
But in what, the Thinker asks, does the nature of
dwelling consist? To answer we must again follow language
back into what it originally said. According to the
Thinker, the German word for dwelling, 'wohnen,' has its
roots in the Old Saxon word, 'wuon,' and the Gothic word,
•wunian,' which both, like the old word 'bauen,' mean to
remain, to stay in place. But, unlike the word for
dwelling that latter developed into the English word for
dwelling, the Gothic word is more descriptive of how this
dwelling is experienced. 'Wunian' originally means, to be
at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. As
Old English did too, the German language originally said
peace with the word 'friede,' now meaning, the free. The
word, free, originally was associated with what was loved
and called for protection from harm and danger, safeguarded
in its nature. To free really means to spare, to spare not
only in the negative sense of not harming what we spare, to
not set upon it as a means, a tool, but also, and more
importantly, in the positive sense of leaving something
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beforehand to its own nature, actively preserving it in its
peace
.
TO dwell, then, in its most profound sense, is to
preserve things in their peace, to actively spare them from
anything that might disturb them, as a lover would a
beloved, a mother her child. The fundamental nature of
dwelling is this nurturative sparing and preserving. it
pervades dwelling throughout its whole extent, its whole
way of being, which is the stay of mortals on the earth,
under the sky, before the gods. To dwell, the Thinker
says, is to gather things together— the earth, the sky, the
gods, and the life of mortals--and make each a moment in
the the whole.
As the fruitful source of all that rises forth as
plant and animal, that spreads out in rock and water, and
yet takes it all back again in death, decay and time, the
earth is the concealing darkness, the mystery hiding the
truth of things in dark obscurity. Earth is what the early
Greeks thought as chaos. Chaos, according to Vycinas was
not the mindless disorder that we think now, but the open
abyss, the nothingness, the groundless ground, from which
things rise up and appear of their own accord. [56] Physis,
as the power of the earth that brings things forth, brings
them forth from the earth's concealment. For the Thinker
the earth, as physis, is not an object of utility, but a
way of Being, the way it is when it is concealed. Within
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the earth, concealed by its mystery, is the logos, the
interpretation of things that draws the world near to
mortals when the thing breaks forth and appears to them.
The language of Being does not come from man and it is not
his instrument, but rather it comes from the earth, the
abyss which is the source of all truth. The earth keeps and
safeguards the seeds of things that, in their own way and
time, rise up into the sky to be greeted by the gaze of
mortals and drawn near to the bounds of the holy.
The sky, as the horizon surrounding the place of
mortals in their life upon the earth, reveals things as
they present themselves, the daily path of the sun, the
waxing and waning of the moon, the wandering planets and
the glittering stars, the glow of the Northern Lights and
the gloom of starless nights, the unexpected comet, the
changes in the weather and the changing of the seasons.
All these things that appear under the sky appear in the
nearness of mortals. Through their life, travails,
movements, and especially the interpretations they are
called on to make of things, the horizon changes, things
rise up in their presence and fade into obscurity with
their passing. The sky is sky only because it stands in
contrast to the earth. What the earth brings forth, the
sky reveals. The contrast between earth and sky is the
contrast between Being as the abyss and Being as presence,
between concealment and unconcealment
.
338
r
The Gods are the truths that gather mortals into thei;
care, the messengers bearing in the myths that surround
them the reality of their governing power. They are the
bearers of the holy, the truth, which bounds the
comportment of mortals to the things that appear under the
sky, on the earth. Even in a destitute world, a time
marked by the flight of the gods, the absent gods still
provide the limits and truth of mortal relations to things.
How they bring them forth, how they use them; even, what
they are. The flight of the gods means that mortals cannot
have a free or peaceful relation to things, but yet things
still are and that means that the absent gods still govern
the way that we cultivate things, if only in their absence.
According to Vycinas, a god for the Thinker is not as
we Christians know them, a supernatural entity which
reveals its presence in the miraculous, the unnatural
intervention, but is instead more like the early Greeks
knew them, as truths that are revealed in the natural way
of things, never against them. For the Greeks, a god does
not have to disturb or distort nature in order to be known,
but rather is known as the truth of nature. A god is not
above nature, but in it and finds its way through it.
According to Vycinas, a god is a world, a truth which
gathers things into it, providing them their place and
interpretation. Because the Greeks knew many gods, they
knew many worlds or ways of being, and were present in them
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all simultaneously. Because the truth, the way of Being,
ing
or interpretation, surrounding it is different, the th
is different in each world because it reflects a different
god. Night, for example, in the world of Artemis and night
in the world of Hermes are different realities because they
disclose different truths. Since Artemis is the goddess of
unexplored nature, her nights are frightful and mysterious,
and since Hermes is the god of luck, thieves, and gamblers,
his night is an advantageous or disadvantageous cover for
one's pursuits. Similarly, love, as a truth of Hermes, is
a matter of luck or opportunity, a pleasant occurance
because it brings nothing with it but itself, while as a
truth of Aphrodite it is a blissful unification, breaking
all bounds and inviting sudden tragedy because it
overwhelms morals, ethics, and responsibilities, bringing
with it scandal and disgrace. Gods do not specialize in a
portion of reality as we Christians think; they cover all
things and they reveal their truth in them all. A god is a
totality that gathers everything into its truth, providing
a place and an interpretation for them all. Because the
Greeks knew so many gods, truth was never as unambiguous or
unequivocal for them as it is for us who can know only one
eternal and universal god.
A god for the Thinker, according to Vycinas, is the
essence, the background, which holds everything in its
place, making possible an interpretation of it. A thing is
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because it reflects a god, it is what it is because it
reflects a particular god, even though it may be something
entirely different if it reflects a different god. As a
result, the reality of a god never, for the Greeks, hinged
on their power as causes because they were known not as
puppet masters but as truths bringing forth the realities
of things.
While the gods are the truths of all things, mortals
are the measure of all things, their death the possibility
governing the bringing forth of all things. Their
mortality, their death, which beckons to them all their
life long, brings them into the world, forcing on them a
responsibility that makes them move near to the things that
demand their care. Death gathers mortals up into the
world, compelling their attention. Only humans die;
animals perish without any possbility of the anxiety that
governs the life of mortals. For man, death is the shrine
of nothing, an empty void which neverthless is. It
presents the mystery of Being itself, the astonishing
presence of the thing, and it is the measure of every
mortal life, the judgment that calls us to our truth. The
world and every thing in it is because mortals can die, can
anticipate the nothingness of death, and against it ground
the presence of the thing. Death governs man, confining
him to the sky's horizon, under which things rise up from
the earth, bounded by the sway of the gods. Death calls on
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humanity to dwell upon the earth, under the sky, before the
gods
.
Mortals dwell in saving the earth, setting it free
into its own nature. They do not seek to master it, to
subjugate it and twist its nature to accord with their
thoughtless whims.
Mortals dwell in recieveing the sky as sky, and they
dwell when they let the earth bring things forth in its own
way
.
Mortals dwell in initiating their own nature,
accepting death as their fate and living life in the face
of death. Mortals dwell in seeking a good death. But this
does not mean that they darken their days with gloomy
meditations on their end, nor does it mean that they make
death their goal, argues the Thinker. Death is to be the
constant measure of life, the place where the occurance of
things is set. It is the guiding concern that determines
how a thing is to be done, whether it is to be done or left
undone. Death is the shrine of being, and mortals dwell
through it.
Dwelling occurs in saving the earth, in receiving the
sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating the mortals.
It is the fourfold preservation and sparing of the
fourfold, the setting free of the thing into its own
nature. Dwelling preserves the thing as it rises from the
earth, and mortals dwell in letting things be in their
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presencing. Mortals do this by nursing and nurturing the
things that grow and carefully constructing the things that
do not grow. Seeking to secure the fourfold in things,
mortals build, bringing forth in their cultivating and
constructing their dwelling place.
In the second part of "Building Dwelling Thinking,"
The Thinker gives some examples of what building is. The
first is of a bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers
the fourfold, and in doing so it allows a site for the
fourfold, a place for it to come to presence. A river has
many points that can be crossed by a bridge, but until a
bridge is built, none of them are places, spaces within
which something has been made room for. A place is
something that has been cleared and set free, something
bounded by a boundary. But for the Greeks, and for us
seeking to find the essence of things, a boundary is not
the geometric point where something ends, but the beginning
where something begins its presencing, not an encircling
mark imposed by the will, but a horizon for revealing the
thing. Space is space because mortals dwell in it, handle
it with their hands and their tools, bring forth the god
god in it. Thus, spaces receive their being from their
locations, which are locations because of their place in
the lives of mortals, not from geometric space itself, an
abstraction beyond the life of humanity. Even spaces
preserved from the direct hand of man are opened up as
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spaces by their proximity to man— the Custer Battlefield,
the Medicine Rocks State Park, the Custer National Forest.
Spared from industrial development, they yet receive their
location, their being, from the dwelling of man. Despite
our depravity, something sacred, something beautiful,
something magical still speaks from these locations and
protects these things from the hand of the developer, the
strip miner, and the businessman.
The nature of building is letting dwell. The Thinker
gives an example of this in an old farmhouse in the Black
Forest, built 200 years ago. In this house the
self-sufficient power of dwelling let earth and sky,
divinities and mortals enter into simple oneness and
ordered the house. It protectd the house by placing it on
a wind-sheltered mountain slope, facing south in the
direction of the winter sun. It is among the meadows and
close to a spring. It's shingle roof has a wide
overhanging and a proper slope to stand-up under the winter
snow. It has an alter corner behind the community table, a
place hallowed by the child bed and the coffin. The
farmhouse was built only because the craftsmen who built it
already dwelled, respecting the weather in its changes,
knowing both birth and death, and responding to the needs
of life.
The housing crisis, the homelessness that we face
today comes not from any lack of housing, though there is
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that in plenty, but from modernity's rootlessness,
aimlessness, and nihilism. People cannot dwell in
trailerhouses, awaiting their next job a hundred miles
away. Cut off from the earth that sustains them and the
family that gave them birth, they cannot have a proper
respect for the earth they live upon, nor can they offer a
thoughtful interpretation of what any thing is for; they
can only drain it for what they can use and move on when
the smell becomes to strong and the poison too deadly.
If anything is to be spared, humanity must turn from
its way and build not by the standards of reason, which
closes itself off from the earth and builds according to
the logic, internal imperatives, and artifical architecture
of man's will, but by thinking, by opening up to the earth
and responding to the world's worlding. Building as
thinking responds to the dwelling place, its climate, its
soil, its people, and its gods. It builds as a response to
the world that world's there and leaves the things present
there as things deserving the care of mortals. It does not
reduce anything to man's utility and it does not subject
them to necessities of distant, aimless, and thoughtless
imperatives.
Enarchy builds homogeneity over vast areas, leveling
everything over and organizing it according to plan. In
order to secure man's willing it makes everything into a
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transparent re-presentation of man's utility. Disorder,
dispersion, dirt, noise, irrationality, ambiguity, and
slack are rigorously excluded because they are not man's
will. Thinking, on the other hand, builds in order to
protect hetrogeneity, difference, diversity, and
dispersion. In diversity, anarchy, and in the openness to
it, the mystery of the earth and the holyness of the world
is revealed. Thinking builds to spare things not because
it is useful to do so, but because in its sparing it is
opening itself up to the occurance of truth. Thinking
knows that truth is not man's truth, an ordering that is
projected over things by man's will, but is the occurance
of Being, the rising up of the earth at a particular
dwelling place. It is Being that thinking is directed
toward, and because it is, it does not seek to fabricate
artifical simplicity by positing a boundary of control,
imposing operational definitions within it, and using
analytic methods to extract man's truth from it. Thinking
can know its truth and build according to it only when
things are left alone, when they are not made into objects
of man's will. It is then, and only then, that the whisper
of the world's worlding can be heard. Seeking truth, the
thinker must silence his willing, and in that silence let
the earth come forward.
Where Enarchy builds in order to secure man's willing,
thinking builds in order to let the world world. This
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being the possibility of thinking's truth, it is possible
to hint at some of the things thinking would build and the
way it would proceed. Since thinking does not seek control
over vast extents-and indeed cannot because human control
over a thing conceals its truth— it will not build vast
energy grids, but will instead build local, small scale,
and simple energy systems because they will be responsive
to the truth in local needs and the handmade cares of the
household
.
Instead of relying on distant economies to supply it
with food, housing, and energy, and many tools, the
thoughtful household would attempt to make most of the
things it needs itself. And instead of depending on a
global economy to supply it with things it cannot build
itself, it would rely on barter and community work.
But mostly, I believe that in this time of Enarchy's
doom the buildings that we must build are Arks, secure
places that protect things in their splendid diversity from
the callousness of man's utility, which would set upon them
and organize them according to the monotony of his most
efficient use. In Biblical times, Noah built an Ark in
order to give protection to 2 of every kind of creature,
one male the other female, from the rage of God's judgement
against man's corruption. Of every kind of bird, of every
kind of animal, of every kind of reptile on the ground, and
of every kind of insect that flew or crawled, two went into
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the Ark that their lives would be saved and that their
species would replenish the earth. Once he had made
provision that a pair of every living thing would live, God
opened the springs of the deep and the sluices of heaven
for 40 days and nights, drowning all the flesh of the
earth.
The Ark is an instrument for protecting anarchy, it
does not seek to subject the things within its protection
to command, control, or archy of any sort, but to spare
them from the tempest that rages outside of it, keeping
them safe for a day when they can leave its confines and go
their way. Since the time of Noah, the Ark has been a holy
instrument, a sacred instrument because it protects the
whole dispersion of things and keeps their integrity safe.
It was in an Ark, an Ark of an entirely different
construction, that the holy objects of the Jews were kept
safe from the trials of time and use.
Noah's Ark was built to protect the creatures of the
earth from the flood, but ours must be built to protect the
sacredness, integrity and anarchical dispersion of the
creatures of the earth from the doom of Enarchy. Man's
utility has covered the earth with a monoculture of plants
that are the most productive for his economies, pushing all
others to a shrinking margin where they are endangered
because the ecosystems that nurtured them are falling apart
in the space left to them. Following the broad diversity
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of the earth's plants to the margins of man's utility, many
species of animals, such as the wolf, the bear, the whale,
the mountain lion, are similarly endangered. Amid the vast
fields of man's monoculture, many insects become pests and
are treated with heavy doses of poison, further disrupting
the cycles that renew and protect the earth. As a result,
the task of modern Ark builders, responding to the doom of
the world they dwell in, must be to find ways to spare the
anarchy of these dispersed beings from the tempest of man's
will. The seeds of endangered plants must be gathered and
planted, animals endangered by a collapsing ecosystem must
be gathered up and placed in zoos that nearly as possible
duplicate their natural habitate, protected for a day when
they can again resume their way.
More than that, as the guardians of the earth, human
beings themselves must find ways to survive, for the day is
coming when the economies that sustain their lives will be
shattered. Attending to their calling, they must find ways
to dwell and build that allow them to listen and respond to
the doom that comes, ceasing to be dependent on the world
that reason has built, knowing that they might well
disappear with it.
As in Noan's time. Ark building does not begin with
large numbers of people, political action, tight
organization, or extensive plans, but with a thoughtful
response to the perils of the time. Since nothing can be
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done by reason unless everyone does it together, thinking
begins in a small way with the individual opening him or
herself up to the whisper of the world worlding, and it
proceeds with the responses they make in their building and
dwelling. Since it builds small, and comes to its truth
through the things near to it, thinking can start with one
thinker. This is the hope left to us.
NOTES
I cannot lay claim to the thought in this work, as is
so common nowdays, because I do not believe that I am its
orgin, the one who brought it about. Rather it was there
before I was, if in concealment, calling on me and others
to bring it forth, to think it, to live it, to build
according to its truth. Thought itself is not made by
human beings and its truth cannot be the possession of any
thinker. Rather, a gift given, it is brought forth from
concealment by the skill of a craftsman, someone who stills
their pounding heart and listens to the whisper of the
world worlding about them.
The writer of this work, I have only my skill as a
thinker, and that too is a possibility cultivated and
nurtured by my parents, my teachers, the States of Montana
and Massachusetts, and the American government. Perhaps it
is no small compliment to them that they helped me develop
my skill, trusting me to use it wisely while leaving me
enough room to bring forth a voice sharply critical of
their ways, the world they built, and the truths that they
know and are certain of.
If I am imprisoned in the world they have built,
angered and horrified by its truths, I also cannot fail to
be grateful for the possibility they have given me to
glimpse another way, to think it, and build according to
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it. That such a possibility was given to me gives me hope
that one day other possibilities will be given as well.
Since I am not the subject of my discourse, I have not
attempted, as subjects do, to summarize the contributions
of others, distinguish them from mine, and lay claim to my
originality, however small, in footnotes tracing the
progress of humanity toward its perfection. Rather, I name
the names of those whose skill as thinkers directly helped
me to build my own, whose thought touched mine, and whose
life, writing, and teachings, became the interpretation of
my reality. In doing this I do not seek to display
humanity's progress toward truth, but to honor my teachers
and acknowledge their skill as thinkers and builders.
First among these are my parents, Edward and Lucille
Sikorski, who supported me when I was in need, ignored my
eccentricities, and helped me build my house. Two Catholic
priests at Montana State University, Fathers Mike Miles and
Con Kelly, and one professor, Ray Pratt, nurtured my
eccentricities, stirred my anger at injustice, and
encouraged me to dream of another way, even if it was
forbidden. The University of Massachusetts at Amherst gave
me access to a number of outstanding scholars and
thinkers—Bob Ackermann, Bill Connolly, Jean Elshtain, and
Jerry King, to name but those who most influenced me.
My Grandmother, Rose Griffith, generously gave me
money, household appliances, and time to go my own way.
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Despite strong differences of opinion about everything, my
sister, Sandy Sikorski, tirelessly ran off multiple copies
of anything I needed and did endless small favors for me
that only she could do. My friends Gary Aller and Jane
Bennett gave me encouragement, sent books and papers, and
perhaps a little hope for the world when I didn't have
much
.
As the author-ities whose reading this writing
awaited, anticipated, and dreaded, the skills of Bill
Connolly, Jerry King, and Mike Best are re-presented, if
unworthily, in this work. Perhaps, their skills as
readers, teachers, and thinkers are most present where my
thinking breaks most sharply with theirs--as it does over
the issue of subjectivity.
Chapter I
Thinking About My Place
1. The facts and numbers in this chapter come from the
USDA's "1984 Fact Book of US Agriculture (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Of f ice , 19 84) .
"
2. The distinction between thinking and reason and the
extend interpretation of them comes from the Martin
Heidegger's book: What Is Called Thinking (New York, NY:
Harper and Row, 1968)
.
3. The discussion of nuclear bureaucracy comes from
Paul Bracken's book: "The Command and Control of Nuclear
Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983)."
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Chapter ll
Thinking about Technology
4. This chapter is an interpretation of Heidegger's
seminal essay: "The Question Concerning Technology/' from
book with same title (New York: Harper Colophon Books,
1977) .
5. Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," in Poetry, Language,
Thought, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971).
Chapter III
Technology as a Way of Revealing Truth
6. Once again, this chapter is developed from the
essay: "The Question Concerning Technology."
7. The concept of anarchy is came to me from Reiner
Schurmann's book: Heidegger on Being and Acting
;
From
Principles to Anarchy
,
(Bloomington : Indiana University
Press, 1987)
.
8. But most of the essay is an interpretation of: "The
Essence of Truth," in Martin Heidegger : Basic Wr it ings
,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977).
9. Toward the last part of the chapter I used thoughts
from: "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Martin Heidegger
:
Basic Wr it ings
,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977).
10. From "The Essence of Truth," once again.
Chapter IV
Science and Technology
11. Most of this chapter is an interpretation of: "The
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Age of the World Picture" and "Science and Reflection," in
The Question Concerning Technology, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1977) .
12. The reference to Robert Ackermann comes from his
book
:
Data, Instruments, and Theory; A Dialectical Approach
to Understanding Science ," (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985)
.
13. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, (London: Redwood
Burn Limited Trowbridge & Esher, 1975).
14. Paul Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society,
(London: Verso Editions, 1978).
15. William Barret, The Illusion of Technique,
(London: William Kimber & Co. Ltd, 1979)
16. "Science and Reflection" in The Question
Concerning Technology
.
17. "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question
Concerning Technology
.
Chapter V
Enar chy
18. This chapter is almost entirely an interpretation
of: "The Question Concerning Technology."
19. William Barrett, The Illusion of Technique .
20. "The Question Concerning Technology."
Chapter VI
The Flight of the Gods
21. Martin Heidegger, An Intrduction to Metaphysics
,
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(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
22. This chapter is an interpretation drawn from
Heidegger's essay: "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead," in
The Question Concerning Technology.
As Bill Connolly has pointed out to me, Nietzsche is
not a technocrat, and he is not an unambiguous supporter of
modern science and technology, but rather an interesting
critic of them. One of Nietzsche's most haunting images is
of the man of science on his belly, groveling before the
facts. This is certainly not the attitude of the overman!
Science, technology, and the machine, according to
Nietzsche in the "Will to Power," have leveled out all of
humanity, submerging them all in the purposeless necessity
of the mechanism. With no meaning to govern their actions,
reduced uniformly to the machine's utility, and breed as a
herd, the way is opened for the overman, the one who will
use the herd to create to create his meaning, impose his
will on everything. On the one hand modern science and
technology lead toward an ultimate sickness of the will,
the breeding of the herd, on the other the herd becomes the
ultimate means for the overman, an instrument for his use.
Even though Nietzsche, as always, is ambiguous in his
evaluation of science and technology, and even though he
writes of self overcoming, he nevertheless continues, as
all of modernity does, to think of science and technology
as a means available for the will, ultimately the overman's
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will—not as a way, limited by its time and place, of
bringing forth truth. Taking the will to power as the
truth of all beings, appropriating everything as a means to
the will's willing, Nietzsche does not overcome the age of
the machine, but brings it to its highest fulfillment, the
great noon of its triumph. By bringing everything forth as
a means for the will to power, Nietzsche thinks the most
appropriate thought of our time, the pure utility of
everything. And, in doing so, he opens himself up to the
most horrible question of all times--what is anything for?
If his answer (the overman) does not overcome the age of
the machine, it does enable us (we who interpret the
thought of the last metaphysician) to think the thought
that would at last reveal the mystery of Being.
Nietzsche existed, his thought is not an error to be
overcome, but a truth too terrible to ignore. In his
thought, the flight of the gods becomes an absence that we
must, at last, acknowledge, and because of this, they
become present as an absence. Now we must ask of
everything "what for?" And in our use of things and
people, we must acknowledge that we have no answer in a new
way
.
If we think Nietzsche's truth as the abyss of Being
opening up in our presence, we can know his nihilism as
something divine, something the holy sent to us. Nietzsche
himself recognized the divinity of his nihilism when he
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cried, "I seek God, I seek God." Nietzsche was a poet and
we should think his thought as poetry, acknowledging its
ambiguity and multiple meanings while we listen to the
whisper of the world worlding through it.
Chapter VII
A Prison of Reason
23. This chapter is an interpretation of Michel
Foucault's Discipline and Punish ; The Birth of the Prison,"
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
24. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963).
26. I found this interpretation of the social sciences
in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow's book: Michel Foucault,
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneut ics
,
(Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1982)
.
Chapter VIII
Amer icanism
27. Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel
,
Heidegger , and the
Ground of History
,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago,
1984) .
28. Michael Rogin, Ronald Reagan , the Movie and Other
Episodes in Political Demonology
,
(Berkley: The University
of California Press, 1987)
.
29. The list of atrocities committed by America was
drawn from Edward Herman's book: The Real Terror Network ,
(Boston: The South End Press, 1982)
.
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30. The discussion of the passions and the interests
are interpretations of Albert Hirschman's book: The
and the Interests^ Political Arguments for
Capitalism before its Triumph. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
university Press, 1977). And, of course, Madison and
Hamilton's work, The Federalist Papers, is present
throughout the chapter.
Chapter IX
The Collapse of the Household as Handmade Care
31. Neil Sampson, Farmland or Wasteland, A Time To
Choose
,
(Emmaus, Pennsylvania : Rodale Press, 1981).
32. Most of the historical information comes from Ruth
Schwartz Cowan's book: More Work for Mother
,
The ironies of
Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave
,
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983).
33. The examples of the ice box and the transportation
system come from Michael Best and Willian Connolly's book:
The Politicized Economy
,
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1976) .
34. Part of the discussion of how machine power took
its place on the farm is from Jean-Pierre Bertan and
Richard Lewontin's essay in the July-August 1986 issue of
the "Monthly Review:" "Technology, Research, and the
Penetration of Capital: The Case of US Agriculture."
35 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844,"
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in The Marx-Engels Reader
,
Ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1972)
Chapter X
Harnessing the Earth to the Slavery of Man
36. Most of this chapter is an interpretation of Harry
Braverman's book: Labor and Monopoly Capital, The
Degredation of Work in the Twentieth Century
,
(New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1974), including the commentary on
Bright. Michael Best pointed out to me that the degredation
of work in a capitalist economy is not always as smooth and
continuous as Braverman argues, but rather that there is a
complex dialectic that takes place between the machine and
the worker. For instance, the machine may so completely
replace the worker that there is nowhere for him or her to
go except to a more highly skilled job. Or the development
of machine technology may be hampered by the ready
availability of cheap workers. It seems that the
introduction of the machine and the degradation of the
worker takes place in fits and starts, sometimes reversing
itself for awhile, before conditions are appropriate for
more rationalization of production. After years of having
their work increasingly rationalized, blue-collar workers
in some industries, usually where production proceeds by
batch process instead of a continous assembly line, are
finding their skills increasing. However, many low level
white-collar workers, traditionally spared from the rigors
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of rationalized work, are finding their work increasingly
disciplined. NO doubt the way is being opened up for their
repacement by artifical intelligence programs. And, as I
observed, many highly skilled jobs have been opening up in
areas such as advertizing, security, labor management, and
correction.
But despite this flux, the essential degredation of
humanity continues on because from the very beginning we
have already been appropriated in our entirety as utility
for the machine. It does not matter if some find their
skill level increasing because it is only because the
rationality of production at the moment dictates it. As
long as humanity is as utility for production, the skill of
human beings will be subjected to the measure of
efficiency, the rationality of production, and the utility
of systemic demand. Appropriated entirely by reason, it
will be a skill for bringing about the distant imperatives
of Enchaining, not a skill for bringing the thing forth
from the earth in response to the call of the dwelling
place
.
37. The discussion of agriculture is an interpretation
drawn from Wendell Berry's book: The Unse ttl ing of Amer ica
,
Agr icul ture and Culture
,
(San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
1978) .
Chapter XI
The Vulnerable Machine
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38. The discussion of coyotes and rabbits and the
discussion of DDT and mosquitoes comes from Amory and
Hunter Lovins's book: Brittle Power (Andover, MA: Brick
House Publishing Company, 1982)
39. Douglas R. Hofstadter Godel, Escher, Bach; an
^^^^"^1 Golde" B^^aid, (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).
40. The discussion of Keyensian economics and
externalities comes from Michael Best and William
Connolly's book: The Politicized Economy. (Lexington, MA:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1976).
41. Charles Schultze's book is. The Public Use of the
P^^ivQte Interest (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1977) .
42. William Connolly's critique of Schultze is in his
book: Appearance and Reality
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981)
.
Michel Foucault, Madness &^ Civilization
:
A History of
Insanity in the Age of Reason, (New York: Vintage Books,
1973)
Chapter XII
The Architecture of Insecurity
44. Most of these argurments are interpretations of
Amory and Hunter Lovins's arguments in Br i ttle Power
,
(Andover, MA: Brick House Publishing, 1982).
Chapter XIII
The Architecture of Doom
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45. Once again, an interpretation of Amory and Hunter
Lovins's book: Brittle Power
.
Once again, William Connolly, Appearance and Reality
.
Chapter XIV
The Monster
47. Mary Shelly, Frankenstein
, (New York: New American
Library
, 1983) .
48. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin
and Foundations of Inequality," The First and Second
Discourses
,
Ed. Roger Masters (New York: St Martin's Press,
1964)
.
49. Jean Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract,
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1978).
50. I first learned of the idea that Sade and Rousseau
are doubles from William Connolly's lectures. He has
developed his ideas in a forthcoming book.
51. The Marquis deSade, "Philosophy in the Bedroom,"
in The Marquis deSade
,
(New York: Grove Press Inc., 1978).
I do not want to give the impression in this chapter
that Rousseau is a secularist and that Sade shows him what
his secularism comes to. As Connolly has reminded me, God
is very important to Rousseau, the ultimate defence against
the monster Sade. If there is no God, then there is no
design, purpose, or end to anything and everything is
permitted, even the most horrible abominations. Rousseau
understands Sade very well because Sade is the abyss that
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he would fall into if it weren't for God. Connolly argues,
and I agree, that Rousseau finds the voice of God in
nature, that he follows the Enlightenment in the thought
that God can no longer be known in scripture, through
miracles, or in the authority of the church. He is
revealed in nature because nature is a coherence of forces,
each linked to another, efficiently transmitting his will
as the first mover throughout the whole extent of the
universe. Because nothing material can of itself move but
only transmit the motion it recieves from another body, the
chain of cause and effect throughout the universe must
eventually lead back to a non-material will that wills
everything and first sets it into motion—God. That
everything in the universe fits together so nicely, so
perfectly reflecting a rational design, is a testament to
the intelligence of the being that set everything into
motion. As a coherence of cause and effect, nature is
thus, the proof and reflection of a rational will, a
meaningful design, and a supernatural purpose.
However, I want to add, nature itself for Rousseau is
nothing holy, only the material manifestation and proof of
a non-material will. God's design and will can be
discerned in nature, known through it, but nature, being
material and linked together by a chain of cause and
effect, is something different than God. Rousseau, I
believe, follows the Enlightenment and the history of
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Christianity in general by removing God from nature to a
beyond, a supernatural realm where the divine will designs
nature according to its intelligence and sets it into
motion according to its will. Even though Rousseau can
hear the voice of God through nature, he has radically
purged God from it by making God something wholly other
than it, a non-material will that expresses its design
through the linkage of cause and effect. Thus, even though
God is the ultimate source of Rousseau's order, the ways of
nature that reveal God's will are, of themselves, nothing
holy. In this, Rousseau has the same relationship to
nature that Sade does. It is just without the design and
meaning of a supernatural will. This is why Rousseau and
the Enlightenment are so haunted by Sade. Since the
Enlightenment continues what Christianity began and removes
God from nature to a supernatural beyond, far from the
earth in a will that wills everything at the beginning of
time, it is but a short step to declaring that there is no
God, and thus, that nature has no plan, meaning, or
purpose. Sade de-secrates nature, but only because nature
has already been desecrated by the retreat of God into the
supernatural.
And yet Rousseau finds in nature the truth which is
the ground of the legitimate state. God does not reveal
his will in scripture, at least not unambiguously and with
out the corruption of man entered into it, but it can be
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discerned in nature, de-secrated though it is, because it
is the occurance of God's will. From the nature of man,
man can discern the will of God. And as a will that wills
its nature, man can discern in his willing God's will for
man. But, and this is crucial, we do not need to refer to
God, except implicitly, to establish the ground of the
legitimate state because eveything necessary for that is
contained in man's nature and his will. Rousseau never
refers to the supernatural as the ground of the legitimate
state in his Social Contract, only to the natural. And so,
although God is crucial to Roussseau's metaphysic, he has
removed himself from man's natural existence. With
Rousseau and the Enlightenment in general, man is liberated
from any need to refer to the supernatural as he goes about
his natural affairs. And so, even those who profess strong
belief in God, become political secularists. This is what
is meant by the phrase the flight of the gods.
Chapter XV
The Turning
52. This chapter is an interpretation of Heidegger's
essay: "The Turning," in The Question Concerning
Technology
,
(New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977).
Toward the end of his book: "Hegel, Heidegger, and the
Ground of History," Michael Gillespie thinks that there is
cause for concern in the Thinker's turn toward Being
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because, according to him, "We must first prepare ourselves
for the experience of Being by purging ourselves of all
past metaphysical standards and valuations, of all
categories of logic, of all distinctions of natural kinds,
of all our conceptions of justice and right, of freedom and
necessity, of causality, indeed of every idea, structure,
and institution with which we are familiar." Gillespie's
fear as we follow the Thinker in acknowledging the nihilism
that is the truth of our world, as we follow Being into the
abyss and wait for whatever revelation emerges there and
resolutely follow it where ever it may lead, is that we may
become monsters, raging agents of destruction and evil. He
says: "Having abandoned the categorical reason of
metaphysics for something approaching pure intuitionism and
the orderly world of everyday experience for the terrors of
the abyss, man is thus is liable to fall prey to the most
subterranean forces in his soul or at least is in danger of
mistaking the subrational for the superrational.
"
This, Gillespie thinks, is why the Thinker was seduced
by National Socialism for a brief while. Since the Thinker
surrenders all responsibility for his thought to Being,
since there is no ground for distinguishing between good
and evil in it because there is no possibility of
separating the two because they are linked together as
doubles of the the same truth, any thinker, Gillespie
fears, can practice evil with impunity. As the Thinker
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himself said, "He who thinks greatly, errs greatly."
Because it goes into the abyss, Gillespie argues that
the Thinker's thought, despite itself, might be subjective
(he actually uses that word)
, which is to say whimsical
caprice. In thinking there are no clear reules that allow
a thinker to differentiate an authentic revelation of Being
from mere caprice, the claims of true prophets from the
demagogic claims of false prophets.
I think that in this critique Gillespie betrays a
lingering participation in an old fear, a fear of reason's
other. In this fear Gillespie refuses to let go of the
world reason has built, to free himself from the prison of
subjectivity, or release himself from the security of
objectivity. Gillispie wants the certainty of rules, the
security of unambiguous, uncomplicated, and above all, safe
knowledge. He wants control over what people are permitted
to think. The terrors of the abyss are indeed frightening,
but the horrors of the world that reason has built are
worse. It is a world rushing toward a nuclear holocaust,
ecological disaster, catastrophic systems failure, and
totalitarian disciplinary regimentation. In its
thoughtlessness it desecrates the earth, turns all humanity
into its slaves, and dooms all the earth to a pointless
death
.
Monsters may well come up out of the abyss, but they
can be monsters only because the world reason has built is
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monstrous. whims do not reach far, and cannot govern
unless a place is already prepared for them. Otherwise
they disappear from history, forgotten.
It is the reason, the subjectivity and objectivity
that Gillespie protects, that breeds monsters and prepares
a place for them. Having reduced all of humanity to its
utility, reason governs the world without allowing an aim
or purpose that does not refer back to its utility. It is
reason which destroys limits, ethics, morals, and
traditions by subjecting them to its utility. it is reason
which gives the monster the thought that frees him from any
restraint that would stop him from playing with humanity or
keep him from making them into objects of his raging
utility. Moreover, having asserted control over
everything, reason makes it possible for the monster to
destroy everything reason has built and made dependent on
itself through a disruption of its fragile and centrally
controlled linkages. And so we need not look at the ways
of thinking to find a dangerous thought. Despite its calm
arrogance, reason is already pregnant with its own
monsters.
This does not mean that thinking is not without its
dangers, especially not if it is done in the world reason
has built. Thinking is the highest form of action, and the
most dangerous. It is thinking which reveals the
monstr ousness of our ways, and calls on us to adopt others.
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Building and dwelling according the the new truths that it
knows makes inevitable the destruction of the old—and all
the traditions, institution, s systems, and procedures that
depended on them, where the old world revealed in America
the world's best possibilities for justice, freedom,
equality, and a better life, the new truths reveal in
America, injustice, slavery, sacrilege, and a ghastly doom.
The moment thinking reveals these new truths and begins
building and dwelling according to them, it suddenly
undermines the security of the old ones.
In the world that reason has built any truth thinking
reveals are especially dangerous, because the truths reason
has revealed have made so many things dependent on them,
linking people and every aspect of their lives to the vast
systems that reason has built. Even if thinking proceeds
in the most innocent ways—building houses that do not need
external heat, finding alternative energy sources, growing
food in gardens and greenhouses close to the household— it
endangers the economies reason has built with catastrophic
failure because everything was built according to the ready
availability of consumer demand. Perhaps if even a small
proportion of thinkers no longer support reason's economies
they will fail for everyone, dooming the whole world to
desperation, because they were not built to tolerate, to
them, unthinkable defections.
Perhaps any thinking in our age must implicate itself
370
in horrible crimes, accept them, and proceed despite them,
because it must build its place in a world that has no
place for it. Perhaps every thinker, no matter how gentle
and caring their ways, must become a monster, a protent of
evil, to those who live according to the truths of
Enchaining
.
53. Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting:
From Principles to Anarchy, (Bloomington : Indiana
University Press, 1987)
.
Chapter XVI
Bulding Dwelling Thinking
54. I got the idea of the Ark from "The Journal of the
New Alchemists," number 7 in particular, (Br at tlebor o
,
Vermont: The Stephen Greene Press, 1981). 55. This
chapter is an interpretation of the Thinker's essay:
"Building Dwelling Thinking," in Martin Heidegger : Basic
Wr i tings
,
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977)
.
56. Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods : An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Mar tin Heidegger
,
(The Hague: Nijhoff,
1961) .
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